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Upon its adoption in December 1936, Soviet leaders hailed the new so-called 
Stalin Constitution as the most democratic in the world. Scholars have long 
scoffed at this claim, noting that the mass repression of 1937–1938 that 
followed rendered it a hollow document. This study does not address these 
competing claims, but rather focuses on the six-month-long popular dis-
cussion of the draft Constitution, which preceded its formal adoption in 
December 1936. Drawing on rich archival sources, this book uses the dis-
cussion of the draft 1936 Constitution to examine discourse between the 
central state leadership and citizens about the new Soviet social contract, 
which delineated the roles the state and citizens should play in developing 
socialism. For the central leadership, mobilizing its citizenry in a variety of 
state-building campaigns was the main goal of the discussion of the draft 
Constitution. However, the goals of the central leadership at times stood in 
stark contrast with the people’s expressed interpretation of that social con-
tract. Citizens of the USSR focused on securing rights and privileges, often 
related to improving their daily lives, from the central government.
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We, the workers of the Regional Forest Administration, noted during the 
discussion of the draft Constitution that the very fact the draft Constitution 
was handed over for popular discussion is evidence of our union’s power-
fully developed might. The historically unprecedented fact that the people 
developed the Constitution for themselves speaks to the people’s energy and 
[to] our government’s strength and stability.1
from the Kirov Regional Forest 
Administration’s report on the discussion
Soviet leaders reached out to their citizens from what they believed to be a 
position of strength, seeking to harness popular enthusiasm and participa-
tion to further strengthen and stabilize the Soviet state. In 1935, in response 
to changing socioeconomic conditions in the USSR, the Party and state 
elite formed a Constitutional Drafting Commission to revise and then later 
rewrite the Constitution of the USSR. The committee worked on the new 
Constitution through June 12, 1936, when a finished draft was submitted 
to the public for discussion. The discussion of the draft Constitution took 
place over a period of six months, from June to December 1936. In this six-
month span, an estimated 42,372,990 people participated in meetings and 
discussions across the whole USSR,2 during which Soviet citizens made over 
43,000 suggested changes to the draft Constitution.3
While the six-month-long public discussion did not result in substantive 
changes to the draft Constitution, it did involve Soviet citizens in a public 
dialogue unlike any since the revolution. This book examines the discourse 
between the central state leadership and citizens about the new Soviet social 
contract, which delineated what roles the state and the citizens should play 
in developing socialism and what the responsibilities of each were. For the 
central leadership, mobilizing its citizenry in a variety of state-building 
campaigns was the main goal of the discussion of the draft Constitution. 
Central state actors tried to develop enduring institutional forms for ter-
ritorial administration, military-coercive power, revenue extraction, and 
other socioeconomic functions through such campaigns.4 However, the 
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goals of the central leadership at times stood in stark contrast with the peo-
ple’s expressed interpretation of that social contract. Citizens of the USSR 
focused on securing rights and privileges, often related to improving their 
daily lives, from the central government, but also made known their support 
of and opposition to aspects of the draft Constitution. 
Stalin’s Constitution shifts the focus from Moscow and explores broader 
issues of state building and state-citizen relations by recognizing the agency 
of local actors and decentralizing the historical narrative. The scope of the 
all-Union discussion, with over 40 million participants, makes it impossible 
to study it as a national campaign in any meaningful way. A focused case 
study enables an examination and contextualization of the often-conflicting 
agendas of the national government, local and regional officials, and of the 
populace. This book uses the Kirov region, which is located about 550 miles 
northeast of Moscow, to examine this campaign. Kirov is ideal for a regional 
study because the debate there was animated and wide-ranging, and the 
regional archives are exceptionally rich in materials. As the Kirov region was 
beyond the line of German occupation, the archives were never damaged or 
evacuated. Therefore, documents not found elsewhere, such as letters and 
district-level reports, exist in abundance in Kirov’s two main archives: the 
State Archive of the Kirov Region (GAKO), the main state archive for the 
region, and the State Archive of the Social and Political History of the Kirov 
Region (GASPI KO), the archive of the region’s Communist Party.5 
Utilizing these archival sources, this work provides ample evidence that 
Soviet citizens, particularly collective farm workers, engaged with the state 
and pressed for some resolution of their local and larger concerns and voiced 
their complaints about local governance. Regional studies such as this one 
demonstrate that the Soviet citizens were not without agency and, in fact, 
often shrewdly sought to manipulate state goals, rhetoric, and campaigns 
to their own ends. But as this book argues, the people did not always speak 
with one voice. Urban residents and rural residents, and at times differ-
ent generations, often had divergent views on various issues, as did local 
elites and the mass population. Such differences should not be surprising 
given that the individual experiences of the region’s population differed. 
This study sheds insight into the different perspectives expressed by the 
residents of the Kirov region and argues that where one worked, one’s life 
experience, and one’s personal values influenced citizens’ views on the draft 
Constitution. As such, it provides a counterpoint to the work of historians 
who have written about aspects of the discussion of the draft Constitution 
and the implementation of Stalinist campaigns and policies in general, but 
have done so on a national scale and from the perspective of the central 
leadership in Moscow. 
The literature on the popular discussion of the 1936 Constitution is 
sparse. Some historians, such as Robert Tucker and Sarah Davies, write 
about the Constitution in passing and focus on the failure of the state to 
honor the promises made in the Constitution. Davies in particular focuses 
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on the dissonance created when Soviet citizens compared the promises made 
in the Constitution with the realities of their lives.6 Others, such as Ellen 
Wimberg, focus on how Soviet leaders used the Constitution to promote 
their own agenda, investigating the formulation of the draft Constitution 
and the discussion of that draft in the Soviet press as a way to examine 
tensions between various Party leaders at the time, particularly focusing 
on Bukharin.7 J. Arch Getty, G. I. Tret’iakov, and Andrei Sokolov provide 
good overviews on the development of the drafting commission and the 
discussion on a national scale, including the most popular additions, correc-
tions, and suggestions, and how these suggestions influenced the final draft 
of the Constitution.8 Both Getty and Sokolov note that many Soviet citizens 
took advantage of this open forum to agitate for personal and local issues. 
This study makes the same point. However, because these published studies’ 
examination of suggestions relies on Central Executive Committee archival 
materials, their evidence is akin to snapshots from throughout the USSR 
and is difficult to interpret except in broad terms. Getty himself admits that, 
“without detailed studies of the Soviet countryside in the 1930’s, it is dif-
ficult to interpret such data.”9 This is where a case study like this one pro-
vides the much-needed context by framing the discussion within the setting 
of Stalinist state-building projects and the patterns and concerns of everyday 
life in the regions.10
New regional studies, which allow historians to view how campaigns were 
implemented on the ground and how local and personal factors affected this 
implementation, have served to drastically change the way Stalinism and its 
state-building projects are viewed in Western historiography. Older genera-
tions of Western historians often had access only to central publications 
or, beginning in the early 1990s, to central archival documents and tended 
to portray Stalinism as a totalitarian and command-style society in which 
any opening up of society was merely a ploy to mask the Soviet leader-
ship’s (or Stalin’s) true intentions. For example, Robert Tucker argues that 
Stalin’s main expedient for camouflaging the terror operation in the late 
1930s was his rewriting of the Constitution.11 Tucker reduces the discus-
sion of the Constitution to a propaganda exercise aggrandizing Stalin, who 
“was a master of deceit who was making use of the public discussion of the 
‘most democratic’ Constitution as a smokescreen for moves to transform 
the Soviet regime into something approximating a fascist one.”12 
Stalin’s Constitution joins a growing list of works which demonstrate 
that the structure of the state and Party did not guarantee the fulfillment of 
directives as formulated. In fact, seemingly more often than not, Moscow 
was frustrated by the less than satisfactory fulfillment of central policies. 
During the discussion of the draft Constitution, various Central Committee 
members were frustrated by the improper implementation of the discussion 
and the casual attitude of many local officials towards having meaningful 
discussions and recording popular suggestions, as well as the local and per-
sonal nature of many suggestions. After the Constitution had been ratified, 
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many Soviet leaders were concerned about former class enemies’ misuse of 
new constitutional rights. This constant friction between the goals of the 
central leadership and the goals of Soviet citizens is reflective of their dif-
fering interpretations of the rights and duties of the state and citizens in a 
socialist society. 
The sense of the population as embattled by the state pervades many of 
the historical studies of the USSR in the 1930s. Lewis Siegelbaum and Andrei 
Sokolov use the diverse collection of documents presented in Stalinism as a 
Way of Life to demonstrate how the challenges of building socialism con-
fronted people, often in life-threatening ways, in their daily life. They focus 
on how citizens negotiated the disruptions that collectivization and rapid 
industrialization created, but Siegelbaum and Sokolov demonstrate how 
citizens learned to “speak Bolshevik” and advocate for their own interests 
within the framework of rhetoric created by the state.13 In reference to the 
draft Constitution, they note, 
Seizing the opportunity presented by the Constitution’s incorporation 
of a language of rights, letter writers and participants in formal discus-
sions projected their own ideas, hopes, and resentments onto the docu-
ment. Their comments and suggestions thus provide an unusual, though 
not entirely transparent, glimpse into popular mentalities.14 
Siegelbaum and Sokolov are among the first historians to recognize the 
bilateral nature of the discussion and central state officials’ deep interest 
in what the people were saying, as well as the plethora of opinions that lay 
beneath a thin veneer of all-out support for the Party’s ideas.15 
As the centerpiece of Stalin’s state-building policies, the drafting, dis-
cussion, ratification, and implementation of the 1936 Constitution weaves 
together many threads: the political course the central leadership wished to 
set for the country, its ability to mobilize the population, and the ability of 
the people to engage the state using its own language and to agitate for their 
own interests and desires. Such negotiations were taking place in the many 
places where official state policy and citizens’ lives intersected. Siegelbaum 
notes in his study of Stakhanovism that the state was not able to imple-
ment Stakhanovism by fiat, but rather the state and its citizens engaged in a 
sort of dialogue interpreting how Stakhanovism would be enacted through 
interpenetration of state and personal interests and mutual interdepend-
ence.16 Stephen Kotkin similarly notes in his groundbreaking micro-history 
of Magnitogorsk: “it is possible to see—without denying the heavy coercive 
force of the Communist project—a two-way struggle, however unequal the 
terms, over the drawing of lines of authority.”17 In these participatory and 
collaborative aspects, the designing, drafting, and discussion of the 1936 
Constitution mirrors the development of other experimental social endeav-
ors, such as Stakhanovism and the construction of Magnitogorsk. Not only 
are they contemporaneous state-building projects, but also they were all 
intended to completely reshape the foundations of society. 
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For many historians, there seems to be a contradiction between the fact 
that the USSR in the 1930s was a one-party dictatorship, aspiring towards 
strong central control, and the popular participation of the citizenry in actu-
ally shaping the parameters of the state. This work argues that there was 
no contradiction. While the Bolsheviks and the Soviet state had no desire 
to yield power, both also viewed popular participation in state-sanctioned 
campaigns as essential. And in fact, the Party sought to mobilize citizens for 
such campaigns, whether they were in service of collectivization (e.g., the 
25,000ers)18 or greater worker productivity (e.g., Stakhanovism). As these 
campaigns demonstrate, the Party and state did not disdain popular partici-
pation. On the contrary, they embraced it, albeit within prescribed limits. 
Popular participation was a way for the Party and state to communicate 
certain goals and values to the population, as well as a way for the popula-
tion to help the central state to identify problems with the implementation 
of these campaigns and local governance. While central authorities deliber-
ately structured such participation, participants often used the opportunity 
for involvement to convey their own concerns and demands.
As historians begin to examine these campaigns in depth, they have found 
much negotiating and maneuvering on the part of the cadres charged with 
implementing state initiatives and the citizens charged with their fulfillment. 
Siegelbaum notes that the Stakhanovite initiatives of the central leadership 
were often dramatically transformed as they were interpreted and imple-
mented at the regional and local level. He observes that as initiatives came 
down from above, they were transformed such that the campaign came to 
be something less and also something more than was originally foreseen or 
officially sanctioned. It was not that the central state and Party initiatives 
stopped at the factory gates, but that what went on beyond them had a 
profound effect on the formulation and modification of those initiatives, as 
the management and workers tried to maneuver, accommodate, participate 
enthusiastically, or resist orders that made their lives more difficult.19 
Such negotiations are also seen in the other major mass social and eco-
nomic campaign of the 1930s: collectivization. In his pioneering study on 
collectivization in Siberia, James Hughes argues that the Soviet leader-
ship employed mass mobilization and materialistic incentives to fracture 
the peasants as a class and prevent resistance to the regime. Hughes con-
cludes that the “Ural-Siberian method” of collectivization was more suc-
cessful in part because it relied on the mobilization and organization of 
poor peasant support.20 The Ural-Siberian strategy focused on organizing 
small groups of poor and middle peasants to act as caucuses to wrest the 
village assembly from the control of kulaks (prosperous peasants) and then 
use the legitimacy of said assembly as the governing peasant institution to 
vote approval for Party policies. Hughes notes that participation in both 
collectivization and these peasant caucuses was secured by providing selec-
tive material incentives, including excludable benefits (from grain bounties, 
to free goods from cooperative stores, and to a share of looted kulak prop-
erty) for poor peasants who supported the state.21 According to Hughes, 
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“the implementation of the social influence (Ural-Siberian) method also had 
entrenched the ‘state building’ organizational foundations, bureaucratic 
structures and institutional procedures which gave the Party powerful levers 
to control the countryside.”22
The idea of an active citizenry that embraced various aspects of these 
participatory state-building campaigns is a relatively new idea in Soviet his-
toriography, but it should not be a surprise. In recent years, many good 
regional studies like Hughes’ have allowed historians to investigate the 
implementation of campaigns at a local level and the negotiations that took 
place between local and regional state and Party officials and the masses. 
Charles Hier argues in his study of collectivization campaigns in Sechevka 
raion, Western Oblast’ that local Party and state officials were often lax 
in implementing collectivization because they were the ones with the most 
personal property to lose. He documents how local poor peasants worked 
with regional officials to collectivize the land because of the benefits the 
state offered to collective farms, such as tractors and high-quality seed. 
Hier found that many peasants not only embraced collectivization in this 
region, but also had to actively struggle against local Party and state officials 
to implement central directives.23 In his study of the Kirov region, Aaron 
Retish likewise notes that peasants embraced and utilized state programs 
to strengthen their socioeconomic position and to improve their daily lives. 
He notes that Viatka/Kirov24 had a strong tradition of local self-government 
and advocacy, as peasants were well-represented in the pre-revolutionary 
zemstvos. During the Civil War, when committees of the poor and other 
collective organizations were formed, the peasants of the Kirov region 
embraced them as a way to improve landholdings and gain access to agricul-
tural supplies. While these committees failed quickly in other regions, Retish 
notes that they endured in the Kirov region and formed the basis for some of 
the first collective farms here.25 The citizens of the Kirov region continually 
showed great skill in adapting state campaign forms and language to suit 
their needs. In his study of regional bureaucracy in Kirov in the 1930s, Larry 
Holmes notes that the regional and local educational bureaucracy adopted 
the rhetoric of failure and escalating negativity to account for the material 
and professional failures that plagued the region’s schools. Doing so, he 
argues, helps to explain their use of the language of victimhood to petition 
for rights and privileges. These administrators were not just passively trying 
to weather the wrath of the state, but rather used the state’s own rhetoric 
and institutions to settle personal scores and to agitate for personal rights 
and privileges.26
This study uses the discussion of the draft Constitution as a spring-
board to explore how the state sought to advance its state-building goals 
by redefining social relations through the use of a social contract, the new 
Constitution. The state crafted this social contract to help create a stable 
legal base for society and to promote participation at local and regional lev-
els, as well as a way to make Party and state officials accountable. Like other 
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Stalinist campaigns, the discussion of the draft Constitution was often rein-
terpreted during implementation, making it a forum for negotiating how the 
state would look at the local level. However, unlike Stakhanovism and other 
economic campaigns, the discussion of the draft Constitution was designed 
to solicit citizens’ opinions. While the regime’s leaders had no doubt antici-
pated outspoken support for their vision of socialism, this was not always 
the case, as the participants used the discussion and the state’s language to 
bring local and personal issues to the forefront, and in the process, create a 
decidedly different interpretation of what the Soviet Union should be. The 
drafting and discussion of the Constitution provides a unique opportunity 
to study these negotiations, as the state specifically solicited and meticu-
lously recorded citizen answers and opinions about how the actual legal and 
theoretical foundations of the state should be formed. 
Chapter 1 demonstrates how the draft Constitution highlights the state’s 
attempt to create a new social contract with its citizens and what it expected 
from them in return. This chapter sets the context for the public discussion, 
providing an overview of select constitutional thought and theory, which 
played a role in the drafting of the 1936 Constitution. To this end, this 
chapter concentrates on the development and evolution of specific articles, 
which focus on the redefinition of citizens, and citizenship rights, includ-
ing the re-enfranchisement of former priests and kulaks. It illustrates those 
aspects of the Constitution, such as increased material benefits, that the 
central leadership sought to highlight, and how it hoped that the discussion 
of the draft Constitution would be instrumental in generating enthusiasm 
for state-building projects. 
The second chapter emphasizes the complex realities that shaped daily 
life and concerns in the primarily rural region by focusing on the demo-
graphic, social, and economic situation in post-revolutionary Kirov. Due to 
the underdeveloped and principally agrarian nature of the region, many of 
these concerns focused on land, foodstuffs, and material goods needed to 
survive. Local power struggles, often over access to these daily necessities, 
were a part of everyday life. These realities significantly shaped the percep-
tions of its citizens and the complaints and suggestions that they made dur-
ing the discussion. This chapter makes clear that the citizens of the Kirov 
region were politically savvy, petitioning for personal interests through the 
existing channels, such as the local press and local organizations, and using 
the political language of state campaigns to give these local problems more 
political significance. This chapter reveals a populace capable of using the 
discussion of the draft Constitution to agitate for their own interests, and as 
such, it offers a contrast to the view that Soviet peasants in the 1930s were 
sullen but apolitical.
Chapter 3 focuses on the implementation of the popular discussion in the 
Kirov region. This chapter addresses many of the tensions within the Soviet 
system as revealed by the debate. The central Party and state leadership had 
a specific vision of how the campaign should unfold. It wanted to enhance 
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the process of state building (i.e., the development of enduring institutional 
forms of administration, military power, and revenue extraction). The new 
Constitution represented that effort and the Stalinist vision of the state. But 
unlike past state-building efforts, the Soviet leadership urged citizens to 
appreciate and discuss the new citizenship rights that the central state lead-
ership had written into the Constitution. This focus was evident in lesson 
plans created for local Party organizations, which dictated the topics to be 
covered during the deliberation of the draft. However, the implementation 
of the discussion was left primarily to local district officials, who tried to 
balance the debate with the demands of their day-to-day tasks. As a result, 
many of the local organizers treated the discussion like just another cam-
paign, simply reading the draft Constitution aloud instead of encouraging 
deliberation. Such treatment drew the ire of the central leadership and then, 
in turn, of regional officials, who blamed local organizers for a number of 
“inappropriate suggestions” to the draft. These inappropriate suggestions 
are revealing, as they focused on individual needs rather than state-building 
goals. Among them were suggestions to grant collective farmers the same 
rights as workers and urbanites, and to create peasant unions. This chapter 
argues that such suggestions were not the result of poor preparatory work, 
although that was a significant problem, but were a reflection of popular, 
especially peasant, concerns and demands. 
The fourth chapter analyzes the coverage of the popular discussion 
in Kirovskaia Pravda, the regional newspaper, and several local district 
newspapers. These newspapers often relied on letters and materials from 
privileged groups, such as Party members, Stakhanovites, collective farm 
chair-people, and urban workers, whose ebullient accounts served to vali-
date claims of socialist victory. These materials make clear the stark divide 
between this small, yet active, relatively educated and privileged population, 
which had been successfully integrated into the Soviet society, and the peas-
ants who comprised the vast majority of the region’s population. This chap-
ter demonstrates that the better-educated and more politically integrated 
urban dwellers were much more likely to embrace the central government’s 
state-building narrative than were their rural counterparts. Those urban 
dwellers who wrote letters to newspapers focused on how they were work-
ing to create a strong socialist state; many often pledged to work harder in 
gratitude for their new rights and privileges. Peasants focused much more 
on local political and economic issues; they had their own ideas about how 
state power should be used. This chapter makes clear that the well-publi-
cized state-building goals of Party and state leaders were internalized by 
only a small stratum of citizens, most of whom were members of the urban 
and working elite, and conveys rural dwellers’ hopes and complaints.
Chapter 5 examines the popular suggestions to the draft Constitution put 
forth by Kirov’s citizens. These suggestions provide insight into the issues 
that preoccupied Kirovites, as well as how they interpreted socialism based 
on their daily experiences and interactions with the Party and state. This 
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chapter focuses in particular on how the reframing of citizenship to include 
all inhabitants of the USSR, and the expansion of citizens’ rights and privi-
leges, became a touchstone for many of the debate’s participants. In Kirov, 
the participants in the discussion focused on including or excluding people 
from citizenship rights and/or corresponding benefits, while stressing issues 
that would create safe, stable, and materially secure lives for themselves. 
Many of the popular suggestions to the draft Constitution focused on vaca-
tions, material or monetary aid for collective farmers, land ownership, and 
access to educational resources. The participants used the rhetorical and 
political tools that the state had given them to agitate for their interests in 
order to change state policy. They often cited state policies or their contribu-
tions to state-building efforts, such as collectivization, to justify increased 
material benefits and political equality for themselves or their community. 
The evidence in this chapter makes clear that many discussants were politi-
cally active and engaged in a dialogue with the state so as to promote their 
interests, which were often drastically different than the needs and expecta-
tions that the state had been promoting through its managed discussion of 
the draft Constitution. 
Chapter 6 examines two major aspects of the new draft Constitution: 
the expansion of electoral and citizenship rights to all people in the USSR, 
including former kulaks and religious sect members who had been previ-
ously stripped of their rights and systematically discriminated against, and 
the establishment of habeas corpus protections for the accused. This chap-
ter focuses on how, at the local level, citizens accepted what they deemed 
useful aspects of these policies, while core aspects of these policies, which 
threatened local stability, were met with much resistance and hostility. 
Kirovites embraced Stalin’s mandate that democracy be a tool for making 
local officials accountable for their behavior and failures. They had many 
suggestions to increase their ability to hold local officeholders accountable 
and demonstrated their willingness to remove incompetent or corrupt offi-
cials during the 1936 local elections, which this chapter also discusses. But, 
Kirovites prized safety and stability, particularly in the countryside where 
the state was the weakest. As a result, they overwhelmingly rejected habeas 
corpus protections and the re-enfranchisement of those stripped of their 
rights, and proposed counter-suggestions that would make it easier for the 
police and citizens themselves to apprehend criminals. 
The final chapter discusses how the subsequent 1937 national elections, 
based on the new Constitution, contributed to the repression that began 
that year in Kirov and nationwide. Reports of anti-Soviet activities in the 
region and instances of formerly disenfranchised people (lishentsy, kulaks) 
nominating their own candidates for local offices were sent to Moscow. 
These reports amplified the anxieties that the central leadership had about 
the perceived increase in enemy activity throughout the country. The local 
NKVD Party cell minutes, from which many materials are drawn, demon-
strated this increased anxiety within the police and the community at large. 
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As 1937 progressed, participants at those meetings stopped referring to the 
infiltration of Soviet organs of power by class enemies as a possibility but 
rather as a reality that needed to be aggressively confronted. This chapter 
explores how such reports and pressure from the regions contributed to the 
onset of mass repression in 1937 and its evolution. As this study examines 
one region of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), the 
purpose of this chapter is not to make overstated claims about the mass 
repression, but to show ways in which local issues and state concerns over-
lapped. In this way, it contributes to the recent literature on the repression, 
while also raising questions about popular involvement. 
Stalin’s Constitution concludes that the opening up of the electoral fran-
chise combined with the open forum of the discussion encouraged many 
Soviet citizens to engage the state in a dialogue about their needs and 
responsibilities. The locally and personally oriented needs and suggestions 
of the citizenry were contrary to the suggestions that the state had expected. 
When citizens, particularly those from already suspect groups, began using 
their rights to agitate for these personal interests, it heightened central anxi-
eties to the point that it contributed to mass repression in 1937. This step 
back from the centralized focus of the other historical works on the consti-
tutional discussion sheds light on how citizens understood the roles they and 
the state should play in developing socialism and what the responsibilities 
of each were.
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Upon its adoption in December 1936, Soviet leaders hailed the new 
Constitution as the most democratic in the world. Western scholars and 
citizens have long scoffed at this claim, noting that the mass repression 
of 1937–1938 followed the adoption of the so-called Stalin Constitution. 
While the goal of this study is not to address these competing claims, the 
draft Constitution should be seen in the context of many leaders, includ-
ing Stalin, feeling that the revolution had brought about radical changes in 
Soviet society, which required the re-conceptualization of certain groups’ 
roles in Soviet society and the Constitution to be rewritten to reflect this new 
balance of power. Collectivization was a “fact,” rapid industrialization was 
a “fact,” and Soviet power was a “fact.”1 As a result of these achievements, 
the 1934 Party Congress was referred to as the “Congress of Victors,” and 
this victorious language is reflected in the press coverage surrounding the 
release of the draft Constitution two years later. 
There are no documents in the archival record to contradict the Soviet 
leadership’s public support for a more participatory Constitution or to 
indicate they viewed the Constitution and the subsequent discussion as 
mere propaganda, as some historians suggest.2 In fact, the archival records 
indicate that Stalin and other leaders were invested in the process, read-
ing Western constitutions, meticulously editing the draft, and demanding 
accountability from regional officials for the collection of all the popular 
suggestions, which was in step with the Soviet Union’s, and even Tsarist 
Russia’s, larger history of “listening to the people.”3
While the reforms introduced in the Constitution may have been largely 
honored in the breach, as the mass repression of 1937 undid many of the 
promised changes, no one in the second half of 1936 could have anticipated 
such developments. As addressed more completely in Chapter 7, unexpected 
developments, such as unanticipated popular responses to the draft and the 
active participation of kulaks and other class enemies in the subsequent 
elections, precipitated the return to a restricted franchise and repressive 
measures. Other factors that influenced the Soviet State’s return to repres-
sion include Stalin’s paranoid personality, his distrust of the state and party 
elite, an unresponsive and obstinate regional bureaucracy, fear of potential 
1 Citizenship and a social contract
The drafting of the 1936 Constitution
Drafting the 1936 Constitution 13
threats from certain groups at home and abroad, and past success using 
repression to manage state-building efforts.4 Repression was a knee-jerk 
reaction to what Stalin and other Soviet leaders came to view as a hostile 
environment. This means that their sincerity in 1936 should not be called 
into question by the events of 1937, and in fact, their disillusionment with 
the incompleteness of the socialist victory and the rise of new challengers 
may help to explain the severity of the subsequent repression. 
To grasp the reasons behind the Soviet leadership’s opening up of mass 
participation in 1936, and the subsequent reaction in 1937, requires a brief 
overview of Soviet legal and constitutional theory to understand how top 
leaders conceived of democracy, the role of a constitution, and what respon-
sibilities they envisioned for citizens. Soviet conceptualizations of democ-
racy, viewed from the perspective of those who formulated them, reveal 
that, within their own understanding of politics and constitutionality, their 
intentions were both legitimate and earnest. It also reveals how such inter-
pretations helped to frame, but not determine, the public discussion.
The party’s central leadership had a very particular understanding of 
democracy and legality, which allowed for and even encouraged citizen 
participation. While Western scholars may see a contradiction between 
the tightly controlled one-party state based on the principles of democratic 
centralism and popular participation, no such contradiction existed in the 
minds of Soviet leaders. They viewed popular participation as essential for 
the development of the social and economic systems in the USSR, an inter-
pretation that produced the participatory rhetoric preceding the discussion 
of the draft Constitution and provided the foundation for the central state 
leadership’s attempts to guide and manage the discussion. 
The principles of constitutional theory in the USSR
The new Constitution was the centerpiece of Stalinist legal reformation and 
state-building efforts. The Soviet state sought to increase social stability and 
political legitimacy in the wake of the vast political, social, and economic 
upheaval brought on by the Five-Year Plans. It did so through the redefinition 
of Soviet citizenship to include a much broader segment of the population, 
such as former kulaks and other former class enemies, who were disenfran-
chised in the two preceding constitutions, as well as expanding citizenship 
rights and access to state benefits.5 John Hazard argues that Soviet lead-
ers in the Stalinist period used judicial decisions and legislation to solidify 
their position in power and to lay the foundation for a new pattern of social 
organization, while at the same time to codify and solidify the changes that 
had already been made. In the field of criminal law, this meant attempting 
to make officials behave rationally, i.e., to serve socialist institutions rather 
than their own interests, and by repressing enemies.6 Other historians, such 
as Peter Solomon, develop this idea further. He argues that the late 1930s 
saw a return to traditional legal order, replacing Nikolai Krylenko’s ideas of 
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“revolutionary legality,” which relied on proletarian intuition, with profes-
sional cadres and systemized legal codices championed by Andrei Vyshinsky.7 
Solomon believes that the promulgation of the new Constitution in 1936 was 
symbolic of this shift, as the discussion of the draft Constitution provided a 
forum for the promotion of the status and authority of law.8 This study of the 
discussion of the draft Constitution supports Solomon’s assertion. However, 
Solomon views the 1936 Constitution as a farce, arguing that it never sought 
to promote popular participation but rather was designed to give the Soviet 
Union a veneer of respectability abroad and to enhance the authority and 
legitimacy of the Soviet government inside the country’s borders.9 In contrast 
to Solomon, Stephen Kotkin asserts that “not only could the USSR under 
Stalin plausibly claim that it had developed the programs and practices of 
state-guaranteed social welfare to a greater extent than had previously been 
the case anywhere, but it could do so in a way that contrasted with the fascist 
reaction: by embracing fully the illustrious European heritage known as the 
Enlightenment.”10 This work asserts that Soviet leaders viewed participatory 
politics as a tool for socialist construction rather than an end in itself, but in 
formulating and promoting the Stalinist Constitution, Party and state leaders 
paid homage to the European roots of democracy.
The Constitutional Drafting Commission consulted multiple “bour-
geois,” i.e., Western constitutions, and ensconced many of the ideals of 
universal suffrage, popular participation, and the responsiveness of the 
state to its constituency in the draft. Karl Radek was charged with gath-
ering the texts of foreign constitutions and appropriate laws and review-
ing them along with Nikolai Bukharin (the editor of Izvestiia from 1934) 
and Lev Mekhlis (the editor of Pravda in 1936).11 The collected materi-
als of the Constitutional Commission contain election laws from England, 
Belgium, Germany, Norway, Czechoslovakia, and Switzerland, copies of 
the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen” (1789), and 
various Western (bourgeois) constitutions.12 Although the archive does not 
contain notes on the discussion of these materials, when describing the pro-
posed electoral system in 1937, Kalinin noted that the new Soviet system 
would resemble the French electoral system.13 And Molotov stated, “all the 
best [parts] of the democratic systems of other states we brought in and 
added to our Constitution to apply to the conditions of the Soviet state.”14 
In order to appreciate what aspects of European constitutional theory 
the Soviet leadership incorporated into the 1936 Stalinist Constitution, it is 
imperative to understand what role Bolsheviks believed that a constitution 
should play in Soviet society. Party and state leaders viewed the Constitution 
as the codification of the achievements of socialism, rather than a document 
that identified aspirational goals or guiding principles. In his November 
1936 speech to the 8th Congress of Soviets, Stalin made it clear that the 
Constitution should not be confused with a program: 
a program talks about what does not yet exist and that which must be 
obtained and won in the future, the Constitution on the other hand, 
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must speak about what already exists, what has already been obtained 
and won now, in the present.15
Nikolai Krylenko,16 People’s Commissar of Justice (July 20, 1936–September 
15, 1937) and the Procurator General for the Russian Socialist Federated 
Soviet Republic (1929–1931), penned several works explaining why the new 
Constitution was drafted.17 Krylenko argued that the USSR had become a 
democracy of the majority and that the tightly regulated and limited dictatorship 
of the proletariat was no longer needed.18 For many Soviet leaders like Krylenko, 
the 1936 Constitution represented a shift in the balance of power. In 1918, 
Bolsheviks and the support base for a Soviet state were seen as a beleaguered 
minority, but by 1936 many of the perceived enemies had been dealt with, leav-
ing the Soviet leaders confident that they finally had majority support and could 
use this position of strength to further develop participatory politics in the USSR.
The Soviet leadership viewed popular participation as a powerful weapon 
against bureaucratism and corruption and were quick to solicit popular 
involvement to remedy these problems.19 To this end, Stalin advocated the 
expansion of the electoral franchise and multi-candidate elections, which 
were introduced in the draft 1936 Constitution and were to be applied 
to the elections to the Supreme Soviet in 1937. In his interview with Roy 
Howard on March 1, 1936, Stalin addressed the issue of open elections.20 
While he dismissed the idea of multi-Party elections, he strongly supported 
the idea of multi-candidate elections. Stalin noted that under the new draft 
Constitution, social organizations of all varieties, not just the Communist 
Party, would have the right to nominate candidates for election.21 These con-
tests, not between different parties but between different individuals, would 
allow the proletariat to effect change in the government and policy through 
mass participation.22 Stalin saw participation as an effective weapon against 
bureaucratic incompetence in the USSR:
I foresee very lively election campaigns. There are more than a few insti-
tutions in our country, which work badly. Cases occur when this or 
that local government body fails to satisfy certain of the multifarious 
and growing requirements of the toilers of town and country. Have you 
built a good school or not? Have you improved housing conditions? Are 
you a bureaucrat? Have you helped to make our labor more effective 
and our lives more cultured? Such will be the criteria by which millions 
of electors will measure the fitness of candidates, reject the unsuitable, 
expunge their names from candidates’ lists, and promote and nominate 
the best. Yes, election campaigns will be very lively; they will be con-
ducted around numerous, very acute problems, principally of a practi-
cal nature, of first class importance for the people. Our new electoral 
system will tighten up all institutions and organizations and compel 
them to improve their work. Universal, direct and secret suffrage in 
the U.S.S.R. will be a whip in the hands of the population against the 
organs of government, which work badly.23
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What multi-candidate elections meant was that elections might provide 
an opportunity for citizens to reject local or regional political figures who 
did not represent popular—and Soviet—interests. Stalin and the Bolshevik 
Party had no intention of altering or endangering their Party or the concept 
of democratic centralism on which it was based. What they did seek to 
achieve by revising the Constitution and holding multi-candidate elections 
was to enhance the functionality, legitimacy of, and popular support for 
that Party and to remove “bureaucrats,” in the pejorative sense of the word.
In the fall of 1936, in the face of numerous suggestions made during 
the popular discussion to re-impose limits on the voting franchise, Stalin 
defended his decision to grant universal suffrage and multi-candidate elec-
tions. In his speech to the 8th Congress of Soviets on the draft Constitution, 
Stalin stated that the Soviet state had deprived “dangerous elements” of 
voting rights during a time when they were waging open war against the 
people and undermining Soviet laws. Now that the exploiting class had 
been destroyed and Soviet power had been strengthened, it was time to 
introduce universal suffrage. He countered the argument that universal 
suffrage would allow enemy elements to worm their way into organs of 
power24 by replying that not all former kulaks and white-guardists were 
harmful to Soviet power, and if the people somewhere elect dangerous peo-
ple, it would mean that agitational and propagandistic work was not car-
ried out well.25 
Molotov, too, focused on the idea of reasserting control over the regional 
and local organs of power by means of participatory elections. He noted that 
the new electoral system would secure the complete development of democ-
racy and would help to improve the state apparatus through the expansion 
and renewal of leading soviet cadres and the elevation of working people to 
the Party organization.26 In addition to supplying new cadres with strong 
ties to the working people, “the new elections will shake up the weak and 
strike out at bureaucratism.”27 Democracy was a tool to turn against incom-
petent and unresponsive regional and local bureaucratic organizations that 
had consistently frustrated central authorities.28 
J. Arch Getty argues that Soviet leaders remained staunch supporters of 
multi-candidate elections through much of 1937, despite increasing resist-
ance from regional and local Party leaders. He argues that the central leader-
ship propagated a long campaign for multi-candidate elections and pushed 
regional leaders to make the appropriate preparations until October 1937, 
when, facing increased resistance and outright disobedience from regional 
Party apparatus, the Central Committee and Stalin abandoned the plans 
for multi-candidate elections.29 Though Soviet leaders primarily supported 
democratization as a tool for combating bureaucratism in the Party and 
state apparatus, they may also have genuinely embraced the fundamental 
notions of participation and, if Getty is correct, remained committed to the 
idea of multi-candidate elections until it became politically untenable.
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Drafting the Constitution
Although in popular parlance the 1936 Constitution is often referred to as 
Stalin’s Constitution, Stalin’s role in this study is episodic. He played a crucial 
role in articulating the official rationale for a new constitution, in convening 
the Drafting Commission, of which he was Chairman, and in editing the draft 
Constitution. His suggestions were usually, but not always, decisive. But as this 
study focuses on the popular discussion of the Constitution, Stalin’s appear-
ances are confined to these roles and few others. One of his more important 
roles was as an advocate for expanding those groups that qualified for enfran-
chisement, as mentioned above. He played an important role in bookending 
the discussion, first by contributing to the formulation of the draft and then 
by examining the outcome of the popular discussion and giving his support 
for the ratification of the little-changed draft Constitution in December 1936.
While Stalin played a leading role in formulating the Constitution, it was 
Molotov who announced the need to revise the 1924 Constitution at the 
7th Congress of Soviets in February 1935, after which the Central Executive 
Committee proceeded to elect a 31 member Constitutional Commission. 
Despite being appointed in February, the commission’s first meeting did not 
occur until July 7, 1935. Stalin chaired the initial session, which appointed 
12 subcommissions to address the various facets of the Constitution.30 Stalin 
was Chairperson of the Commission, while Molotov and Kalinin served as 
vice chairpersons. Each of the subcommissions was chaired by a prominent 
political figure, all of whom were high-ranking Party members and many of 
whom had held state posts.31 
Table 1.1 Composition of committee subcommissions32
Name of subcommission Chair of subcommission Number of commission members




Electoral system Radek† 12
Judicial organs Vyshinsky 9
Central/local organs of 
power
Akulov† 10
People’s education Zhdanov 9
Labor Kaganovich 13
Defense Voroshilov 11
International affairs Litvinov 6
Editing Stalin and all subcommittee 
chairmen33
11
†Four of the chairmen did not survive the mass repression: Chubar’ (d. 1939), Bukharin (d. 
1938), Radek (d. 1939), and Akulov (d. 1937).
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During this initial session, the chairmen of the subcommittees were 
instructed to nominate their subcommittee members and to prepare drafts 
of their section of the Constitution in two months. The two-month dead-
line was not met, and the drafting work of the subcommissions continued 
into 1936. What had begun as changes to an existing constitution became 
a lengthy process, involving at least five drafts. Each subcommission pro-
duced its own partial draft, which the editorial subcommittee of Iakov 
Arkaidiovich Iakovlev,34 Aleksei Ivanovich Stetskii,35 and Boris Markovich 
Tal’36 wove together into a complete document by February 1936; a second 
version of this draft was formulated in April 1936.37 On April 17,1936, 
Stetskii, Iakovlev, and Tal’ submitted a draft constitution to Stalin for his 
consideration. Stalin himself met with the editorial subcommission in his 
office on April 17, 18, 19, and 22, 1936, and personally revised the draft 
Constitution multiple times. On April 18, 19, and 22, the three drew up sub-
sequent drafts, with most of Stalin’s suggestions adopted wholesale. From 
there, the draft was presented to the whole Constitutional Commission, 
where even more changes were made, before being published for national 
discussion on June 12, 1936. 
As this discussion of the Constitutional Commission’s work suggests, 
the writing of the draft Constitution was a collective affair involving sub-
commissions, the editorial subcommittee, Stalin, and finally, the whole 
Commission. As the following discussion will make clear, the original 
draft itself underwent various revisions, some at the suggestion of commis-
sion members, some by the editing subcommission, and some by Stalin. 
Many earlier sources, such as Stephen Cohen’s Bukharin and the Bolshevik 
Revolution: a political biography 1888–1938, credit Bukharin with writing 
the 1936 constitutional draft. 38 The source for this claim comes from Boris 
Nikolaevsky’s “Power and the Soviet elite: the letter of an old Bolshevik 
and other essays.”39 However, upon examining the documents in the opis 
of the Constitutional Commission in the State Archive of the Russian 
Federation,40 the original complete draft appears to have been written by 
Iakovlev, Stetskii, and Tal’ and heavily revised by Stalin himself. Bukharin’s 
contributions were therefore probably limited to a draft of the section on 
rights, as he chaired that committee. Getty also concludes that Bukharin 
likely played a much less important role than previously ascribed to him, 
and that Stalin “clearly played a major role in the process and devoted con-
siderable time to it.”41 The available archival materials do not allow one 
to identify who, other than Stalin, proposed what aspects of the draft and 
why. But that should not sidetrack readers from a crucial aspect of the draft 
Constitution—it was the result of a collective effort by leading Party mem-
bers and state officials who shared a common vision of the role and purpose 
of a constitution. 
Examining the drafting process allows us to see a variety of opinions about 
the role of the state and offers a glimpse into the negotiations behind the 
formation of a central narrative about the role of the people in governance 
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and the shaping of an ascribed citizen identity. Overall, the  original draft 
 produced by Tal’, Iakovlev, and Stetskii focused on the creation of an encom-
passing program of sociocultural development, designed to create a modern 
Soviet citizen. As longstanding Bolsheviks, Iakovlev, Stetskii, and Tal’ were 
committed to remaking society by changing social relations, gender roles, 
and obliterating bourgeois patterns of life. However, despite his radical eco-
nomic policies of the 1930s, Stalin was a social conservative. He removed 
many aspects of the more radical social changes from the draft Constitution, 
ensuring the continuation of more traditional social roles and state-building 
efforts. Rather than examine the entire draft Constitution, this section will 
focus on the evolution of articles in the sections on social construction of 
the USSR, the Courts and Procuracy, elections and voting rights, and the 
rights and duties of citizens—each of which received considerable attention 
in the public discussion—in order to understand the master narrative that 
the Soviet leadership sought to project about its relationship to the people 
and the role of participation of the people in governance.42 Interested read-
ers will find a copy of the Draft Constitution in the Appendix.
Defining citizenship
Citizenship rights define who has the right to participate in governance and 
who does not. In the first two Soviet constitutions, full citizenship rights 
were purposefully limited to workers, peasants, and certain other laboring 
people. Many members of the former exploiting classes were disenfranchised 
and excluded from governance and, in some cases, from state programs 
like education. With the announcement of the victory of socialism and the 
destruction of exploiting classes, who was entitled to full citizenship rights 
in the USSR had to be redefined. By examining the changes in the various 
drafts, we can appreciate the process of constructing citizenship identities 
in the USSR. We can also analyze the internal Party and state dialogue as 
various leaders proposed differing definitions of citizenship and citizenship 
rights in the drafts of the Constitution, where class, race and nationality, 
gender, and participation in electoral franchise helped to define citizenship. 
Because of the Marxist nature of the Soviet state, class was the defining 
factor in classifying citizenship. The first section of the draft Constitution 
demarcated the class make-up of the USSR and clarified in which classes 
sovereignty was vested. The first article of Stetskii, Tal’, and Iakovlev’s orig-
inal draft defined the USSR as a socialist government of free laborers (трудя
щихся) of the city and country, and stated that all power in the USSR rests 
with the laborers in the persons of the Soviets of Laborers’ Deputies.43 Stalin 
heavily revised this article, changing it to “the USSR is a socialist state of 
workers (рабочих) and peasants (крестьян)”44 and took the second half of 
the original Article 1 and made it a separate article. Stalin’s description of 
the organs of power in the USSR became Article 2: “The political basis of 
the USSR is composed of the Soviets of Workers’ and Peasants’ Deputies/
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Soviets of Laborers’ Deputies,45 which developed and became stronger as a 
result of the overthrow of power of the landlords and capitalists.”46 Stalin 
emphasized the existence of two official classes, workers and peasants, by 
changing the name of the Soviets in the original draft. He also added a 
completely new Article 3 to Stetskii, Tal’, and Iakovlev’s April 17th draft, 
recommending: “All power in the USSR resides in the laborers of the city 
and countryside in the persons of the Soviet of Laborers’ Deputies.” 
These first three articles acknowledged the concept of popular sover-
eignty in that all power was vested in and arose from the people, while 
also noting the role that the victory over the exploiting classes had in shap-
ing the state’s broadening conception of its constituency. However, Stalin’s 
decision to define the USSR as a state of “Workers and Peasants” rather 
than “laborers” would have real far-reaching consequences for the people 
of the USSR. While the Russian word “laborers” (трудящихся) refers to all 
laboring people without differentiation, the use of the words “workers and 
peasants” implies a strong separation of the two. The rhetorical separa-
tion of workers and peasants in the draft Constitution both created and 
implied real inequality between the two groups and perhaps acknowledged 
the incompleteness of the transformation in the countryside. In his speech 
at the 7th Congress of Soviets in 1935, Molotov stated: “Soviet Democracy 
provides for the participation of the peasantry, with guidance, in the task 
of administering the new government.”47 Molotov essentially implied that 
the peasantry was still not developed enough to be trusted and still needed 
“guidance” from the more socially conscious working class. Subsequent 
amendments made to the section on citizens’ rights and duties demonstrated 
that Stalin did not regard peasants as full citizens with all the rights and 
privileges of the working class.48 This was to be of profound importance, 
given that other articles specified workers received more benefits from the 
state than the peasants. This unequal distribution of rights, despite guaran-
tees of equality, would be strongly contested during the public discussion 
of the draft. 
In contrast with Stalin’s definition of a “classless” society composed of 
two classes with different rights, Stetskii, Tal’, and Iakovlev had proposed a 
different, more egalitarian, interpretation of class in the USSR. Article 10 of 
their April 17 draft stated: 
In the USSR the division between classes has been annihilated. In the 
USSR there is no exploitation of people by other people, no parasitical 
classes living off the work of the workers and peasants. Soviet society 
is comprised of free toilers of the city and countryside—the workers, 
peasants and intelligentsia. All of them are builders of socialism with 
equal rights.49 
This conceptualization of classlessness in the USSR would have made the 
collective farmers equal to workers, because it denied that any important 
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differences between them existed. However, Stalin struck this article from 
the draft completely on April 17 in favor of his concept of a strictly divided 
working class and peasantry. In his speech on the Constitution at the 8th 
Congress of Soviets in November 1936, Stalin defended his word choice, 
stating that it is well known that the Soviet Union has two classes, workers 
and peasants, and that only this phraseology represents the “true” social 
makeup of the USSR.50 
While class remained the most important factor for determining Soviet 
citizenship, the Commission’s members recognized that race, national-
ity, and gender limited franchise in most democracies. They responded by 
promising equal rights for all races (расы) and nationalities, and both sexes. 
Gender and racial equality were incorporated in the first two Soviet con-
stitutions as part of Lenin’s strategy to minimize their importance relative 
to class. The Soviet leadership’s stance on racial equality had not changed 
much by 1936. Iakovlev, Tal’, and Stetskii’s draft article on race stated that 
all citizens of the USSR have equal rights, regardless of nationality or race. 
It guaranteed aid to help disadvantaged national minorities and guaran-
teed their rights as national minorities.51 Other than some minor changes in 
wording, this article was not changed. 
Women’s rights had long been a key issue for socialists. The first Soviet 
Constitution, written in 1918, granted women equality and the right to 
vote. However, the Bolsheviks were not satisfied with merely declaring 
women equal. They also sought to give them the tools to realize that equal-
ity and to liberate them from domestic burdens so that they could enter 
the workforce. Therefore, Stetskii, Iakovlev, and Tal’ proposed an article 
on women’s rights that featured a list of state programs designed to help 
women realize their equality. The article granted
every woman equal rights with men to work, equal pay for work equiv-
alent to its quality and quantity, equal opportunities for elementary, 
middle and higher education, in the law about marriage stipulating 
the safeguarding of the interests of mother and child, granting preg-
nant women leave with pay, organizing public catering, kindergartens 
and nurseries, concern about construction of the family on the basis of 
equality between men and women.52 
Stalin made only minor changes to this article on April 19, but on the 22nd 
he presented a version that removed some of the specific privileges and 
protections that Stetskii, Tal’, and Iakovlev’s version provided to women. 
Stalin’s new version did not include equal pay for equal work, or the pro-
motion of equal gender roles within the family.53 The full session of the 
Constitutional Commission further altered this article, adding that women 
were equal in state life, as well as economic, cultural, and sociopolitical life. 
It reinstated the stipulation about equal pay and replaced the state guar-
antee of social dining with a promise of an expanded network of birthing 
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houses, which was more in line with the state’s new emphasis on the role of 
women as mothers.54 
The final aspect of citizenship in the USSR was connected with who was 
able to vote and be elected by the Soviets. In contrast with the earlier 1918 
and 1924 Constitutions, there were no class restrictions on voting in the new 
draft Constitution because the Soviet leadership felt confident that former 
class enemies had been successfully integrated or otherwise neutralized and 
the punitive restrictions could be lifted. Tal’, Stetskii, and Iakovlev’s draft 
section on election law consisted of two articles. One stated that “Elections 
to all Soviets of laborers are Universal: every citizen, who in the election 
year has reached 18 years of age has the right to participate in elections 
and be elected, with the exception of under-aged people and those stripped 
by the courts of voting rights.”55 The other article guaranteed equal voting 
rights to women and racial minorities.56 The wording of this article changed 
very little, though Stalin broke down the second article about protection for 
women and minorities further, creating two separate articles, one dealing 
with minority rights and one dealing with women’s rights. 
Central authorities and media outlets emphasized the expansiveness of 
citizenship in the USSR. However, the rhetorical changes that Stalin made 
effectively limited the rights of collective farmers and removed some of the 
earlier guarantees of material aid to women. Citizens addressed both of 
these shortcomings during the public discussion. And while the expansion 
of the franchise was heralded as a step towards greater participation by the 
center, many people challenged it.
The rights of citizens
In assigning the rights and duties of citizens, there appears to have been 
a great deal of discussion amongst the four men who produced the text 
of the draft Constitution. When focusing on citizens’ rights, Stetskii, Tal’, 
and Iakovlev typically presented detailed plans for a symbiotic relationship 
between the state and citizens that guaranteed a wide array of rights and 
services that would further enhance socialist state-building efforts. Stalin’s 
edits often simplified or even removed whole articles that Stetskii, Tal’, and 
Iakovlev had proposed, though on some occasions the deleted sections were 
later reinserted into the text by the whole Commission. These rights were 
so carefully crafted because they were not simply propaganda but real pro-
grams the state sought to implement for its citizens. For the most part, these 
goals were met, with the state providing social, educational, and medical 
benefits to its citizens, reacting harshly to the suppression of criticism by 
local leaders and protecting personal property in the face of earlier, overly 
enthusiastic collectivization efforts. Some of Stetskii, Tal’, and Iakovlev’s 
articles were probably more suited for legislative initiative, and indeed some 
of the content that Stalin removed from the draft reappeared in later legisla-
tion. Since no explanation for the changes was given, one can only speculate 
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as to why changes were made. However, viewed together the changes made 
to the articles of the draft Constitution tell the story of the creation of a 
central narrative about citizens’ rights, the popular participation in govern-
ment, the privileges granted by the state, and the duties that citizens had to 
fulfill in return for these privileges.
Participation in governance is one of the fundamental factors in citizen-
ship and a basic right of citizens. In this vein, the proposed second article 
from Tal’, Iakovlev, and Stetskii’s draft section on citizens’ rights sought to 
create a participatory society to help the masses bring the state apparatus 
back under control. It reads: 
Citizens of the USSR have equal rights to participate in the adminis-
tration of the state. The USSR guarantees this right, engaging laborers 
though the soviets, in the administration of the state, organizing on 
the basis of collective farm charters, the participation of all collective 
farmers in the administration of large scale social production, engaging 
laborers from state factories, collective farms and other enterprises to 
actively participate in the administration of the economy, promoting 
their unification and organization, supporting professional unions, the 
Komsomol57 and other social organizations in their work to unify the 
laborers and struggle with the bureaucratic perversion of soviet and 
economic organs.58 
This proposed article provided for the direct, albeit rather structured par-
ticipation of citizens in administering aspects of the state. It also supported 
the initiative to rid the Soviet state apparatus of “bureaucratic perversion.” 
This draft article makes clear the nature and limits of the commission’s view 
of a participatory society. The article extended the opportunities for par-
ticipation beyond the Communist Party and the Komsomol to trade unions 
and a host of other social organizations, which while limited to fighting 
bureaucratism, may have provided latitude for effecting real change on the 
state apparatus.59 
Stalin removed this article from the draft Constitution on April 19. 
However, on April 22 he added a different article allowing for the partici-
pation of approved organizations in the process of governance. Stalin’s pro-
posed article was, in turn, revised by the full Constitutional Commission. 
Stalin’s version read: 
In accordance with the interests of the laborers in developing spontane-
ous organizations and the political activities of the masses, the right to 
unite in voluntary organizations and societies is provided to the citizens 
of the USSR: professional unions, cooperative associations, unions of 
youth, sporting and defense organizations, cultural, technical and sci-
entific societies. The most active and conscious people from amongst 
the workers and general laborers will unite in the Communist Party, 
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becoming the first detachment of laborers in the fight for the victory 
of communism and the leading force of all laborers, organizations in 
the USSR.60
The Constitutional Commission edited the last section of Stalin’s proposed 
article so that the Party would strive for the “strengthening and develop-
ment of socialist construction and is presented as the leading nucleus (ядро) 
of all organizations of laborers, society and the state.”61 Additionally, 
another article allowed for civic organizations to nominate candidates in 
elections, providing some chances for the contested elections that Stalin had 
envisioned.62 
Stalin’s version of participatory rights was more limited in scope than 
was that of Stetskii, Tal’, and Iakovlev. Robert Tucker notes that, in keeping 
with practices established in the 1918 RSFSR Constitution, these changes 
effectively brought all state and civil organizations under Party oversight, 
as it gave them the right to control institutions’ administration and lim-
ited the choice of candidates whom they could nominate in the upcoming 
elections.63 As a result, the focus of the subsequent propaganda campaign 
during the discussion of the draft Constitution was on increasing citizen 
participation in established organizations, often with the expressed purpose 
of combatting bureaucratism.
Another aspect from the 1918 and the 1924 Constitutions that was car-
ried over into the draft 1936 Constitution was the provision of the material 
conditions for the realizations of citizens’ rights. Like the right to participate 
in governance, however, these rights were often tailored to protect those 
who conformed to the state’s goals. For example, the USSR had a curious 
relationship with the freedom of speech, press, and assembly. On one hand, 
the state encouraged citizens to engage in criticism of the state and Party 
apparatus as a control mechanism to bring the often-contentious regional 
and local organs to heel.64 On the other hand, the formation of contending 
parties or even factions within the Communist Party was forbidden and had 
dire consequences. Stetskii, Iakovlev, and Tal’s draft recognized this appar-
ent contradiction, couching these freedoms of expression in the context of 
promoting the final victory of socialism, stating, “Citizens of the USSR are 
provided (with the aim of the struggle for the final victory of socialism) the 
freedom of expressing their opinion, the freedom of the press, free meetings, 
demonstrations and organization.”65 They also incorporated the means to 
realize these rights 
by granting [to the people] all that is applicable for accommodating 
people’s meetings, all typographic establishments at the disposal of the 
laborers and their social organizations, paper for the printing of news-
papers, books, etc., and other industrial press, establishing their free 
distribution to the whole country, [as well as] organizing the construc-
tion of new societal buildings.66 
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Soviet leaders viewed this promised accessibility as an important distinction 
between socialist and bourgeois constitutions.
Because of the nature of the Soviet state’s relationship with these rights, 
this article underwent multiple and complex editing sessions. On April 19, 
Stalin separated Tal’, Iakovlev, and Stetskii’s article on the right to free 
speech, press, and association into several articles, while simultaneously 
merging the freedom of expression with Stetskii, Tal’, and Iakovlev’s article 
on citizens’ rights to criticism and self-criticism. The initial article presented 
the right to criticize as invaluable in the “fight with the bureaucratic per-
versions in the state apparatus and in the elimination of hindrances (преп
ятствий) in socialist construction.”67 Stetskii, Tal’, and Iakovlev valued the 
freedom to criticize officials to such an extent that they included measures 
to prevent local officials from stifling criticism, “guaranteeing this right by 
sternly punishing and looking into the faces of all the guilty, in defense of 
anybody persecuted for criticism and self-criticism.”68 Stetskii, Iakovlev, and 
Tal’ also included a separate clause allowing citizens to hold such officials 
accountable by giving citizens “the right to demand any official figure be 
prosecuted for breaking this law.”69 Stalin’s version shared characteristics 
of the parent articles, combining provisions for the realization of the right 
of free speech (meeting places, etc.) with the right to freely criticize the state 
and officials.70 He also drafted articles providing for the freedom of assem-
bly and the freedom of organization.71 The right to criticize local officials fit 
neatly with Stalin’s and the Soviet leadership’s goal of turning participatory 
policies into a weapon against elements within the bureaucracy. However, 
Stalin may have considered such specific goals inappropriate for a constitu-
tion. On April 22, he again condensed these articles into one article, with 
the caveat that these rights (free speech, free press, freedom to have meet-
ings, and freedom to demonstrate) were guaranteed “in accordance with 
the interests of the laborers and the goal of strengthening socialist construc-
tion.”72 This final draft did not contain any specific mention of the right to 
criticize state officials, but it may have been implied as part of strengthening 
socialist construction. It also limited the use of the rights of free speech, 
press, and assembly to only those activities deemed to be in the interests 
of the masses or the state, effectively curtailing other forms of opposition. 
While such a caveat had existed from the first draft of this article, where 
these rights were enumerated in the context of struggling for the final vic-
tory of socialism, Stalin’s language made it clearer that opposition to state 
goals was not acceptable, even if opposition to local leaders and bureaucrats 
was encouraged.
Supplementing citizens’ rights to free speech was an article on citizens’ 
rights to engage in propagandistic activities. Iakovlev, Tal’, and Stetskii’s 
original article stated: 
A citizen of the USSR is granted the freedom of propaganda of a mate-
rialistic worldview. To citizens, not having freed themselves from 
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religious prejudice, the USSR gives the freedom of departure from their 
religious cults, but the teaching of any religious studies in schools is not 
permitted.73 
Stalin reworked this article to focus more on a separation of church and 
state and the suppression of religion: 
With the goal of ensuring real freedom of conscience for the laborers, 
the church is separated from the state and the schools from the church. 
Freedom of materialistic worldview propaganda and departure from 
religious cults is recognized for all laborers.74 
On April 22, Stalin removed the words “materialistic worldview propa-
ganda” and later the full Constitutional Commission added the freedom to 
engage in anti-religious propaganda.75 Like the right to free speech, the right 
to engage in propaganda could only be used in the interests of the state, i.e., 
for anti-religious purposes, even though during the discussion many people 
interpreted this as a right to also engage in religious agitation, much to the 
state’s chagrin.
In addition to providing more traditional rights for their citizens, mem-
bers of the Soviet leadership set about providing guarantees of government 
sponsored social services, such as education, paid vacations, and financial 
and material aid. Tal’, Iakovlev, and Stetskii’s draft provided an extensive 
program of education for every citizen of the USSR. They introduced uni-
versal mandatory elementary education and made schooling prior to the 
university-level free, created seven-year instruction in the native languages 
of the peoples of the USSR, as well as “organizing productive-technical and 
agricultural instruction and political enlightenment for adults and youth 
in factories, state farms, machine tractor stations and on collective farms” 
designed to promote the “systematic raising of the level of workers in engi-
neering-technical and agricultural work.”76 To ensure that education was 
accessible for all citizens, Stetskii, Tal’, and Iakovlev’s draft provided for 
the financial support of high school students (обучающихся) at the state’s 
expense. But their draft went above and beyond the confines of traditional 
education. They mandated “bringing books, newspapers, film, theater, 
sports, schools for adults serving in the Red Army, political and general cul-
tural instruction facilitating the self-cultivation of laborers in all spheres in 
their own creative work, within the reach of the masses of laborers.”77 This 
focus on creating both an educated populace and cultured modern Soviet 
citizens had long roots in Bolshevik policy and thought.78 For example, the 
Proletkult movement, which pushed for the creation of a genuine proletar-
ian culture, dated back to 1917. During the Civil War period, Proletkult had 
flourishing theater workshops, studios, literary circles, and adult education 
classes under its administration.79 Although the Proletkult movement faded 
during the New Economic Policy (NEP), the Bolsheviks never abandoned 
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the idea of cultivating proletarian consciousness. Continuing such efforts, 
Stetskii, Tal’, and Iakovlev’s draft provided a comprehensive program of 
not just education but of “enlightenment.” 
In his April 19 edit, Stalin removed the focus on enlightenment from this 
article. His new version read: 
Citizens of the USSR have the equal right to education. This right is 
guaranteed by the existence of universal compulsory elementary educa-
tion, free education up to higher educational institutions, and state aid 
for instruction in schools in native languages. This right is also secured 
by the organization in factories, state farms, machine tractor stations 
and on collective farms of industrial-technical and agricultural instruc-
tion for adults and youth, and the systematic raising of workers and 
collective farmers to the level of workers of engineering-technical and 
agricultural work.80
Then on April 22, Stalin decided to make the technical instruction in facto-
ries and farms explicitly free, conceivably to encourage the rapid develop-
ment of skilled workers in these important economic sectors.81 At the June 
meeting of the entire Constitutional Commission, a clause providing “sys-
tematic state stipends to an overwhelming majority of students in higher 
schools” was added.82 While this amendment provided additional state sup-
port for education, it failed to live up to the all-encompassing program of 
“enlightenment” that Stetskii, Tal’, and Iakovlev had initially envisioned. 
The focus on enlightenment dominated another of the draft articles in 
Tal’, Iakovlev, and Stetskii’s version of the Constitution. Article 6 focused 
on developing Soviet youth, stating:
Youth in the USSR have the right to material security and cultural devel-
opment. The USSR guarantees the realization of this right for all young 
men and women of the USSR, limiting the work day to four hours for 
teenagers under 16, with pay as if for a full work day, combining the 
work of teenagers with their instruction in schools for factory appren-
ticeship, protecting the health of teenagers and organizing treatment for 
the ill in rest houses and sanatoria, abolishing the exploitation of chil-
dren and teenagers as landless laborers, establishing ample opportunity 
for independent work for peasant youth, and raising their qualifications 
with exposure to city culture.83 
In his comments on April 19, Stalin left most of this article intact, changing 
only the section that applied to rural youth. Rather than being preoccupied 
with their cultural level, Stalin changed the article to read that peasant youth 
now “have the ability to become qualified, cultured operators of large-scale 
agricultural machinery.”84 This entire article was removed from the April 
22 draft, but portions of it reemerged later as part of the Labor Code. 
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Despite not being part of the final draft of the Constitution, this article dem-
onstrated that some Soviet leaders were not just creating a legal code but 
trying to create a new, modern, and educated citizenry.
Tal, Iakovlev, and Stetskii’s Article 7 in the citizens’ rights section also 
emphasized, albeit implicitly, raising the cultural level of citizens by allocat-
ing leisure time. 
Citizens of the USSR have the right to rest, to comprehensive physical and 
cultural development. The USSR guarantees every citizen the use of this 
right, shortening the working day, establishing yearly vacations for labor-
ers (трудящимся), providing free medical aid for laborers, rendering state 
aid for the construction of sanatoriia, rest houses, and sports stadiums.85 
Stalin revised this article to the point that its meaning changed dramatically. 
His version from April 19 read: “Citizens of the USSR have the right to rest. 
This right is guaranteed by the shortening of the working day, the estab-
lishment of yearly vacations for workers and service workers [emphasis 
added] with retention of pay, and the construction of sanatoriia, rest houses 
and clubs.”86 While Stalin again diminished the focus on an encompassing 
program of cultural and physical development, the most important change 
Stalin made was to change the word “laborers” (трудящимся) to workers 
and service workers, which thereby effectively excluded collective farmers 
from yearly vacations. On April 22, after further deliberation with Stetskii, 
Tal’, and Iakovlev, Stalin made still more changes to this article by adding 
the qualification: “the right to rest is secured by the shortening of the work-
ing day for the majority of workers [emphasis added] to 7 hours.”87 These 
changes further disenfranchised the collective farmers by only limiting the 
working day for workers, though peasants still theoretically had access to 
rest houses. However, the funding and construction of these sanatoria, rest 
houses, and clubs was no longer guaranteed. This version only promised 
that these institutions be open for use, not that the state should fund or 
build more. This discrimination against the collective farmers did not go 
unnoticed during the discussion of the draft Constitution and raised serious 
questions about the equality of Soviet citizens.
While Stalin seemed to have the final say on most of the changes to the 
first draft of the Constitution, the editorial process surrounding the article 
on state social security benefits seems to have relied more on compromise 
between Iakovlev, Tal’, and Stetskii on one hand, and Stalin on the other. 
Like the right to rest, the original version was egalitarian, stating: 
Citizens of the USSR have the right to security in old age, and also to 
material aid from the state in cases of the loss of health or working abil-
ity. This right is guaranteed by the USSR through the organization of 
state benefits and social security at the state’s expense and on the basis 
of the model of the agricultural artely charter.88 
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On April 19, Stalin removed the phrase “at the state’s expense” (на счет г
осударства) from the clause about social security and added that laborers 
can have access to resorts and sanatoria.89 However, on April 22, he rein-
serted the phrase “at the state’s expense” and specified that citizens have 
the right to material aid.90 Collective farmers were not specifically excluded. 
However, as discussed below, citizens noted that the draft Constitution only 
provided for parts of the population to realize these rights and the expan-
sion of access to governmental services would make up the bulk of citizens’ 
comments. 
Property rights were another gray area for the Soviet state. On one hand, 
the leadership hailed the collectivization of agriculture and state ownership 
of industry as markers of socialist victory, and they denounced bourgeois 
constitutions that were too focused on property rights for the elite. On the 
other hand, they sought to provide for the continuation of individual small-
holdings and craftsmen and to protect personal property from state sei-
zures. Originally, Tal’, Iakovlev, and Stetskii’s article on property rights was 
rather general, stating: 
Citizens of the USSR have the right to personal property. The USSR 
secures this right, safeguarding by law personal property of laborers of 
the city and countryside. No one has the right in the USSR to encroach 
upon the personal property of citizens, unless stated otherwise, like the 
decision of the courts and in cases especially provided for by the law.91 
Stalin’s changes to this article on April 19 were minor. But on April 22, 
he removed this article from the section on citizens’ rights and duties 
entirely, and he added an article on personal property to the first part of 
the Constitution on the construction of the state. That article states: “The 
personal property of citizens, in their earned income or savings, in the 
objects of household economy and utensils, together with the objects of 
personal consumption and comforts, are safeguarded by law.”92 The full 
Constitutional Commission added the protection of the home to the list of 
protected personal property.93 The revisions made to this article indicated 
that property was not thought of so much as a citizen’s right, but rather its 
safeguarding was a legal function of the state.
In addition to property laws protecting the personal effects of all citi-
zens, the first draft of the Constitution had a specific article designed to 
define collective property and collective duties to the state. The article began 
by defining collective farms as “enterprises founded by collective farmers, 
voluntarily collectivizing their means of production and conducting their 
economic activity on land belonging to the state, and which conduct eco-
nomic activity in accordance with their charter on the basis of a plan and 
under the leadership of Soviet state organs.”94 Stetskii, Iakovlev, and Tal’ 
succinctly defined collective farms, but also implied that they have a sym-
biotic relationship with the state, noting that “collective farms bear state 
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obligations, established by law.”95 But Stetstkii, Tal’, and Iakovlev did not 
conceive of this as a unilateral relationship. According to their draft arti-
cle, the state also bore certain responsibilities to the collective farmers. The 
Soviet state,“through our machine tractor stations, [is responsible for pro-
viding] tractors, combines, and other modern agricultural machines to col-
lective farmers for working the land and harvesting.”96 
In addition to promising collective farmers access to modern agricultural 
equipment, this article also sought to codify the difference between collec-
tive farm property and the collective farmers’ personal property, noting that, 
together with the social property of the collective farm, every collective 
farm household has for personal use a garden plot, the dimensions of 
which are specified in the charter of the agricultural artel’, a milk pro-
ducing cow, and petty agricultural stock.97 
This article guaranteed the right to a household economy for collective 
farmers, though the subordination of personal property to collective prop-
erty was in line with laws protecting state property. As Iakovlev, Stetskii, 
and Tal’ drafted this article, it implied mutual responsibility for the success 
of Soviet agriculture as well as the creation of a private economic sphere 
within what was an otherwise very collectivized economy. 
In his April 18 revision of this article, Stalin removed the description of 
collective farms and their cooperative relationship with the state. Instead 
he chose to specify what constitutes collective farm property: “Social enter-
prises on collective farm and cooperative organizations, with their living 
and inanimate stock, used in collective farm and cooperative organization 
production, equally with their communal buildings, are property of the col-
lective farms and cooperative organizations.”98 Four days later, he revised 
the section on collective farmers’ personal property, changing the article 
so that every household could have “a small [emphasis added] garden plot 
and personal property for subsidiary economic activity on the garden plot, 
a milk cow, fowl and petty agricultural stock as specified in agreement 
with the charter of the artel’.”99 The Constitutional Commission added the 
guarantee of a house to the list of collective farmers’ property.100 Stalin’s 
changes removed the mutual responsibility of the state and collective farm-
ers for agricultural production and made it clear, through the specificity of 
protected property, that any activity taking place on the collective farmers’ 
garden plots was to be secondary to the work on the collective farm. His 
revisions thereby served to strengthen the principle of the supremacy of col-
lective property in the USSR.
However, not all citizens’ protections had such limitations. In the mid-
thirties, Andrey Vyshinsky and Stalin both promoted a return to codified 
legal statutes and legal order in the face of the chaos caused by collectivi-
zation, rapid industrialization, and other official campaigns. This shift in 
Soviet legal thought was codified in habeas corpus-style protections in the 
Drafting the 1936 Constitution 31
draft Constitution. The original version of habeas corpus that was included 
in Iakovlev, Tal’, and Stetskii’s draft established basic protections: 
Citizens of the USSR are equal before the law. No one may be freed 
from prosecution, who is liable by law. No one may be subject to arrest, 
except by decision of the court or with the sanctions of the procurator.101 
On April 19, Stalin rewrote the article to include citizens’ rights to hold pub-
lic figures accountable. His article stated: “Citizens of the USSR are equal 
before the law. Citizens of the USSR have the right to demand any public 
official be prosecuted for breaking the law. No one may be placed under 
arrest without a court order or sanction of the procurator. No one may be 
freed from prosecution, who is liable by law.”102 This once again illustrates 
Stalin’s distrust of bureaucrats and desire to use popular participation as a 
weapon against corruption. However, Stalin further revised the article on 
April 22, removing the section about public officials. The new article was 
streamlined: “Citizens of the USSR are guaranteed the inviolability of their 
person. No one may be placed under arrest without a court order or with 
the sanction of the procurator.”103 
The inviolability of the person was complemented by the inviolability of 
the home which appeared in Tal’, Iakovlev, and Stetskii’s original draft104 
and to which Stalin later added a guarantee of privacy in written commu-
nication.105 While these new habeas corpus laws sought to protect citizens 
from the extra-legal arrests of the early thirties, citizens widely and almost 
unanimously rejected them, because people viewed them as a hindrance to 
restoring order in the countryside. The reasons for this seemingly puzzling 
stance are examined in Chapter 5.
The duties of citizens
The leadership of the USSR sought to guarantee social services to Soviet citi-
zens that were designed to enrich their lives and create better citizens, and 
to protect citizens from state encroachment into certain spheres of their life. 
However, this was a reciprocal relationship. If the state had obligations to 
its citizens, then citizens had obligations to the state as well. Tal’, Iakovlev, 
and Stetskii’s draft contained several articles enumerating the duties of citi-
zens, including defending socialist property and the Constitution, raising 
children properly, and defending the USSR. Most of these articles under-
went only minimal edits, as they reflect the state’s need to defend itself from 
various enemies and to strengthen socialism. 
As the fundamental law of the USSR, the Constitution played an impor-
tant role in state building. Therefore, citizens were responsible for safeguard-
ing its main tenets. Tal’, Iakovlev, and Stetskii drafted an article requiring 
[e]very citizen of the USSR [to] observe the Constitution of the USSR, 
executing its fundamental law and, also, decisions and instructions, 
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guard daily the iron discipline of labor, be honestly concerned with 
labor and social duty, [and] respect the maxims of socialist society.106 
Stalin made only minor changes to this article, removing the words “exe-
cuting its fundamental law” and the word “iron,”107 indicating consensus 
in the Soviet leadership that citizens must obey the laws of the USSR, in 
particular labor discipline, which helped to promote the construction of a 
socialist society. 
As part of their efforts to strengthen socialist values of the USSR, 
Iakovlev, Tal’, and Stetskii suggested that citizens had the responsibility 
of rearing their children in a socialist manner, stating: “Every citizen of 
the USSR must raise their children to be physically healthy and cultur-
ally committed to their motherland, and to hate the laborers’ enemies.”108 
While this suggestion may appear comical out of context, it demonstrated 
the commitment to an overall program of sociocultural development that 
Iakovlev, Tal’, and Stetskii promoted in their original draft Constitution. 
Stalin removed this article from the Constitution on April 22, demonstrat-
ing his commitment to either a less radical socialist redevelopment of life 
or his realization that such issues were more effectively dealt with through 
legislation. 
Tal, Iakovlev, and Stetskii also proposed more conventional ways to 
make citizens commit to the state and safeguard socialist gains. Their draft 
contained an article on the defense of socialist property, which stated: 
Every citizen of the USSR must defend, take care of and increase social 
property, the sacred Constitution and the inviolable base of Soviet con-
struction as the source of wealth and power of the motherland, as the 
source of a prosperous and cultural life for all laborers. People encroach-
ing on socialist property are considered enemies of the people.109 
Stalin removed the word “defend” from this article, but made no other changes 
to it.110 The Constitutional Commission removed the part about taking care of 
the Constitution, focusing this article solely on social property.111 The empha-
sis on the sacredness of socialist property reinforced a commitment to the 
socialist economic structure and to punishing those who would violate it. 
Military service was the ultimate defense of the Soviet state from enemies, 
and the language of the draft articles on military service reflected that fact. 
Tal’, Iakovlev, and Stetskii’s draft stated:
[T]he defense of the motherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of 
the USSR. Military service is the honorable right and duty of every citi-
zen of the USSR. The betrayal of the motherland, that is for citizens to 
commit acts to the detriment of the military might of the USSR, its state 
independence or the inviolability of its territory, is to be punished with 
all harshness of the law, as the most terrible, abominable crime.”112 
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Stalin made some changes to this article, changing the word motherland to 
fatherland, adding that breaking the military oath or going over to the side 
of the enemy and spying were considered treasonous acts, and removing the 
parts about territorial sovereignty.113 But he left the essence of the article, the 
“sacred duty” to defend the USSR, intact. In addition, he created a whole 
new article to address the role of a citizen army. Initially it read, “military 
service is the honorable right and duty of every citizen in the USSR. The 
Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army is built on the principle of universal mili-
tary duty.”114 Later the language was revised so the article read, “Universal 
military service is a duty (повинность) required by law, and military service 
in the Worker and Peasants’ Red Army is presented as an honorable duty 
of the citizens of the USSR.”115 This focus on military service reflected both 
the revolutionary concept of citizen soldiers that goes back to the French 
Revolution and the increased military preparedness in the USSR in the face 
of the rise of fascism in Europe and uncertainty in the Far East. Service in 
the military as part of a citizen’s duties to the state was a topic of great 
debate during the discussion of the draft Constitution. Part of the debate 
focused on whether women, as equal citizens, should have to serve in the 
army. Others focused on the idea of military service as an obligation (повин
ность) rather than an honor.
The drafting of the new Constitution highlights the state’s attempt to cre-
ate a new social contract with its citizens and what it expected from them 
in return. This framework set the context for the public discussion, which 
focused on the redefinition of citizens, and citizenship rights, including the 
re-enfranchisement of former priests and kulaks (prosperous peasants). It 
further illustrates those aspects of the Constitution, such as increased mate-
rial benefits, that the central leadership sought to highlight, and how it 
hoped that the discussion of the draft Constitution would be instrumental 
in generating enthusiasm for state-building projects.
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Context is imperative for understanding and interpreting the popular sug-
gestions to the draft Constitution. The social and economic realities of the 
Kirov region in the 1930s shaped how people thought about the issues 
raised by the draft Constitution and the types of suggestions that they for-
mulated. The Kirov region, formerly called Viatka, was in a period of great 
transition in the 1930s from a region of independent peasants to an increas-
ingly urbanized and industrialized region with collectivized agriculture. 
Renaming many of the streets (particularly those with religious names or 
tsarist names) in the provincial capital for revolutionary heroes and organi-
zations1 beginning in 1918, as well as renaming the region and the capital 
city in honor of Sergei Mironovich Kirov (the Leningrad Party boss who had 
been born in the city of Urzhum) following his murder in 1934, illustrates 
one of the many forms this transition took from tsarist and backwards to 
Soviet and socialist. However, in the mid-1930s, this transition was by no 
means complete. Many traditional aspects of rural life as well as the tradi-
tions of independence and local self-governance that made the Viatka region 
unique endured even as the social and economic upheavals of the 1930s 
drastically changed people’s way of life. This makes the Viatka/Kirov region 
a unique and compelling case study. This overview of life in Kirov in the 
1930s makes no pretense to be complete. Rather, its purpose is to provide 
some context for understanding the chaotic and sometimes painful transi-
tion of Viatka into Kirov and the impact it had on the daily lives and experi-
ences of those who participated in the constitutional discussion.
The Kirov region is located about 550 miles northeast of Moscow. The 
Viatka province was amalgamated into Nizhny Novgorodskii Krai (region) 
in 1930. In 1934, following the murder of Leningrad Party leader Sergei 
Kirov, a series of administrative reforms split the Viatka region away from 
the Gorky (Nizhny Novgorod) region and the newly formed region was 
named for the fallen Bolshevik. The region was predominantly ethnically 
Russian, with Tatar, Udmurt, and Mari ethnic minorities. In 1934, Kirov 
Krai occupied a territory of 144,000 square kilometers with a population of 
more than 3.3 million people.2 
2 Daily life in Kirov in the 1930s
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The climate of the Viatka/Kirov region had an important influence on 
its industrial and political development. Because of its northern climate, 
the Viatka/Kirov region is agriculturally marginal. The soil in the north of 
the region is clay and sand, while further to the south it draws closer to the 
more fertile black earth regions. The climate is harsh, with frosts sometimes 
occurring as late as July in the region’s northernmost reaches. The primary 
agricultural products in the southern part of the Viatka region were grain 
and animal husbandry. Flax production predominated in the north, where 
the growing season is too short for reliable crop production. This made 
life on collective farms unstable and left peasants vulnerable to hunger and 
privation. Dairy farming became a far more stable alternative to crop farm-
ing. Even today, the Kirov region remains famous for the quality of its dairy 
products. However, the poor agricultural land in the Viatka region proved 
to be positive for the political and civic lives of Viatka’s peasants. The 
marginality of Viatka’s agricultural land meant that the region’s peasants 
experienced an unusual amount of independence during the Tsarist period. 
Viatka had very little serfdom, enjoying the highest rates of privately owned 
land in pre-emancipation European Russia.3 Following emancipation, the 
zemstvo movement was very strong in the Viatka region. Peasants held a 
majority of seats in Viatka’s zemstvos and devoted much effort to public 
services such as education, which the peasants deemed necessary to conduct 
business in a wider world.4
The poor climate also drove increased urbanization and the longstand-
ing tradition of migratory labor in the Viatka/Kirov region. In the 1890s, 
over 90 percent of Viatka’s peasant households relied on handicraft produc-
tion or migrant labor to supplement their agricultural income.5 Peasants 
in the pre-revolutionary period provided the workforce in armament and 
metal-working factories in Izhevsk, Glazov, and Votkinsk.6 In the regional 
capital, Viatka, smaller factories producing leather goods, wooden barrels, 
and furniture sprang up. As in many parts of Russia, migrant labor proved 
especially important in forging ties between the city and the countryside 
and for circulating ideas.7 In 1928, the population of the region was still 
91.2 percent rural. The industrial push of the First Five-Year Plan, coupled 
with the recovery of industry following the Civil War, spurred migration 
to urban areas. In 1933, the urban population had grown to 13 percent of 
the total; by 1939, the proportion of urban inhabitants had climbed to 15 
percent, with 85 percent of the population remaining in rural areas.8 
The cities that saw the largest increases in urban population were also 
the most industrialized and were undoubtedly attracting people as workers 
to their expanding industries.9 The city of Kirov (Viatka) saw the largest 
population growth, adding 23,500 people to its population between 1926 
and 1933. Most of this population gain occurred during the years of the 
First Five-Year Plan (1928–1933), when industry in the city recovered from 
the downturns of the Civil War and the investments of the Five-Year Plan 
began to spur development. Other cities that were connected with targeted 
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industries, such as Votkinsk, which housed a large machine-building fac-
tory, experienced even higher growth rates—a 43 percent growth in popu-
lation during the years of the First Five-Year Plan. However, urbanization 
was not equally distributed among the cities and urban settlements. Cities 
not closely associated with industrialization, such as Iaransk and Nolinsk, 
only experienced moderate growth, while the city of Malmyzh experienced 
negative growth during the years of the First Five-Year Plan. 
Despite the implementation of the Five-Year Plans, the Kirov region did 
not transform into a heavily industrial region overnight. Given the long 
tradition of craftsmanship in the region, the industrial strength of the Kirov 
region lay in light industry. Many of these industries, especially those focus-
ing on animal and forest products, had developed during the late Tsarist 
period and played to the strengths of the Kirov region. Food processing, 
leather, and fur industries, as well as lumber processing, made up the bulk 
of the Kirov region’s economic output.10 Notwithstanding increased indus-
trial growth during the 1930s, many of the enterprises in the Kirov region 
were small. The two largest enterprises in the region were the Votkinskii 
Machine Building Factory, located in the city of Votkinsk, which employed 
5,458 workers, and the “Squirrel” Fur Factory in Slobodskoi raion, which 
employed 4,491 workers in 1935. The rest of the region’s enterprises were 
moderate to small in size, employing 2,000 workers or less. Smaller enter-
prises tended to have less of a proletarian character than larger enterprises, 
which dominated in regions like Leningrad and Moscow. This fact, combined 
with the more traditional handicraft nature of the region’s economy, meant 
that many of the enterprises retained their pre-revolutionary character.
Despite these continuities between the Tsarist and Soviet eras, the tran-
sition from a Tsarist state to a Soviet one was not an easy process. The 
ravages of war and instability took their toll on the Viatka/Kirov region. 
The Civil War, in particular, had a deleterious effect on industry in Viatka. 
In 1918 and 1919, when the Red Army fought against Admiral Kolchak’s 
forces, Viatka was on the frontlines. The resulting violence led to the death 
of thousands from famine and disease, and disrupted both agriculture and 
industry. The Civil War saw a sharp decline in many industries, which had 
barely recovered by the late 1920s.11 It was only with the industrialization 
push of the Five-Year Plan that industry in the Kirov region began to grow 
again. As part of the industrialization drive, socialist competitions and 
Stakhanovism took hold in Kirov’s enterprises, encouraging active worker 
participation and driving production increases in the mid-1930s. In 1936, 
40 percent of the workers in Viatka enterprises reportedly participated in 
the Stakhanovite movement.12 Though factory management, to serve their 
own ends, often inflated participation figures, such figures also suggest that 
such campaigns for popular involvement resonated with the population of 
the Kirov region.13
The growth of industry in the Kirov region during the First Five-Year Plan 
caused a rapid influx of new workers from the surrounding countryside. In 
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1931, new industrial workers who had migrated from the countryside made 
up 33 percent of the workers in Viatka’s enterprises.14 During the Second 
Five-Year Plan, the number of non-agricultural workers in the region grew 
by 48.9 percent (from 133,000 in 1932 to 198,000 in 1937). Some of these 
new workers stayed permanently; others engaged in seasonal migrant work 
(otkhodnichestvo). By 1936, about 10 percent of the able-bodied collective 
farmers were engaged in migrant labor. The Slobodskoi district, which was 
home to several large fur and forest products factories, saw the highest rate 
of collective farmers leaving for seasonal work in factories (16 percent), 
while Biserovskii15 raion on the far eastern borders of the Kirov region had 
the lowest incidence of migrant labor (5.6 percent).16
These new workers coming from the villages had difficulty acclimating 
to factory discipline, the rhythms of which were very different from the 
rhythms of rural life. This difficult adjustment resulted in a relatively high 
rate of turnover among industrial workers. For example, in the Kirov dis-
trict (raion), the annual turnover was 17 percent. Additionally, one in ten 
of the newly arrived workers were illiterate. In order to address this, factory 
schools (fabrichno-zavodskoe uchilishche) and courses were created par-
ticularly for the newly arrived workers.17 Cities proved to be an important 
place for increasing the educational levels of seasonal workers and their 
counterparts who remained in cities. These migrant workers who came to 
staff the developing fur, food, and forest industries in the cities and set-
tlements in the Viatka region continued to serve as links between village 
and country, bringing a rural frame of mind from the countryside to the 
city and returning with new Soviet ideas and the expectations of city life 
to the village.18 The fact that workers suggested that they be given land to 
farm demonstrates that the separation between rural and urban was by no 
means complete and that many people moved frequently between these two 
spheres. Like people all over the USSR, Kirovites were being pulled into 
Stalin’s industrial machine, which changed their entire way of life, from the 
length of the workday, to where they lived, to the type of education they 
received. The complex nature of this transition is reflected in the discussion 
of the Constitution, in the increasing delineation of urban and rural needs, 
and the simultaneously enduring ties between town and country. 
The pre-revolutionary traditions of strong local governance, the active 
involvement of peasants in local governmental bodies, and the firm con-
nections forged between city and countryside continued to shape the con-
sciousness of the inhabitants of the Kirov region through the 1930s. One 
area where tradition, modernization, urban, and rural interests all coincided 
was education. The Viatka/Kirov region had a tradition of recognizing the 
importance of education. During the tsarist period, the peasant dominated 
zemstvos often devoted most of their attention and budget to elementary 
education, which the peasants viewed as key to developing small businesses. 
During the Civil War and NEP era, the Bolsheviks also tried to build edu-
cational institutions as part of their goal of destroying the old tsarist culture 
44 Daily life in Kirov in the 1930s
and creating a new socialist society. Under the Five-Year Plans, educational 
resources grew, though the demand always outstripped the supply. As late 
as 1936, seven-year compulsory education was available only in 17 cities 
and workers’ settlements within the Kirov region. Despite the limited geo-
graphic spread of higher-level education, the quantity of students attend-
ing such institutions grew steadily in the 1930s, from 354,000 in 1935 to 
375,000 in 1937.19 Education, specifically who could attend educational 
institutions and what sort of financial support the state should provide for 
students, was a topic of much debate during the discussion of the draft 
Constitution. 
The Bolshevik government had lacked the resources in the Civil War 
period to maintain the existing school network, and most schools closed 
in the early 1920s before experiencing a revival in the 1930s. According 
to Aaron Retish, the Soviet government had better luck promoting its 
educational goals through small cultural centers like reading huts during 
the early NEP period.20 Because reading huts and red corners were suc-
cessful and particularly widespread in Viatka, they became an important 
locus of communication between the peasants and the state in the early 
NEP period.21 Reading huts and red corners remained an important point of 
contact between the representatives of the state and its citizens throughout 
the 1930s, playing an important role as organizational points during the 
discussion of the draft Constitution.
Other cultural centers were also developed in the Kirov region, particu-
larly in the regional capital. During the Second Five-Year Plan, Kirov city 
witnessed the building of the House of Soviets, the Drama Theater, the 
Central Hotel, and the “October” movie theater. At the same time, the local 
government demolished many historical monuments, such as the Aleksander 
Nevskii Church, as a way to destroy the old consciousness and replace it 
with a Soviet one. The network of cultural and informal educational facili-
ties also spread to the countryside, albeit more slowly. In 1936, 667 collec-
tive farm and workers’ clubs and 50 houses of culture were opened in the 
region.22 Such institutions often played a vital role in the countryside as they 
provided the primary points of contact between the rural population and 
the state and Party, which sent officials and representatives out to conduct 
lectures, readings, meetings, and other events, including the public discus-
sion of the draft Constitution.
In the countryside, however, the main organization that governed every-
day life was the collective farm. Collectivization in Viatka had early roots. 
In 1918, the Soviet authorities launched Committees of the Poor (kombedy) 
designed to encourage the poor to pool their resources and engage in strug-
gle with kulaks in the villages. While these Committees of the Poor did not 
flourish in other regions, the movement blossomed in Viatka, which had 
established 15,573 committees by December 1918, almost double the num-
ber of any other Russian province.23 Aaron Retish argues that, unlike the 
Committees of the Poor in other regions, respectable members of the village 
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community rather than outsiders staffed the Viatka committees, much as 
they had staffed the pre-revolutionary zemstvos.24 However, the committees 
failed to control the village communes or to meet the grain requirements of 
the state and were soon disbanded. 
Nonetheless, these Committees of the Poor spawned the first collective 
farms in the Viatka region in 1918. While these collective farms ran into 
administrative problems, they still remained appealing to many peasants 
because of increased access to land, supplies, and modern farming tech-
niques.25 Retish argues that, while many of these early collective farms 
struggled, the NEP era saw not only modernization plans from above but 
also from below. He notes that before 1917 local village assemblies (skhods) 
and former zemstvo organizations often pushed forward with agricultural 
modernization efforts, and that when the Soviet state agencies engaged in 
such projects, they often retained the zemstvo officials as advisers.26 As this 
suggests, the peasants in Kirov often co-opted Soviet-sponsored initiatives 
and reworked them to their own advantage, much in the same way they 
would later co-opt the discussion of the draft Constitution. Thus, collec-
tivization in Viatka, while not without its struggles and hardships, often 
developed out of state and peasant cooperation and co-utilization, and with 
far less brutality than seen in the southern and western parts of the USSR.
The early 1930s saw full-scale collectivization and the beginnings of 
mechanized agriculture. For example, the second half of 1930 saw a new 
stage in the collectivization of the countryside, when the first Machine 
Tractor Station (MTS) was built on Viatka territory in Zuevka. It contained 
50 tractors and serviced 1,187 collective farms.27 From there, collectivi-
zation expanded rapidly. At the end of 1932, there were 9,936 collective 
farms in the Gorky Region, which at that time included the territory of the 
Viatka region. They unified 240,000 peasant households, or 44.7 percent 
of the total households. The overwhelming portion of individual smallhold-
ers remained in the northern half of the region, where the land was poorer 
and more forested. In these regions, farmsteads were located in the woods, 
sometimes as much as four to five kilometers apart, which made movement 
between them difficult and collectivization almost impossible. In the north-
ern regions, only in Zuizdinskii raion was there any significant collective 
farm development in the early 1930s.28 
The collective farms formed from 1918 through 1932 were weak, often 
cobbled together out of a few families of former smallholders or landless 
peasants. Many collective farms did not have storehouses, stables, or live-
stock farms. The inventory, livestock, and seed were stored in individual 
houses. Therefore the district and regional Party focused its efforts on bring-
ing the process of collectivization to completion by consolidating gains and 
strengthening collective farms, particularly those involved in social animal 
husbandry.29 Such efforts by the Party and state paid off as collective farms 
overall were strengthened and consolidated. In 1928, individual households 
had 1.1 million head of cattle, but the collective farms only had 410 head. 
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But in 1934, the ratio had changed, with individual households having 
756,400 and the collective farms having 194,700 head of cattle.30 As of 
the beginning of 1935, 77 percent of the peasant households in the Gorky 
Region had joined a collective farm.31 
Far from being the monolith often depicted in historical literature, the 
collective farms of the Kirov region were diverse and fluid. In 1936, the 
collective farms varied widely in size, ranging from an average of 77 house-
holds per collective farm in Kaiskii raion to 18 collective farm households 
in Murashinskii raion.32 Although 35 households per collective farm was 
the overall average for the region, the number of households in the primar-
ily grain-producing regions was slightly higher, with 37 households, while 
the flax-producing collective farms had fewer members as a whole, averag-
ing only 33 households.33 The rates of collectivization also varied across 
the various districts within the Kirov region. Verkhoshizhemskii raion was 
the most collectivized in 1936, with a 98.3 percent rate of collectivization; 
Karulinskii raion was the least collectivized, with only 68.3 percent of its 
cultivated land collectivized.34 Overall, 1936 saw a decrease in the rate of 
collectivization with a total decrease of 0.93 percent in collectivized terri-
tory, possibly due to poor harvest or increased urbanization. The steepest 
rate of decline was in Kirovskii raion, which saw a 10.4 percent decrease in 
its collectivized land holdings.35 However, collectivization prevailed and, at 
the end of 1937, there were 10,976 collective farms, unifying 94.3 percent 
of the peasant households. Collective farms and state farms sowed 99 per-
cent of the region’s tilled land.36 By 1937, individual peasant smallholders 
made up only 5.7 percent of the population, but the conditions in rural 
Kirov Krai made it clear that central state structures and influence were 
quite weak.37 There was no single collective farm experience in the Kirov 
region, due to the economic and organizational strengths and weaknesses 
of the individual collective farms, which resulted in a variety of opinions 
on some issues. However, overarching concerns such as fairness and the 
maintenance of law and order, both of which became central issues in the 
constitutional discussion, united the collective farmers despite the varied 
nature of their economic lives.
One of the best ways of illustrating the fluidity of the collective farms 
is by measuring expulsions and households/members who withdrew from 
the collective farms. Rather than this number decreasing by the mid- to 
late-1930s as the collective farm system became a fixed part of Soviet life, 
the number of collective farmers expelled or withdrawing from collective 
farms actually grew. In the beginning of 1935, 11,100 households were 
expelled or voluntarily withdrew from collective farms. In 1936, 13,400 
households were expelled from collective farms,38 and 21,700 households 
had been expelled by the beginning of 1937.39 The question of the exact 
number of people being expelled from collective farms and the ramifications 
of this expulsion are not clear, because many of those who were expelled for 
violations of collective farm rules were later readmitted. 
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One of the things that collective farm expulsions illustrate is that, as 
James Hughes notes, the peasantry is not a homogenous mass and should be 
viewed as a collection of individuals who often had rivalries and competing 
interests and who could be appealed to and motivated by common goals, 
in the case of collective farm expulsions, or state incentives, in the case of 
the draft Constitution.40 Expulsion from the collective farm served as a way 
for collective farms to regulate the behavior of their members, ensuring that 
all members pulled their weight and did not damage the economic fortunes 
of the collective farm upon which everyone was reliant for survival. For 
example, on March 13, 1934, at the general meeting of the V. Sludka col-
lective farm, Trifon Grigorivich Buldakov, Arkadii Semenovich Buldakov, 
and Aleksei Vasil’evich Yel’tsov were expelled for the loss of collective farm 
horses.41 The horses were lost in the city of Glazov, when the three collec-
tive farmers were taking a sick family member to the hospital.42 The meeting 
participants decided to expel Aleksei Vasil’evich Yel’tsov’s whole house-
hold, and Arkadii Semenovich Buldakov and Trifon Grigorovich Buldakov 
were also expelled from the collective farm and sent to court.43 However, 
these expulsions were not long-term. The former two households were soon 
reintegrated into the community. Vasilii Yel’tsov and his whole family were 
taken back into the collective farm on the condition that they gave their 
personal cow to the collective farm in exchange for the lost horse. A. S. 
Buldakov was also readmitted to the collective farm, but was sentenced 
to pay 885 rubles for the loss of the horse. He too had his cow confis-
cated, to cover the price of the lost horse and court costs, and was given a 
strict rebuke. However, for his negligent attitude to collective farm work 
and property, T. G. Buldakov was not readmitted into the collective farm, 
though it appears that his family was.44 Once restitution had been made to 
the collective farm for the losses inflicted upon it (i.e., the price of the horses, 
which they paid back with credit from workdays and cows given to the col-
lective farm45), the expelled collective famers, with the exception of T. G. 
Buldakov, were welcomed back into the collective farm. 
Expulsion from the collective farm served as a way for the collective 
farmers to attempt to impose fairness and order onto a countryside that 
lacked a strong state presence. Collective farmers had the final say over who 
was expelled from or admitted to the collective farm, which endowed this 
organization with considerable power over the daily lives of its members. 
For example, Anastasiia Stepanovna Ushakova, also from the V. Sludka 
collective farm, was expelled for a second time. She petitioned the col-
lective farm for readmittance and even had a statement from the Raion 
Land Organization requesting her readmittance, but the collective farm-
ers rejected her application, stating, “such thieves and spongers are not 
needed.”46 As these cases clearly illustrate, at the local level, the collective 
farmers were quite active in shaping their communities, and their motives 
were often more a matter of survival than politics. This pattern of cyclical 
expulsion and readmittance to collective farms led Dokuchaev, the inspector 
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from the agricultural section of the Kraikom, to conclude that the question 
of expulsion from the collective farm and the acceptance of members into 
the collective farm was not approached seriously.47 However, he seems to 
have failed to note the effect that such expulsions had on regulating com-
munity behavior, as those expelled from the collective farms were subject to 
increased taxation as individual smallholders and denied access to collective 
farm resources.
Collective farm resources became increasingly important to survival in the 
countryside as more and more restrictions were placed on individual small-
holders and individual property. In the early years of collectivization, col-
lective farmers had frequently invested more effort and resources into their 
own private stock than into the collective farms’ holdings. For example, in 
1935 many collective farmers, particularly administrators on the 50-house-
hold “Flame of Revolution” collective farm (Falenskii raion), maintained 
substantial private livestock holdings. Mikhail Ivanovich Mil’chakov, the 
bookkeeper for the collective farm, had three milk cows, a one-year-old 
heifer, a pig, two piglets, and four sheep. The chairman of the collective 
farm, Mikhail Ksenofonich Ushakov, had one cow, one Iaroslavl Pedigreed 
bull, one heifer, a bull calf, a pig, three sheep, and four lambs. Nikolai 
Gerasimovich Mil’chakov, possibly a relative of the abovementioned book-
keeper, had two cows, two heifers, two bull calves, two sheep, three lambs, 
and a piglet. Of the 50 households in this settlement, 13 households had at 
least two cows with calves. At the same time, on the collective farm there 
were three cowless households. The three families noted above had a dis-
proportionately large amount of livestock, and their heads of house held 
key posts in the collective farm. The large personal holdings of collective 
farmers had a deleterious effect on the livestock herds of the collective farm, 
as well as propagating inequity and jealousy among members. The calving 
plan for the “Flame of Revolution” farm was not fulfilled in 1934 because 
the collective farmers invested far more resources into their personal stock 
holdings than into the collective farm livestock. Additionally, the collective 
farmers did not give heifers or cows to the collective farm perhaps because 
they believed that they were able to have an unlimited amount of personal 
livestock.48 
As a result of incidents such as these, the Kraikom and Kraiispolkom 
passed regulations in 1935 limiting the personal holdings of the collective 
farmers to one cow, one pig with a litter, ten sheep or goats, up to 20 bee-
hives, and unlimited number of birds and chickens, as well as establishing 
the size of garden plots as between 0.25 and 0.5 hectares.49 With such edicts, 
the regional officials sought to limit the personal livestock holdings of col-
lective farmers, to promote the growth of collective farm holdings, and to 
promote equality in livestock holding where collective farmers maintained a 
large personal holding of livestock.50 
Despite the best efforts of the Party and state officials to address issues 
such as “cowlessness,” the actual livestock holdings of collective farmers 
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varied dramatically from collective farm to collective farm. For example, 
in 1935, the collective farm V. Sludka in Poninskii raion reported that all 
its collective farmers had a cow.51 However, that same year the “Second 
Five-Year Plan” collective farm in Falenskii raion reported that, of their 59 
households, 19 had no personal cows.52 Such discrepancies in household 
economies continued throughout the 1930s. In the fall of 1937, 22.6 per-
cent of collective farmers in the Krai did not own their own cows and 14 
percent had no livestock at all.53 Because of the importance of milk cows to 
the peasant economy, the issue of cattle ownership was raised several times 
during the discussion of the draft Constitution. 
Collective farmers’ wages also varied greatly, depending on the success or 
failure of each collective farm. In the Kirov region, Regional Honor Rolls 
(краевые доски почета) recognized and tried to promote collective farm 
excellence. Those successful collective farms featured on the Honor Roll 
received significantly higher wages, though these too increased or decreased 
from year to year based on the fortunes of the collective farm. For exam-
ple, the collective farmers of Krasinskii collective farm54 received payment 
in kind of 3.1 kilograms of food and 10 kopeks per workday in 1934; this 
increased to 4.5 kilograms of food and 30 kopeks in 1935.55 The “First of 
May” collective farm56 saw an even greater increase in their wages. In 1934, 
the collective farmers received 2.08 kilograms of grain and 26 kopeks, while 
in 1935 they received 3.343 kilograms of grain and 1 ruble per workday.57 In 
1936, the harvest failure of that year saw a dramatic decrease in wages and 
stood as a stark reminder to the collective farmers of how unstable agrarian 
life was. Additionally, not all collective farmers, even on successful collec-
tive farms, received monetary payment for their work. In 1937, collective 
farmers on 1,414 collective farms in the region received no monetary pay.58 
Not surprisingly, the lifestyles of collective farmers varied significantly 
based on the success of their individual collective farms. For example, in 
1935 those in the abovementioned “First of May” collective farm, estab-
lished in 1928 and containing 54 families, were living a materially secure 
life. The collective farm was so successful that it made the Regional Honor 
Roll. It had 837 total hectares of land, of which 450 hectares were arable, 
75 hectares were devoted to haymaking, 249 hectares were devoted to pas-
ture, and 63 hectares were forested. It had 45 horses, five young horses, 
and a dairy farm with 118 head of cattle, of which 42 were milk producing, 
38 were heifers, and 28 were two-year-old cows. Every household had one 
cow, one or two heifers, small animals, and chickens. The collective farm 
had a cow barn for 220 head of cattle, a horse stable for 36 horses, and they 
were building a second stable for an additional 20 horses. In 1935, they 
built a calf barn for 40 calves and a silo. The collective farm also had a club 
with 200 seats, nurseries with places for 50 children, two grain storage facil-
ities, and a garage for agricultural machines.59 This was a prosperous col-
lective farm, and not the only one. Other Honor Roll collective farms, such 
as the Gredenevskii production collective farm,60 offered cultural amenities 
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as well. The Gredenevskii production collective farm had five Red Corners, 
seven nurseries, three cafeterias, one music circle, a portable film projec-
tor, a radio set, and various newspapers and magazines.61 The production 
collective farm “Reconstruction”62 was a particularly successful collective 
farm, having bought a truck and a car for the collective farm from grain 
sales revenue. Additionally, they had electrical lighting for 195 households, 
had radios in 26 households, and subscribed to 453 journals and newspa-
pers. The collective farm provided its members with access to three nurser-
ies and four seasonal cafeterias, as well as one permanent cafeteria.63 Such 
successful collective farms stood in stark contrast to many others where the 
standards of living were far lower. 
Despite the relatively high standard of living on Honor Roll collective 
farms, rural life was still strenuous and difficult, often demanding long hours 
with few breaks. For example, the “Socialism” collective farm, which pri-
marily grew grain and flax, was organized in 1931 and experienced tremen-
dous growth, developing from 15 households in 1931 to 138 households 
in 1935.64 Some of this growth was facilitated by fierce socialist competi-
tions with the neighboring collective farm “Union” in which “Socialism” 
was the victor, as well as brigade and individual competitions on the farm. 
These competitions were taken very seriously, with totals from competitions 
between brigades and individual collective farmers discussed every week at 
brigade meetings as well as in the wall newspaper. Thirty collective farms’ 
shock workers were awarded prizes for shock work during the spring sow-
ing, in harvest campaigns, and grain deliveries, and above all the collective 
farm was placed on the Raion Honor Roll.65 While such competition facili-
tated an increase in productive work, the lack of sufficiently mechanized 
agriculture caused the collective farmers to work to extremes to maintain 
this output. On the “Socialism” collective farm, the collective farmers began 
work at 4 or 5 in the morning and finished work at 8 or 9 at night.66 Such 
demands could not be sustained. While these socialist competitions did suc-
ceed in raising production in agriculture, as they did in raising productivity 
in industry,67 such rates of production were in fact unsustainable and shock 
work only masked the lack of mechanization in the Soviet Union that would 
have made such growth rates more permanent. 
Honor Roll collective farms often could not or did not maintain such 
momentum. For example, until 1933 the collective farm “Red Column” 
was considered one of the best and most advanced collective farms in the 
Udmurt Autonomous oblast’. During the 10th anniversary celebrations, the 
collective farm received the Regional Executive Committee (Obispolkom) 
banner and had been awarded prizes several times. But beginning in 1933, 
work discipline weakened, and collective farmers were expelled en masse. 
In 1933–1934, 25 households were expelled, and in 1935, 35 households 
from the village of Azim’ia filed a written request to secede from “Red 
Column.”68 This exodus and the subsequent decline in the collective farm’s 
economy was blamed on the collective farm’s leadership, specifically the 
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former collective farm chairman Nikolai Iosifovich Lozhkin, who was con-
demned for having wild drunken parties, inflating the number of workdays 
worked, and basically running the establishment into the ground.69 Lozhkin 
stood as a reminder that the fate of a kolkhoz and the well-being of its 
members often depended on the actions of an individual or a few individu-
als.70 During the popular discussion of the draft Constitution and the 1937 
elections, such local leaders came under intense scrutiny. 
If strong collective farms occasionally struggled, weak collective farms 
often faced dire situations. In 1935, the regional agricultural department 
considered the collective farm “Wave 2”71 one of the most backward, low-
capacity collective farms in the region. It was undersupplied with grain for 
the spring sowing because it had failed to produce a surplus the previous 
year. It also had production shortfalls of livestock fodder and inadequate 
grain with which to pay the collective farmers. The raion leadership consid-
ered conditions on the collective farm to be catastrophic, particularly the 
supply of provisions, and was forced to give it loans in December to keep 
the farmers and their livestock from starving to death.72 
As the above information demonstrates, there was no one “collective 
farm” experience in the Kirov region. Those who lived on the successful 
collective farms and who had experienced often-dramatic increases in the 
standard of living tended to praise the Soviet state. They greeted the draft 
Constitution, and especially Stalin, with applause, often supplementing their 
glorification of Soviet achievements with tales of hardships under the Tsar. I 
argue that much of this praise was sincere, as their lives had truly improved 
under the Soviet regime. Conversely, those who lived on struggling collec-
tive farms tended to be critical of Soviet power and used the discussion of 
the draft Constitution as a way to vent their frustrations, arguing that the 
Constitution was nice, but that it did not feed them. They too were sincere.
The overall agricultural situation in the Kirov region worsened in 1936, 
when there was widespread crop failure. The first years of the 1930s had 
seen modest increases in agricultural productivity as land was collectivized. 
During the First Five-Year Plan, arable collective farmland grew from 2.6 
to 3.4 million hectares, and the grain harvest increased from 7.7 to 8 tsent-
ers [100 kilometers] per hectare. In 1933–1934, the grain harvest increased 
to 9 tsenters per hectare in the Viatka region.73 The year 1935 brought 
some happiness to the populace with a bountiful harvest yield of grain and 
flax. The grain harvest in the region reached 10.6 tsenters per hectare, and 
total duties on grain for the first time netted a yield of two million tons. 
Conversely, in 1936, the hot, dry summer, and an early, rainy, and cold 
autumn brought a considerable shortage in grain and animal feed, reducing 
the total number of livestock on the collective farms and the personal hold-
ings of the collective farmers.74 In Zuizdinskii raion, a discussant of the draft 
Constitution stated: “the Constitution is good but just the same we don’t 
have bread.”75 As a result of the poor harvest, resources in the region were 
strained, and in some areas food became very scarce. In the spring of 1937, 
52 Daily life in Kirov in the 1930s
hunger spread to Nolinskii, Lebiazhskii, and Urzhumskii raiony. In several 
villages, people fed on the corpses of collapsed livestock, and the local and 
regional authorities were inundated daily with calls for help. 
Instability was always a threat, be it from natural forces, economic 
forces, or corrupt or ineffective collective farm leadership. The variations in 
lifestyle and the success or failure of a collective farm produced an array of 
opinions, particularly about the effectiveness of the Soviet state. During the 
discussion of the draft Constitution, collective farmers addressed this insta-
bility by calling for access to better resources, demanding the extension of 
state welfare systems to include them, or calling for the ability to implement 
their own brand of law and order. 
Crime in the Kirov region was an ongoing problem for the citizenry and 
the state in both cities and the countryside. But the crimes that were of great 
concern to local officials, primarily the procuracy, and those that troubled 
the general population, differed greatly. The procuracy was primarily con-
cerned with crimes against the state or state and communal property. In 
Kirov, the procuracy recorded statistics for 11 types of crime in 1935 and 
1936, but only two of those categories were crimes against citizens: prop-
erty crimes and hooliganism.76 In 1935, the investigative units from the pro-
curacy, the militsia, and NKVD investigated 131 homicides, 55 instances 
of robbery, and 53 sex crimes.77 The procuracy recorded a total of 1,845 
instances of property crime against individual citizens for the whole of 1935, 
and 737 recorded instances in the first half of 1936. They also recorded 
3,031 cases of “hooliganism” in 1935 and 1,200 cases in the first quarter of 
1936. However, the procuracy often did not handle crimes against average 
citizens. Instead, such crimes tended to be investigated by the militsia or the 
NKVD, so the numbers here probably underrepresent the real crime rate in 
the Kirov region.
Violence appears to have been of greatest concern in the countryside, 
where the state’s presence was weakest, and social and economic factors 
may have exacerbated tensions. Local Party reports and raion newspapers 
often carried anecdotal evidence of violence on collective farms, particularly 
against members of the collective farm leadership. These may not have been 
the most common type of crime, but because they were attacks on people 
who could be perceived as part of the state apparatus and who were often 
members of the Communist Party, these were the incidents that received the 
most coverage. Violence against the collective farm leadership was often 
framed in terms of “enemies of the people” attacking good “representatives 
of the state” and became the representation of crime in the countryside. 
“To eradicate Hooliganism,” an article that ran in Kirovets (the district 
newspaper from the Kirov rural district), was a compilation of various let-
ters that the editorial board had received from three different collective 
farms reporting incidents of hooliganism, encompassing everything from 
drunken disorders to attempted murder. On the “Red Putilovets” collec-
tive farm, one of the collective farmers wrote that, over the course of two 
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years, Pavel D. Karavaev and Vasilii A. V. (the last name here was omitted 
in the text) behaved outrageously (хулиганят). On October 4, 1935, they 
beat collective farmer I. Ia. Ogorodnikov in the head with a rock, hitting 
him several times. On Easter 1936, they beat two collective farmers from 
the “12th of October” collective farm and R. M. Karavakov, a Komsomol 
member from the “Red Putilovets” collective farm. On “Trinity Day,” with 
the help of Dmitrii Karavaev, Pavel’s father, they beat several other people. 
Later, on St. Peter’s day (July 19), the hooligans led young people away 
from haymaking to binge drink. They subsequently beat collective farmer 
Ia. I Mel’nikov, tore off his shirt, and hit brigadier and member of the rural 
soviet, Ogorozhnikov, and his wife several times. They wanted to do the 
same to the head of the collective farm, but he was not present. The collec-
tive farmers were rightfully distressed by the conduct of the Karavaevs and 
demanded that the procurator quickly bring them to justice. 
In Nikulitskii rural soviet, on the Voroshilov collective farm, District 
Executive Committee Instructor Comrade Kotel’nikov also reported inci-
dents of violence. He wrote that on the evening of July 21, Aleksander 
Cherepanov organized a binge-drinking session. Then he, his brother, and 
cousin (Nikolai I. and Ivan M.) assaulted the chairman of the collective 
farm, P. A. Cherepanov, and a member of the rural soviet and the editor of 
the wall newspaper, A. N. Cherepanov, dealing them heavy blows with bot-
tles and pickets from a fence. The village executive officer, A. I. Braturkhin, 
and collective farmer, M. I. Braturkhin, tried to come to their aid while 
the collective farm chairman and the wall newspaper editor were beaten 
unconsciousness. But the would-be rescuers were also beaten. All four of the 
victims were unable to work, and the chairman of the collective farm was 
beaten so badly that he could not walk. The organizer of the bacchanalia 
and beating, A. I. Cherepanov, had been expelled from the collective farm 
and had decided to take revenge on the chairman of the collective farm.78 
Such violence against collective farm leaders bespeaks sharp social ten-
sions in rural areas, but it also limited their ability to effectively manage the 
organization and to use expulsion as an effective means of social control.
By collecting and printing such accounts, the newspaper editors brought 
the specter of violent crime to the forefront of the readers’ attention while 
trying to force local authorities to act. Such cases of violence on collec-
tive farms were hardly unique.79 As we shall see, violence appears to have 
occurred with some frequency, and it took a fair amount of effort to get 
the procuracy to address the issue. On collective farms where the culprits 
were often well-known, many of the inhabitants of the Kirov region rejected 
the implementation of habeas corpus, as it delayed the apprehension of 
the suspects and allowed them to further perpetrate violence. Aleksander 
Vasil’evich Agalakov, a worker in the finishing section of the Lenin leather 
factory, gave voice to the popular apprehension behind the widespread 
rejection of Article 127 (habeas corpus) of the Constitution. In his letter to 
the Slobodskoi district newspaper, Leninskii Put’, entitled “Is it not Early?”, 
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he addressed the vulnerability that average citizens felt and how article 127 
further undermined their sense of security. He wrote that:
In article 127 it says that no citizen of the USSR can be deprived of 
personal freedom or placed under arrest without the agreement of the 
court or the sanctions of the procurator. In my opinion it is incorrect 
and here is why. We have not once and for all eliminated hooliganism. 
Hooligans sometimes insult and attack passersby and, really, in light of 
this the policeman doesn’t have the right to arrest such a person? In my 
opinion, this must even be done by any honest citizen. 
Then, when we have finally eliminated hooliganism, then this arti-
cle can be adopted. But now in my opinion it is too early. This is my 
observation.80 
Such complaints and newspaper articles demonstrate that the inhabitants of 
the Kirov region were not shy about agitating for their interests, even if they 
conflicted with those of the state. Even less-educated rural inhabitants were 
comfortable and politically astute enough to challenge or use Soviet laws in 
support of their interests. A case from Zuevka raion in 1935–1936, where 
collective farmers came into conflict with the district state administrative 
authorities over land use, demonstrates the tenacity and political astuteness 
of the collective farmers of the Kirov region.
From March through October 1936, members of several collective 
farms81 challenged the actions of two local organizations, a logging enter-
prise and the raion roads department, both of which operated under the 
auspices of the Zuevka District Executive Committee. The collective farms 
argued these organizations damaged their land’s productive capacity as well 
as infringed on the rights that the central government had recently endowed 
upon collective farms. 
The problem began when the Zuevka District Executive Committee and 
its District Roads Department decided to construct a road from Zuevka to 
Bogorodsk. However, the land required for the roadbed, as well as for the 
gravel to line the roadbed, belonged to functioning collective farms. The 
fact that the land was occupied by collective farms presented a twofold 
problem for the Zuevka District Executive Committee. They had to contend 
both with collective farmers and Soviet law, specifically with the Decree on 
the Eternal Usage of Land, by which the central government bequeathed 
all land to the collective farms in perpetuity. Under this law, the land could 
only be alienated with the consent of the collective farmers. 
However, the Zuevka District Executive Committee did not seek their 
consent, and, in October 1935, ordered the District Roads Department 
to begin construction on the road. The road cut across the fields of the 
“Saturday” collective farm, which had been planted with winter wheat. 
Trenching a planted field, combined with the road technicians compelling 
collective farmers from another collective farm to build the road, sparked 
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complaints. The initial response to the complaint, filed by the road foreman, 
alleged that the road technician, Maria Semenova Pliner, was guilty of vio-
lating the collective farm’s rights. She had begun construction without an 
agreement from the collective farmers, even though they had the state docu-
ment about eternal land usage. She also allegedly acted against the orders of 
her superiors, who had told her to halt construction.82
Soon more complaints surfaced from other collective farms, which also 
lost land to the road project. Senior inspector of the Kirov Land Management 
Department, Zhdanov, was tasked with investigating the legality of the road 
construction, following the publication of an article entitled, “The chairman 
of Zuevskii District Executive Committee (RIK) violated Soviet laws,” in 
the local newspaper. Pliner refused to be blamed. On June 12, 1936, she 
gave Zhdanov information confirming the newspaper story. She stated that 
the new road ran through the territories of the “Dawn of Freedom” and 
“Pushkin” collective farms, and that because “Pushkin” collective farm had 
been officially given the State Act on the Eternal Usage of Land and the 
collective farmers had not given their consent, the Zuevskii District Land 
Organization asked officially that the work stop. The collective farmers had 
referred this question to the Chairman of the District Executive Committee, 
Comrade Sapozhnikov, who stated “that the work would continue and 
that the road would be constructed.”83 The Presidium ordered the Roads 
Department to deliver gravel for construction, and, despite the protests of 
the collective farmers, the road was completed.84
However, the completion of the road was not the end of the saga. 
Sapozhnikov seized land from collective farms for the construction of this 
road in a way that violated both Soviet law and the rights of the collective 
farms. The land seized from two of the collective farms, “Saturday” and 
“Chernousy,” had occurred before these collective farms received the Act 
on the Eternal Usage of Land but after the other farms had been granted 
the land in perpetuity.85 The District Executive Committee established a 
pattern of ignoring Soviet law and used this precedent to further violate 
the rights of the collective farms. For example, the Presidium of the District 
Executive Committee, following the approval of the draft securing the land 
in perpetuity for the “Bubnov” agricultural artel’, decided to withdraw 4 
hectares of land under the gravel quarry from that collective farm. The 
Roads Department had failed to reach an agreement on the land in ques-
tion with the collective farms, but went ahead and began to dig anyway. 
Doing so reduced the food base for the collective farm.86 The protocol of 
the March 18, 1936 meeting of the Presidium of Zuevka District Executive 
Committee indicated that the Presidium reviewed the question of land usage 
for “Bubnov” collective farm and decided against the rights of the collective 
farm agreeing to remove 4 hectares of land from the collective farm, which 
encompassed the gravel pit and access road needed for road construction. 
The Chairman of the District Executive Committee, Sapozhnikov, ordered 
the District Land Organization to seize the land from the collective farm.87 
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The removal of land from the collective farms sparked protests from col-
lective farmers for several reasons. The loss of both valuable arable land and 
the seemingly unilateral actions of the District Executive Committee threat-
ened both the livelihood and sovereignty of the collective farms. Collective 
farmers were afraid that more tilled land might be confiscated and hence 
arable land would decrease further.88 Decreases in acreage not only made it 
difficult for the collective farmers to grow sufficient crops, but in some cases 
shrank the fields to a size where agricultural machines could not be used.
The collective farm “Pushkin,” which also had land seized, refused to 
accept the actions of the District Executive Committee. At a general col-
lective farm meeting held on June 12, 1936 with 35 of the 45 members 
in attendance, the collective farmers discussed the actions of the District 
Executive Committee. Comrade Kuznetsov, chairman of the collective farm, 
recommended appealing to the regional officials for the return of the land 
that had been seized, as the collective farm possessed the Act on the Eternal 
Usage of Land at the time that the land was taken and the size of the remain-
ing fields was inadequate for the use of agricultural machines. The collective 
farmers unanimously decided to file a written request at the regional level 
for the return of the land.89
Addressed to the Presidium of the Kirov Kraiispolkom, the written 
request from “Pushkin” collective farm highlighted the above-stated argu-
ments, driving home the fact that the District Executive committee know-
ingly violated Soviet law and the rights of the collective farm. The collective 
farmers claimed that the District Executive Committee ordered the Roads 
Department to seize 8 hectares and dig across 22 hectares of winter wheat, 
despite the fact that the collective farm had the document authorizing 
its usage of land. Both the District Executive Committee and the Roads 
Department ignored the petitions of the collective farmers, so they asked the 
regional officials to step in. The collective farmers of “Pushkin” collective 
farm petitioned the regional executive committee to not only return the land 
to the collective farm but to also provide compensation for damages in the 
form of lost crops.90
At the same time that the “Pushkin” collective farm was petitioning for 
regional intervention in its struggle with the District Executive Committee, 
another collective farm was also accusing that committee of violating its 
rights. The Luzinskii collective farm filed a complaint against Chairman 
Sapozhnikov as well over damage done to collective farm meadows by a local 
logging enterprise. The regional officials launched an official investigation 
into the claim, but only following the publication of a note of complaint in 
Kirovskaia Pravda on June 7, 1936. On June 10, Senior Inspector of the Land 
Management Section of the Kirov Regional Land Administration, Zhdanov, 
conducted an investigation of the incident. He ascertained that the conflict 
began in the autumn of 1935 when the logging enterprise began to prepare 
land around the meadows for harvesting. The logging enterprise harvested 
some 7,000 cubic meters of wood, but ruined the meadows in the process. 
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The collective farm chairman, Aleksei Shennikov, asked the foreman of the 
logging enterprise, Mikhail Ivanovich Dubovskikh, to remove the bark from 
the meadow so as to enable the meadow’s grasses to grow. But Dubovskikh 
ignored this request and the bark remained. The bark had to be gathered 
into a pile by the collective farmers, who received no money for doing the 
work of the logging enterprise. The collective farm chairman alleged that 
this violated the rights of the collective farm. He also accused the logging 
enterprise of damage to the meadows, resulting in the loss of approximately 
40 hectares of hay, which could have been used to feed 25 cows, 18 horses, 
four yearling horses, 28 sheep, and 30 heifers. Senior Inspector Zhdanov’s 
investigation concluded that the collective farms’ complaints were valid and 
that the chairman of the District Executive Committee broke Soviet laws 
because he did not require the logging enterprise to clean up their mess.91
At the same time that Inspector Zhdanov was investigating the incidents, 
the Zuevka District Party Committee was stirred to action by the publication 
of a June 8, 1936 article in Kirovskaia Pravda entitled, “The Chairman of 
the Raion Executive Committee violates Soviet Laws.” Based on the infor-
mation provided by the newspaper article, the Party Committee confirmed 
that there were regulatory violations that damaged the agricultural artely 
“Pushkin” and “Dawn of Freedom.” The Party committee concluded that 
Comrade Sapozhnikov was the guilty party because he had not observed the 
state act on the usage of land. The decision to remove land for the road and 
gravel quarry had been approved by the Regional Executive Committee, 
but the Zuevka Party Committee concluded that Sapozhnikov did not get 
the appropriate permission from the Regional Executive Committee or 
the Council of People’s Commissars to take the land from “Pushkin” and 
“Dawn of Freedom” collective farms. The Party committee concluded that 
for the violation of the artel’ regulations, Sapozhnikov needed to be repri-
manded and the collective farms compensated for the lost land.92
In the case of “Bubnov” collective farm, the District Party Committee 
also concluded that the head of the Raion Land Organization, Comrade 
Nikulin, and the head of the Roads Department, Comrade Makhnev, should 
be reprimanded because they did not take any action on the complaints of 
the collective farm about damage to the clover planted near the quarry. 
The district Party Committee demanded that Nikulin and Makhnev take 
relevant actions to put up a fence to protect the clover field from possible 
damage by the gravel delivery people. Additionally, they decided to require 
the director of the logging enterprise to completely clean the collective farm 
meadows of garbage left during the winter and to give the collective farms 
monetary compensation for the cleanup. In order to legalize the land seizure 
and stay compliant with Soviet law, the District Party Committee decided 
to ask the Party group of the District Executive Committee to make an 
application to the Regional Executive Committee about the annexation of 
the land beneath the new road and gravel quarry and about the grazing 
lands of the logging enterprise, which the collective farmers used.93 While 
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the members of the “Bubnov” collective farm did not receive the land under 
the road back, they were compensated for their losses. They also won recog-
nition of their rights and an acknowledgement from the District Executive 
Committee that their actions had violated the collective farmers’ rights as 
Soviet citizens and harmed their personal interests. 
The collective farmers, in these cases, demonstrated their political acuity 
by framing their struggle with the District Executive Committee in terms of 
harming their interests as collective farmers and the violation of central state 
law. This demonstrated that they were quite familiar with Soviet laws as they 
applied to their daily lives. Additionally, they appealed to multiple organiza-
tions, such as the regional newspaper Kirovskaia Pravda and the Zuevka 
Party Committee, to investigate the incident and to get justice. And the state 
rewarded their tenacity and faith. The District Party Committee demanded 
restitution for the lost land and crops, censured the errant District Executive 
Committee chairman, and referred the issue to the Regional Executive 
Committee for further action. The cases above indicate that collective farmers 
were not afraid to challenge what they perceived as injustice and illegal state 
behavior, nor were their challenges uninformed. When the Soviet state asked 
for their input into shaping the foundation of the Soviet state through their 
comments on the draft Constitution, the citizens of the Kirov region happily 
complied. For many reasons, not the least of which was that they understood 
the power of the law, they engaged the state in a public conversation about 
their needs and expectations, which were often dramatically different than the 
needs and expectations that the state had been promoting through its man-
aged discussion of the draft Constitution. This incident also highlights a more 
general reality that influenced how the citizens of Kirov interacted with the 
Soviet state—the importance of economic realities. In both town and country, 
citizens who participated in the discussion brought to that discussion their 
economic experiences and anxieties, realities that formed their perspectives.
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The discussion of the draft Constitution began on June 12, 1936 with its 
publication in the central state and Party newspapers, Pravda and Izvestiia. 
In Kirov, many local officials responded with enthusiasm and the pomp 
and circumstance appropriate for such an undertaking. For example, the 
district officials in Votkinskii raion dispatched 120 lecturers, in cars deco-
rated with slogans and greenery, to organize meetings on collective farms.1 
While not all district officials chose such an ostentatious way to inaugurate 
the discussion, local Party and state officials throughout the region hurried 
to implement the discussion in response to regional and central authorities’ 
demands. 
The implementation of the public discussion of the draft Constitution 
represented an intersection of central goals and local realities. Central Party 
officials envisioned a six-month-long discussion of the draft where the 
Constitution would be presented as the embodiment of socialist achieve-
ments and which would stimulate citizens to redouble their efforts to build 
socialism. However, local realities ended up shaping the discussion of the 
draft into something very different, as understaffed and poorly prepared 
raion officials tended to treat this as just another campaign, and many citi-
zens expressed opinions that contradicted the goals of the central leader-
ship. Reviewing the implementation of the discussion in the Kirov region 
allows us to study the tension between what the central Party leadership 
envisioned and what it was capable of implementing. 
How instructors were supposed to guide and  
shape the discussion
Central, regional, and local authorities tried to guide and shape the discus-
sion. They utilized press coverage, wrote and disseminated articles about 
various aspects of the Constitution, and created syllabi for discussions based 
on published articles from the central press. Two examples of discussion 
curricula exist in the Kirov archives: one is a lesson plan for correspondence 
students’ study circles in Kirov city;2 the other is a list of subject matter for 
lectures and meetings discussing the draft Constitution.3 Neither identifies 
3 Local realities 
The implementation of the discussion  
of the draft Constitution
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the organizations that created them, but given their placement in the archi-
val record, the first was probably created by someone in the Kirov City Party 
Committee and the second by the Regional Party Committee as a guide 
for instructors and other discussion organizers. These syllabi are worthy of 
note as they illustrate the aspects of the draft Constitution Party authorities 
wished to highlight and what they wanted students to learn about both the 
Constitution and the state that issued it.
The lesson plans for correspondence students relied heavily on speeches 
and articles by Party and state leaders, published in Bolshevik, Pravda, 
Izvestiia, and Komsomolskaia Pravda, to provide the written texts for 
the lessons.4 Detailed instructions on how to use these texts to highlight 
important aspects of the draft Constitution accompanied these materials. 
The lesson plans focused on correspondence students’ basic civic educa-
tion, for example, understanding the basic functions of the government, 
as well as reinforcing the state-building narrative through a discussion of 
expanded citizenship rights and the resulting social contract between the 
state and its citizens. To accomplish these goals, it was essential to dis-
cuss and explain socialist notions of constitutionality. The correspondence 
instructors were told to use Comrade Alymov’s article, “The Development 
of the Soviet Constitution,” to demonstrate that only a Marxist–Leninist 
constitution represented the working people.5 This basic lesson was to be 
followed by a detailed discussion of how the constitutions of 1918 and 
1924 had expressed the existing correlation of class strength in the country 
and how changes in the fundamental class structure from 1924 to 1936 
necessitated rewriting the Constitution. Molotov’s 1935 speech to the 7th 
All Union Congress of Soviets, and Stetskii’s “About the Liquidation of 
Classes in the USSR,”6 were recommended to illustrate the specific forms 
these sweeping economic and social changes took, such as the closing of the 
gap between the more advanced working class and the peasantry, as well as 
the destruction of the exploiting classes. Study circle organizers were urged 
to present the draft Constitution as the culmination of these achievements, 
as the “codex of the victorious laborers of our country” and “a world-wide 
historically important document, reflecting the great victory of the laborers 
of the USSR under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party.”7 They were fur-
ther encouraged to highlight the unique democratic and class character of 
the new Soviet Constitution. 
The destruction of the exploiting classes and the creation of universal, 
direct, and equal elections changed the definition of citizenship in the USSR 
and brought the issue of citizen rights and responsibilities to the forefront of 
the discussion. The writers of the lesson plans used an article from Pravda 
entitled, “The Tireless Concern of the Party and Government,”8 to high-
light the new Soviet social contract codified in the draft Constitution, which 
was the “greatest document of Stalinist concern (zabota) for the people.”9 
This article outlined state monetary and material investment in the popu-
lation’s well-being through increased expenditures on social service funds 
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for workers and service workers, increased government spending on educa-
tion, the construction of public buildings such as schools and clubs, and the 
provision of “bright new apartments” for urban dwellers.10 This massive 
investment in social projects demonstrated the state’s concern for its citi-
zens, confirmed by comparisons to the lesser investments in social services 
in capitalist countries and an increase in the standard of living since the 
Civil War. Additionally, the socialist state provided the monetary support 
for the implementation of some of the fundamental rights that citizens were 
guaranteed in the draft Constitution, such as the right to education and the 
right to material security. These points highlighted tangible benefits the state 
provided for its citizens and demonstrated that citizens had a vested interest 
in maintaining and strengthening the socialist system.
Reflected throughout the lesson plans was the central Party and state 
leadership’s view that the social contract, which provided the citizens of the 
USSR with the abovementioned benefits, was a reciprocal arrangement. This 
demand for reciprocity was highlighted by two articles from Izvestiia, which 
not only focused on the benefits for citizens, but how citizens were expected 
to use these rights for the benefit of the state. “The Right to Education” 
offered a stark contrast between the pre-revolutionary era, when educa-
tion was difficult for workers and peasants to obtain, and the current situ-
ation in the USSR, which offered a vast array of educational opportunities. 
However, these new educational opportunities were not just a gift to the cit-
izenry. Citizens were expected, indeed, obligated to take advantage of these 
new opportunities to master science and raise their cultural levels in order to 
provide the state with a well-trained, well-educated workforce.11 The arti-
cle, “On Equal Rights with Men,” followed in the same vein, explained 
women’s poor situation before the revolution and the new opportunities 
available to them after the revolution. Women were also expected to use 
their new rights to assume leadership roles in the construction of socialism 
as collective farm brigadiers and tractor or combine drivers, whose labor 
served to strengthen collectivized agriculture.12 The rights guaranteed to 
individual citizens were presented as an investment by the state in human 
capital that should in turn be utilized in the struggle for socialism.13
Though less comprehensive than the lesson plan for correspondence stu-
dents, the list of themes for lectures and meetings provided by the Kraikom 
also served to reinforce the central narrative of a victorious socialist state, 
which had created a better life for its citizens and deserved their continuing 
support. The suggested lecture topics were divided into three main subhead-
ings: “About the Draft of the Stalinist Constitution,” “19 Years of Socialist 
Construction,” and “The International Situation of the Struggle for Peace.” 
Much like the previous lesson plans, the section on the draft Constitution 
focused on themes that the center found important, such as how the state 
was composed of workers and peasants, the forms of socialist property, 
and how Soviet democracy differed from bourgeois democracy. The right 
to work, the right to an education, rights guaranteed to citizens, and duties 
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that they were expected to fulfill were also highlighted, again emphasizing 
the reciprocal nature of rights in the USSR.
The section entitled “19 Years of Socialist Construction” focused on 
national strength and the policies that were the foundation of the Soviet 
state, such as the “victory of collective farm construction in the USSR” and 
the Stakhanovite movement. Likewise, the twin themes, “Lenin and Stalin, 
the organizers of the October revolution, and the victory of socialism” and 
“the victory of socialism over the Trotskyite band, who would restore cap-
italism” emphasized the positive achievements of Party leaders and their 
interpretation of Marxist–Leninist doctrine. 
The section on the international struggle for peace also highlighted 
the correctness of Party policy and presented the USSR as the defender 
of freedom, focusing on the “struggle of the Spanish people for a demo-
cratic republic and fascist intervention,” the Popular Front movement, and 
the “struggle of the Chinese soviets for the independence of the Chinese 
people.” These were all movements supported by Party policy and Soviet 
financial and material aid, which allowed the USSR to portray itself as the 
“bulwark in the struggle with fascist instigators of war.”14 These themes 
sought to underscore the supposed strength of the Soviet state (though the 
need for continued strengthening may in fact have demonstrated the leader-
ship’s insecurity with the existing levels of Soviet development), the fitting-
ness of state policy and the Party line, and the need for citizens to continue 
to strengthen socialism.
Both of these documents demonstrate that officials had a prescribed 
script for the implementation of the discussion, one that emphasized the 
correctness of the Party line and the obligations that citizens had towards 
the state in return for their rights and improved quality of life. A report from 
Slobodskoi raion demonstrated that competent organizers of the discussion 
were supposed to limit the discussion to the specific interpretations that 
dominate these syllabi:
The Party organizations gave additional explanations of questions the 
listeners had not yet mastered, and also reined in suggestions that vio-
lated the fundamental principles of the draft Constitution, for example 
reining in the suggestion that the USSR be called a state of laborers (тр
удящихся) and not workers and peasants, etc.15
From the leadership’s perspective, this was clearly never meant to be a free-
form discussion, and the obligation to properly mold the discussion rested 
with the agitation and propaganda workers. 
The organizers of the discussion
While the Central Executive Committee, the Regional Party Committee, 
and Regional Executive Committee often issued directives, monitored 
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progress, and demanded increased performance and responsiveness from 
district Party committees and district executive committees, they had lit-
tle direct involvement with mobilizing and engaging the inhabitants of the 
Kirov region. This work was carried out at the local level and involved 
ordinary worker–activists as well as members of the local power structure.
District and local officials participated in the organization of the dis-
cussion in two different ways: training people to lead mass meetings and 
actively leading meetings themselves. This is evident in Shabalinskii raion, 
where the local leadership organized small conferences for training lectur-
ers and meeting organizers, as well as general meetings with the public. P. 
A. Iablokov, the chairman of the District Executive Committee, led three 
raion conferences with a total of 130 attendees, four rural soviet plenums 
with a total of 180 attendees, and 27 meetings on collective farms that were 
attended by 1,240 people.16 Five other officials worked with more politically 
active groups, such as local officials and students, who were presumably sin-
gled out because of their place in the Soviet social hierarchy, training some 
of them to be lecturers and meeting organizers.17 Local state officials across 
the Kirov region played an active role in preparing activists to lead the dis-
cussion and in conducting the discussion itself. How they did so illuminates 
how the discussion unfolded.
When reaching out to recruit lecturers and meeting organizers, dis-
trict Party committees and district executive committees relied heavily on 
existing networks of Party and non-Party aktiv to organize the discussion. 
In Slobodskoi raion, the raikom bureau dispatched 308 members of the 
Komsomol and Party aktiv to organize the popular discussion, with the 
Party school taking a particularly active role, sending 144 students to 100 
collective farms, where they conducted 482 meetings with 19,921 partici-
pants (63 percent of the rural population).18 In Kirovskii raion, on June 17 a 
seminar was organized for propagandists, accompanied by three lessons on 
the draft Сonstitution in Party and Komsomol political study circles. These 
raion Party aktiv were then mobilized to discuss the draft Constitution with 
workers and collective farmers. In total, 320 Party, Komsomol, and non-
Party aktiv were dispatched to organize lectures at plenums in 35 rural sovi-
ets, as well as lectures and meetings on the collective farms.19 Such networks 
of politically reliable people formed the core group that local officials uti-
lized to implement the discussion, particularly in the countryside where little 
Party and state infrastructure existed. However, as Roberta Manning has 
noted, communists made up a very small number of the local administra-
tors, and those who held administrative posts were young, inexperienced, 
and lacked adequate education.20 So while they may have been reliable sup-
porters of the district organizations and enthusiastic about their role in the 
discussion, they were often overwhelmed by the scope of the organizational 
activities they were charged with. 
Other civic organizations, such as trade unions, teachers’ organizations, 
and street committees, played important roles in the implementation of the 
Implementation of discussion 67
discussion. In Pizhanskii raion, general collective farm discussion meetings 
and smaller brigade meetings were carried out by 28 members of the District 
Party Committee and the District Executive Committee, 30 individuals from 
the Komsomol and trade union aktiv, and 121 teachers and rural aktiv.21 
Shabalinskii raion utilized 126 teachers and 300 readers from the aktiv to 
lead the discussion.22 These civic networks supplemented the core Party 
and aktiv networks in the countryside and the cities, where they were the 
main organizational networks for non-working urban residents. For exam-
ple, in the city of Kirov, street committees and groups affiliated with the 
city administration conducted meetings among otherwise isolated groups, 
such as housewives and disabled people.23 These networks were instrumen-
tal for organizing the discussion, providing existing social hubs that raion 
officials could readily use, but they ran the risk of excluding some groups. 
Limited resources and the enormous scope of the tasks prevented even the 
non-communist administrators from extending their authority much out-
side their patronage and kinship networks.24 For example, in Slobodskoi, 
the city soviet was accused of not reaching out to a broader audience as the 
discussion at the liquor factory was limited to Party study circles and not 
discussed among the workers as a whole.25
Party, Komsomol, and aktiv members provided most of the lecturers and 
meeting organizers for the discussion of the draft Constitution, but their 
political affiliation only represented part of their social identity. The major-
ity of these lecturers worked either in local administrative positions or in 
industrial enterprises. A report from Slobodskoi raion detailed the occupa-
tions of 127 people dispatched to collective farms in the raion. Sixty of those 
recruited to lead discussions worked in light industry, producing leather 
goods, matches, and alcoholic beverages. Forty-six of the recruits worked in 
some kind of administrative position. Among their ranks were members of 
the trade organization (TORG), the machine tractor station, the social ben-
efits office, the match distribution department (ОRS Spichk), and the raion 
educational, financial, health, and land administrations. Their numbers also 
included a people’s investigator, two members of the Slobodskoi city soviet, 
four NKVD officials, a postal worker, and 14 rural soviet chairmen. Six 
people came directly from educational institutions; only six individuals were 
recruited directly from the collective farms.26 Likewise, 656 people were 
selected to organize lectures and meetings on collective farms in Shabalinskii 
raion. Of them, 26 were rural soviet chairmen, 85 were members of rural 
soviets, 14 worked at the general store (sel’po), 12 worked for the schools, 
85 were collective farmers, and 320 were identified as newspaper readers.27 
As this data indicates, the people charged with conducting the discus-
sion of the draft Constitution were often residents of urban and raion cent-
ers; the administrative elite in the town and countryside. They brought an 
administrative understanding to the implementation of the discussion and 
may have found it harder to relate to their collective farm audience, who 
were less well-educated and less familiar with the theories that the central 
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authorities deemed vital to the discussion of the draft Constitution. They 
were drawn from existing Party and state networks and had to shoulder the 
duty of conducting the discussion of the draft Constitution, in addition to 
their own obligations as administrators, workers, or teachers. As a result 
of their many commitments and the number of total meetings they were 
responsible for organizing, the discussion of the Constitution was often cur-
sory, or in some cases non-existent, as the overburdened raion officials and 
aktiv struggled to implement the discussion with little logistical or material 
support. Numerous problems that arose during the implementation of the 
discussion were related to these issues. Nevertheless, many made honest 
efforts to lead the discussion of the draft Constitution, and beginning in 
June the discussion organizers went forth from the raion centers armed with 
newspapers and copies of the draft Constitution. 
Implementation of the discussion of the draft Constitution
The implementation of the discussion was a complex process involving the 
coordination of multiple levels of Soviet administration; the mobilization 
of the national, regional, and local press; and the utilization of preexisting 
Party and state educational and patronage networks. Mary Buckley notes 
similar intricacies in the implementation of Stakhanovite policies in the 
Soviet countryside. Administrative decisions, made in the upper echelons of 
the system, were transmitted to the local administrators, newspaper editors, 
or collective farm leaders who should implement them. District officials, 
based on their local or personal situation, would then choose to obey the 
order, partially implement it, ignore it, or actively avoid it. These responses, 
in turn, prompted reactions from the initiators of the original order.28 These 
same processes were present during the discussion of the draft, with local 
administrators choosing how completely to implement the discussion based 
on their skill level and other demands on their time and participants inter-
preting the text of the draft Constitution as it suited their needs. 
The discussion was implemented more fully in accordance to the central 
leadership’s vision and with far less negotiation in urban areas, where the 
Party and state networks were more fully formed and integrated into urban 
life. This discrepancy is evident in the scope and depth of the discussion 
in urban areas, compared with the countryside, where communists were 
few and the Party and the Soviet state was less entrenched. However, even 
in urban areas, the demands of implementing such a large-scale campaign 
often proved to be too much for many already overtaxed local officials. As a 
result, in many cases the grassroots discussion failed to meet the high expec-
tations of the central and regional leaders, who blamed local and district 
officials for the many problems that arose. 
Most district officials chose to utilize a simple, lecture-style discussion 
of the draft. For example, the inhabitants of Pizhanskii raion discussed the 
draft Constitution multiple times, first at a general collective farm meeting 
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and then in brigades, where the draft was read out by section and article. 
The meeting leaders read every article out loud, often several times, then 
explained them, after which they expressed their opinions of the article to 
the assembled.29 This method proved ineffective overall because these point-
by-point discussions often turned into a discussion of other matters, such as 
economic and political campaigns, loans for haymaking, and preparations 
for harvesting rye. Daily realities and the legal complexities of the discussion 
often distracted or befuddled participants.30 
The district officials of Sovetskii raion, however, broke with the sim-
ple point-by-point reading of the draft that dominated the discussion in 
many districts. While also occasionally relying on reading and discussing 
the various points of the draft Constitution, the Sovetskii district organizers 
explained the demonstrable benefits of the draft Constitution and used dia-
grams and other visual aids to prove their point.31 The Sovetskii district offi-
cials submitted a rather extensive plan for expanding explanatory work in 
the district. Their proposal included: plans to hold meetings with the pupils 
at all the schools, construction workers of all specialties, and service work-
ers of various enterprises, as well as organizing meetings in the Sovetsk city 
districts and on collective farms where the draft had not yet been discussed. 
In order to ensure that meetings were being run effectively, they proposed 
having organizers listen to the secretary of the Regional Party Committee’s 
report entitled, “About the progress of the explanation and discussion of 
the new draft Constitution”; keep statistics on the number of additions, cor-
rections, and suggestions to the new draft Constitution; and systematically 
verify the work of propagandists during the discussion. The local leadership 
also proposed having the Party educational center (парткабинет) and the 
district library organize an exhibition devoted to the new draft Constitution 
and the discussion of that document in the press. They had even assigned 
individuals responsibility for the completion of each of these tasks.32 Such 
an expansive and detailed plan appears to have been exceptional, but local 
leaders in Sovetskii district organized a total of 391 meetings with 20,305 
participants as of the beginning of September.33
While the implementation of the discussion may have varied from dis-
trict to district, the networks upon which district officials relied for the dis-
semination of information and which served as organizational hubs for the 
discussion remained largely consistent. The press and Party and educational 
networks provided the most efficient means of organizing and implement-
ing the discussion of the draft Constitution. The printed press and, to a 
lesser extent, radio played an important role in disseminating information 
about the draft Constitution to a large audience, and newspapers performed 
vital monitoring and didactic functions as well. Local officials often organ-
ized large-scale radio listening sessions. A report from the Regional Party 
Committee noted that on June 11–12, 12,000 laborers in the Kirov region 
listened to the text of the draft Constitution on the radio.34 In Omutninskii 
raion, group meetings to listen to the radio lectures of comrades Stetskii, 
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Vyshinsky, Krylenko, and Shvernik attracted a large audience. Stetskii’s lec-
ture reportedly attracted 396 communists, 98 sympathizers, 200 Komsomol 
members, and 150 members of the non-Party aktiv.35 But because of the 
limited technology in the Russian countryside, radio only played a supple-
mentary role in the discussion. The printed word was the main vehicle for 
conveying information and publicly critiquing the discussion.
On June 15, the Shabalinskii district newspaper printed out 2,200 copies 
of the text of the Constitution and ran 20 separate issues, which touched 
on the progress of the public discussion of the Constitution. Kraiispolkom 
instructor, Gromov, noted that in Shabalinskii raion one would be hard 
pressed to find someone in the district who was not familiar with the draft 
Constitution due to the work of the district newspaper.36 The Pizhanskii 
raion newspaper also very actively promoted the discussion. It published 
14 articles on the Constitution, 12 articles about the progress of the discus-
sion, 29 individual collective farmer statements, and 21 notes from laborers 
about the draft. In all, it devoted a total of 76 newspaper articles to the draft 
Constitution.37 Additionally, the regional newspaper played an important 
role in publicizing the discussion. As of September 17, Kirovskaia Pravda 
had printed over 100 testimonials and suggested additions to the draft 
Constitution.38 
As previously mentioned, newspaper articles written by central authori-
ties provided discussion materials for study circles and meetings. Agitators 
in Slobodskoi raion took advantage of the widespread press coverage to 
familiarize the participants of meetings with additions and corrections and 
often used material from the local press, Pravda, and Izvestiia to address 
questions regarding the draft Constitution. The use of newspaper materials 
helped liven up the meetings and connect the discussion back to the state-
building narrative that central authorities wished to underline.39
The press did more than spread information and focus popular discus-
sion. It also called to task officials and other organizers who were not prop-
erly managing the discussion. Kirovskaia Pravda ran a series of articles 
detailing the failings of local officials. By presenting investigative articles on 
local officials’ failures, they not only criticized those who failed but dem-
onstrated the kind of behavior that was deemed inappropriate to a broader 
audience of discussion organizers. In an article entitled, “The Mistakes of 
Mozhga City Soviet,” the author, Nazarov, described how poorly the city 
soviet discussed the draft Constitution and how this lackadaisical attitude 
affected the discussion in general in the city. The discussion was initiated at 
a poorly attended plenum of the city soviet where just half the deputies were 
present and only two or three participated in debate after the formal report. 
The general discussion in the city was also poorly organized and attended. 
Of the 1,500 people listed in the “unorganized” population of the city, only 
half discussed the draft Constitution. About 20 meetings were held through-
out the city, but no meeting minutes existed for them because the deputy 
director of the city soviet gave an order to not write them. Six additions to 
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the draft Constitution were recorded, but it was unclear who made them. 
This dismissive attitude was reflected in the attitudes of other local leaders, 
whom Kirovskaia Pravda also took to task.40 
Kirovskaia Pravda highlighted that the wrong kind of discussion could 
be just as harmful as no discussion in “The Mistakes of a Raiispolkom,” 
which focused on the Bogorodskii District Executive Committee’s mistaken 
transformation of the TsIK directive for discussion (obsuzhdeniia) into a 
cursory “working up” (prorabotka) of the draft Constitution and the nega-
tive effects that this had on the discussion in the raion. The author, М. 
Vakhnin, from the raion center, Bogorodskoe, noted that instead of imple-
menting the Central Executive Committee directive, the raiispolkom sent 
out “this mistaken illiterate directive” to every rural soviet chairman:
In the absolute majority of the rural soviets the working up (прорабо
тке)!?41 of the draft Constitution has not begun. The presidium of the 
raiispolkom thinks its importance is underestimated. We ask that every 
collective farm chairman personally organize the working up over the 
course of three or four days. 
Vakhnin accused the District Executive Committee of “debasing the 
Constitution with their bureaucratic game” through the use of the term 
“working up,” which had a devastating effect on the quality of the dis-
cussion. Vakhnin reported that at the plenum of Basharskii rural soviet, 
“the greatest document of the era was discussed as such: “listened to 
Mikriukov’s ‘working up’ of the draft Constitution, Resolved: the draft was 
adopted and ‘worked up’ on every collective farm.” Similarly, the members 
of Veprevskii rural soviet listened to Comrade Anisimov’s “working up” 
of the Constitution and decided to adopt it without discussing the draft at 
all on the collective farms. Though he blamed the raiispolkom directive for 
the poor quality of the discussion in the raion, Vakhnin also held the local 
newspaper culpable for not correcting this mistake. He claimed that the 
editorial board of the raion newspaper, Kolkhoznaya Zaria, “knew about 
the mistake committed by the District Executive Committee and the rural 
soviets but remained silent.”42 The failure of local officials to conduct the 
discussion in a proper manner meant that in many areas the Constitution 
was not discussed as Soviet leaders had intended. The press (specifically 
Kirovskaia Pravda) fulfilled its role as watchdog of the state and investiga-
tor of complaints by exposing these shortcomings as a way to redress them 
and to demonstrate that the poor implementation of the discussion of the 
draft Constitution was not acceptable and would not go unnoticed.
The press also played a didactic function, providing a template of how 
to conduct the discussion by allowing organizers to share both the mistakes 
that had been made during the discussion as well as their successes. On 
October 29, Kirovskaia Pravda published a series of articles on organizers’ 
experience designed to showcase these difficulties and achievements. In the 
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article “My Mistake,” Semyon Teren’evich Utrobin, a gauger at a fur and 
lambskin coat factory, recounted his experience organizing study circles for 
the factory’s workers living in dorms and communal housing, those who 
studied at home or on weekends, and for the remainder of the workers who 
gathered in sections after work on the last day of a five-day shift. The circles 
were very successful, and many participants offered additions and sugges-
tions. However, Utrobin had not considered it important enough to record 
these suggestions but planned to remedy this mistake over the course of 
the next two or three days.43 Likewise, in her article, “In Place of In-depth 
Study, Reading Aloud,” Elizaveta Vasil’evna Iakimova, a senior dryer at the 
leather combine, reported that she had established a constitutional discus-
sion circle that 30 of her 42 colleagues regularly attended. However, the cir-
cle was poorly led. The director of the combine, Comrade Iabloko, led the 
study sessions, but rather than discussing and analyzing every point of the 
Constitution, he only read the draft aloud. The group met irregularly, and 
although Iakimova had asked the Party committee for a special day devoted 
to the work of the circle, it had not yet provided an answer.44 Leadership 
was also a problem in the study circles of the Comintern leather factory. 
In his article, “To better select the leaders of circles,” Veniami Ignat’evich 
Laptev described how he had helped to organize a study group in his section 
of the factory and how this group had chosen an old Bolshevik, Comrade 
Presnetsov, to lead them. He was considered a good choice because he was 
politically educated, but Presnetsov knew it and dominated the circle. Many 
workers left lessons dissatisfied and with many baffling questions. Laptev 
noted that it was necessary to pick better leaders and to organize special 
seminars for them.45 
While these organizers of study circles had attracted participants eager to 
study the draft Constitution, they had failed to record popular responses, 
or there were leadership problems that made the discussion experience frus-
trating for the participants. The ideal discussion experience was captured 
in N. Shevnin’s letter, “Seminars for the Discussion of the Constitution,” 
which described the implementation of the discussion in Pizhanskii raion. 
He noted that in all the rural soviets in Pizhanskii raion, there were two-day 
seminars to study the Stalinist Constitution. Thirty to 35 people partici-
pated in each seminar, including members of the rural soviets, auditing com-
mittee members, chairmen of collective farms, and Stakhanovites. Members 
of the District Party Committee, the presidium of the District Executive 
Committee, and the district Party aktiv led the lessons. The population was 
deeply involved in the discussion and proposed many suggestions.46 Not 
only did this well-organized discussion generate suggestions, but they were 
all dutifully recorded. Shevnin’s letter illustrated all the key components 
that central and regional officials were looking for in the implementation of 
the discussion: a well-prepared and involved rural leadership and an active 
and lively discussion that generated many suggestions that were recorded 
and sent to the press or central officials. The first three articles illustrated 
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the pitfalls that organizers should try to avoid, while the fourth provided a 
template for a successful discussion. 
The timing of these articles reflected a resurgence of the discussion cam-
paign in preparation for the congresses of Soviets in the fall. Chronologically, 
the discussion was strongly promoted after the initial publication of the 
draft Constitution in June and then again in the fall in preparation for the 
district congresses of Soviets and the regional congress of Soviets. The atten-
tion from the press and regional officials spurred raion officials to concerted 
action in June. A region-wide campaign to conduct meetings and assem-
blies took place in Kirov (city) and in a majority of the other cities in the 
region, in factories, villages, collective farms, and enterprises from June 12 
to 20.47 Regional officials came out to support local officials in their effort to 
engage the populace in the discussion. On June 16, at a meeting in the city 
of Kirov, the secretary of the Regional Party Committee, Comrade Stoliar, 
highlighted the importance of the ongoing discussion by giving a report 
about the draft Constitution to an audience of 17,000 people.48 However, 
by the end of June, attention to the discussion of the draft had waned. An 
instructor from the Regional Executive Committee noted that as of October 
19, only 65.1 percent of the work-aged population in Kirovskii raion had 
participated in a discussion of the draft. The ebbing of the discussion during 
the summer months resulted from various factors, including the demands of 
the growing season, cadres’ fatigue after the initial push, and a sense among 
many that they had done their job. Nonetheless, the preparations for the 
district congresses of Soviets sparked renewed efforts to engage the popula-
tion in discussing the draft. 
An overview of the discussion in Votkinskii raion provides the best 
example of this ebb and flow. On June 12, 8,000 urban and rural work-
ers attended meetings to discuss the draft Constitution. Four-hundred-
and-forty-seven people attended a plenum of Norodskii soviet, Votkinskii 
raion, to discuss the draft Constitution on June 15. Additionally, in June, 
5,632 people attended the constitutional discussion meetings in the factories 
and enterprises of Votkinsk, where they asked 372 questions and actively 
engaged in debates. On June 22, the Votkinsk street committees organized 
meetings in nine locations, which attracted 1,153 participants. However, 
no other activities related to the discussion of the draft Constitution were 
reported until August 28, when the city soviet presidium decided to organ-
ize seminars for the leaders of the deputy group sections and leaders of 
the street committees on the draft Constitution. On September 3, 560 peo-
ple attended a plenum at which the progress of the discussion of the draft 
Constitution was examined.49 As this example makes clear, the discussion 
had a certain rhythm. No mention of the draft Constitution was made for 
two months during the summer, but in the fall, at the time when prepara-
tions were made for the district congresses and the harvest had been brought 
in, the leadership of Votkinskii raion once again made the discussion of the 
draft Constitution an important issue.
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The most complete picture of the day-to-day workings of the discus-
sion of the draft comes from Slobodskoi raion. The data provided by the 
Slobodskoi District Party Committee showed significant differences in the 
way that the discussion was conducted in the rural and urban parts of the 
raion. The number of meetings and meeting participants, the type of sug-
gestions offered, and whether the discussion happened in large general 
meetings or in smaller study circles all serve to illustrate the marked dif-
ference between the discussion in the cities and in the countryside. While 
the data from the collective farms is incomplete, it would appear that most 
collective farms hosted only one meeting on the draft Constitution. These 
meetings not only failed to engage with most of the collective farmers, but 
also tended to have a campaign character, which precluded lengthy discus-
sion, and were often limited to point-by-point readings of the text followed 
by questions. In Slobodskoi district, 261 meetings with a total of 8,291 
participants were organized on the collective farms, with an average of 32 
participants per meeting.50 A total of 237 suggestions were proposed, 171 
(70 percent) were collective or group suggestions, 59 were made by indi-
viduals, and seven were classified as not relevant to the Constitution. On 
the seven collective farms that provided complete data, only two thirds 
(65.9 percent) of the total population participated in the discussion of the 
draft Constitution.51 
The better-established Party and state networks in the rural soviets 
allowed for multiple meetings and a more in-depth discussion of the draft 
Constitution, though as can be seen, increased participation did not mean an 
increased adherence to the topics approved by the central leadership. In fact, 
in Slobodskoi district, increased participation seems to have corresponded 
with a marked increase in “irrelevant” suggestions. Meetings conducted 
in the rural soviets, rather than on the collective farm, had a significantly 
higher rate of participation. An average of twelve meetings focused on the 
draft Constitution were held in each rural soviet, ranging from two semi-
nars in Morozovskii rural soviet to 28 meetings in Volkovskii rural soviet. 
A total of 16,873 participants attended 293 total meetings (an average of 
58 participants per meeting). The participants offered up 459 suggestions: 
174 (37.8 percent) collective suggestions, 84 (18.3 percent) individual sug-
gestions, and a whopping 201(43 percent) suggestions, which were deemed 
not relevant to the Constitution.52 
In the urban areas, where Party and state networks were the strongest, the 
percentage of the population that participated in the discussion of the draft 
Constitution was the greatest, and many of the industrial workers made 
individual suggestions. In the industrial enterprises in the city of Slobodskoi, 
82 meetings took place in ten different enterprises, ranging from two assem-
blies in four of the smaller factories to 48 meetings in the largest enterprise, 
the “Squirrel” fur factory. The seminars averaged 66 participants and a total 
of 5,380 people, or 87.2 percent of the industrial workers of the city, partici-
pated in the discussion of the draft Constitution. A total of 17 suggestions 
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were made at these meetings: the participants offered four collective sug-
gestions and 13 individual suggestions.53 A similar trend held true for the 
industrial enterprises in the rest of the raion. Ninety-five total meetings were 
held in eight enterprises, ranging from two meetings in the Kustarka artel’ to 
40 meetings in the “Spas” fur factory, with an average of 48 participants per 
meeting. Some 5,589 people, or 87.8 percent of the total industrial popula-
tion, participated in the discussion. They offered up 15 suggestions to the 
draft Constitution: five collective suggestions and ten individual.54 
However, the participation data for the non-industrial urban population, 
who relied heavily on local civic organizations to organize the discussion, 
more closely resembled that of the rural areas than the highly organized 
industrial enterprises. In the city of Slobodskoi, 12 civic organizations, such 
as the housing trust, the postal organization, street committees, and house-
wife organizations conducted 23 meetings with 730 total participants (an 
average of 32 participants per meeting). An average of 1.9 meetings were 
conducted per organization, ranging from one assembly in seven organiza-
tions to four seminars in Mekhovshik. The participants offered up a total 
of 43 suggestions: seven were group suggestions, but a massive amount 
(27, or 79.4 percent of suggestions) were considered irrelevant to the 
draft Constitution.55
All of these numbers point to one obvious fact—the discussion among 
the urban industrial population was much better organized than elsewhere, 
even if the number of meetings and participants seems comparatively mod-
est in comparison to the much larger rural population. The segments of the 
population, which had fewer nodes of daily interaction with the Party and 
state, did not engage in in-depth examination of the draft Constitution in 
study circles. District Party Committee officials themselves acknowledged 
this shortcoming: 
It is necessary to note that if in the city and among the industrial work-
ers, the discussion of the draft Constitution proceeded systematically 
and had a broad reach, then in the countryside the discussion proceeded 
poorly and to a considerable extent had a campaign-like character.56 
While the press, radio, and organizers dispatched to the countryside suc-
ceeded in involving collective farmers in the discussion, poorly prepared 
and overworked cadres combined with a weak base of support in the coun-
tryside led to an overall more cursory discussion of the draft Constitution 
in the rural areas of the Kirov region. A campaign-style mentality was more 
widespread in the countryside, leading in many cases to an overview of the 
text rather than a real discussion. Like all Soviet campaigns of the period, 
the discussion of the draft Constitution experienced difficulties that stopped 
it from becoming the nationwide discussion that the central Party and state 
officials had envisioned. These failures, discussed below, drew the ire of the 
central leadership. 
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Problems with the discussion of the draft
Like all Soviet campaigns, the discussion of the draft Constitution was 
plagued by problems. Many of those dispatched to conduct the discussion 
were ill-prepared and ill-suited for the task. The Kirov city soviet noted 
problems with a particular propagandist, comrade Glukhikh, whose les-
sons on the Constitution were poorly prepared. He read the Constitution 
section-by-section and, after the reading of each section, asked the listeners, 
“what is not clear to you”? Because the listeners poorly understood the 
material and did not wish to embarrass themselves, they did not ask any 
questions, and Glukhikh proceeded to read on.57 Poor preparation was also 
the hallmark of the study circles in the KUShTO Combine.58 Three com-
munists, comrades Buldakov, Sozontov, and Zubartov, led these discussion 
circles, and they performed badly. Upon inspection, Comrade Buldakov’s 
circle had only 31 out of its 62 members present. The lesson began with a 
rapid reading of the Constitution because people were anxious to leave. As 
the leader of the circle, Buldakov was not able to answer listeners’ ques-
tions and did not conduct a more in-depth study of the draft Constitution. 
Comrade Sozontov’s circle had 41 of its 48 members present, but no women 
participated. Sozontov did not read the Constitution beforehand and had 
not thought about how to present the material, and consequently stumbled 
through the text. Comrade Zubartov’s circle had 71 of its 80 members pre-
sent at the beginning, but ten people left during the course of the lesson. He 
also read poorly, stumbling over words. At the end of an article, he would 
ask the listeners if they understood; if they said yes or were silent, he moved 
on and did not delve deeper into the text. In every case, the circle leaders did 
not provide examples that would help listeners understand the Constitution 
better, and they were also rather incompetent at answering questions.59 This 
cursory overview of the draft was clearly the opposite of what the central 
and regional officials had intended and only served to further alienate the 
listeners. 
Lecture attendance and overall participation in the public discussion was 
an ongoing problem. In the city of Kirov, an investigation into the implemen-
tation of the discussion found that study circles had trouble attracting and 
keeping members, as many were poorly organized and met infrequently. In 
the Stalinskii district of Kirov city, 50 out of 255 circles were not functional, 
and the remaining had conducted only two or three lessons. The industrial 
enterprises in Kirov had similar problems. In the KUTShO combine, all 48 
circles carried out three lessons, but never had 100 percent attendance.60 
Forest Factory No. 2 had 340 people organized into seven study circles that 
conducted four lessons and had an overall attendance rate of 66 percent. 
The lessons in these circles consisted only of readings; no in-depth analysis 
of the articles of the draft Constitution occurred.61 In Slobodskoi raion, 
attendance in some productive enterprises was likewise low. At the beer 
factory, only 167 of the 266 workers and service personnel had discussed 
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the draft, and only 37 of the 116 workers and service personnel at the artel’ 
“Mashinostroitel’” had done so.62 
Regional officials blamed raion administrators’ inattentiveness for the 
inactivity and poor work of the local organizers. A report from Kirov TASS 
(the Kirov section of the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union) noted that 
in Iaranskii raion, Abramycheskii rural soviet, the local communists were 
not working very hard (палец не ударили) and had not conducted a single 
meeting with collective farmers to explain the draft Constitution.63 While 
these shirkers were identified by name, Kirov TASS squarely placed the 
blame for their failure and other shortcomings on the Raikom:
The District Party Committee knew that the discussion of the draft 
Constitution on the collective farms was poorly organized, however 
upon dispatching the propagandists, no one in the Raikom thought it 
necessary to verify their work. Instructor Miliaev was supposed to cor-
roborate the organization of the discussion on the collective farms, but 
this Miliaev has never been on a single collective farm. He waits for 
propagandists to return from the collective farms with travel vouchers, 
which, in turn, the chairmen of the rural soviet must certify. Many of the 
propagandists have not yet gone to the collective farms. In Iaransk, this 
important political work proceeds irresponsibly and bureaucratically.64
A similar report came from Regional Executive Committee organizational 
section instructors, who noted that in Slobodskoi raion, a great deal of effort 
had been put into the discussion, but nonetheless, local officials had failed 
to fulfill their duties. There were rural soviet workers who had not read the 
Constitution themselves, and in several rural soviets, discussion work had 
been foisted onto the heads of the collective farms.65 At the plenum of the 
Leninskii rural soviet, the decision was made “to obligate the chairmen of 
the collective farms to ‘work up’ the draft Constitution on their collective 
farms.” As a result, on Bolshoi Shoromovskii collective farm and Eprinskii 
collective farm, the draft Constitution was not discussed. Likewise, in 
Stulovskii rural soviet, the draft Constitution was not discussed on two of 
the three collective farms that they checked. 
A related failing that attracted the ire of the Regional Party Committee 
and Regional Executive Committee was the “working up” (проработка) 
of the draft Constitution by agitators and propagandists rather than the 
discussion (обсуждения) of its contents. Kraiispolkom instructor Lepekhin 
highlighted why the term “working up” was viewed in a negative light, as 
it “reeks of bureaucratism, and a formulaic approach to such a colossal 
task as the all union discussion of the draft Constitution.”66 “Working up” 
denoted paying only limited attention and devoting minimal time to the 
discussion of the draft Constitution, creating a short campaign-like over-
view rather than the in-depth discussion envisioned by central and regional 
authorities. For example, in Bogorodskii raion, on August 13, the District 
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Executive Committee sent out a directive in which specific directions were 
given to “work up” the draft Constitution. As a result, a set term for the 
public discussion was established in the rural soviets, with the discussion to 
end by August 26.67 Similar events took place in Vladimirovskii rural soviet, 
Kotel’nicheskii raion, where, at the June 24 session of the presidium, it was 
suggested that the chairmen of the collective farms and members of the rural 
soviets “work up” the draft in general collective farm meetings. They were 
to present extracts from the meeting protocols to the rural soviet no later 
than June 26. In Kotel’nicheskii rural soviet, Kotel’nicheskii raion, the pre-
sidium of the rural soviet, discussed the draft Constitution on June 13 and 
resolved to “work it up” at the next plenum and on every collective farm; 
they set the deadline for June 25.68 Even in the city of Kirov, a city Party 
committee report accused a number of leaders of trying to transform the 
discussion of the draft Constitution into a short-term campaign with limited 
meetings and general assemblies.69 This bureaucratic approach undermined 
the political importance that central leaders attached to the discussion and 
rendered any real participation impossible.
An unpublished report from Kirov TASS noted the adverse effects “work-
ing up” had on the discussion in Iaranskii raion.70 The report focused on 
a particular incident from Abramycheskii rural soviet involving comrade 
Baklanov, a Raikom plenum member. Comrade Baklanov organized one 
meeting to discuss the draft, which was poorly attended, and at that meeting 
the draft was adopted without any changes. After hosting this one meeting, 
“Baklanov obviously thought that his work was done, as he did not appear 
again on a single collective farm of that rural soviet.” In addition to shirk-
ing his duties, he further undermined the implementation of the discussion 
by calling on others to follow his example. The reporter from Kirov TASS 
noted with disgust: 
With sleight of hand, comrade Baklanov of Abramychevskii rural soviet 
suggested to the administrations of collective farms to quickly “exam-
ine” the draft Constitution on the collective farms. On many collective 
farms, chairmen and brigadiers read out the draft Constitution with-
out discussion, moving on to the solution of everyday questions. For 
example, on the Stalin collective farm, in the protocol of the meeting of 
collective farmers, it is written: “Agenda: the Constitution—the funda-
mental law of the USSR,—the first question the ‘examination’ of con-
stitutional law, Lecturer G. E. Tantarov. Decided: Constitutional law 
adopted. Pregnant women are freed from work for 2 months before and 
after the birth and are given working days with median pay.”71
Another example of the negative effects that “working up” the draft 
Constitution had on in-depth debate comes from Prosnitskii raion, where 
the public discussion became a formal “working up” that took the form 
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of readings at all-kolkhoz and brigade meetings. The regional inspector 
claimed that, 
such an organization of work made it so that no one had a knowledgea-
ble opinion about any point of the draft Constitution, as a consequence 
of such banal formalism in the discussion well thought out additions 
and suggestions to the draft Constitution were scarce. 
The suggestions that he found so objectionable included the guarantee of 
social security to collective farmers in case of the death of the head of house 
or inability to work, the guarantee of a yearly vacation to collective farmers, 
and free study and use of textbooks by students.72 
Regional officials considered it unacceptable that raion and other local 
officials did not fulfill their duties. Such a failure demonstrated a lack of 
commitment to an important political task, but more importantly it lowered 
the quality of the discussion among the populace. Without strong reinforce-
ment from those leading the discussion, meetings, suggestions, and additions 
to the draft Constitution tended to deviate from the prescribed narrative. 
Instead, suggestions came to focus on local and personal interests rather 
than the larger goal of mobilizing the populace in continued state-building 
efforts. Stephen Kotkin notes that many Soviet policies and programs often 
contained irreconcilable aspects that surfaced during attempts to implement 
them, as the implementation methods were often at odds with the stated 
goals of the programs and policies. Additionally, as these policies and pro-
grams formed part of ordinary and higher-up people’s lives, their reactions, 
initiatives, and responses significantly influenced how those programs were 
implemented, circumvented, and changed in unforeseen ways. These func-
tional problems and reinterpretations of policy on the periphery often led to 
results that were not entirely what the Bolshevik leadership had intended.73 
Comrade Mironov, a delegate of the Regional Party Committee, noted 
the correlation between a poorly organized local discussion and the rise of 
local and personal suggestions to the draft:
The organization of the discussion of the draft Constitution was not 
strengthened by anyone. There were twenty members of the raion aktiv 
who were dispatched, [and] who conducted lectures. School work-
ers and collective farmers made reports to the chairman of the collec-
tive farm. There were cases where in meetings of collective farmers, 
some literate collective farmer read the text of the Constitution and 
the discussion was limited to this. As a result of such a discussion, the 
majority of questions brought forward focused on equality with the 
working class, granting of benefits to elderly collective farmers, about 
vacations for collective farmers, about securing the eternal usage of gar-
den plots, free vacations, medical aid, payment in money, not in kind 
or natural resources. Here, such a relationship to the organization of 
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the discussion of the Constitution speaks of formal preparation. The 
protocols of the rural soviets are extraordinarily careless. For exam-
ple in Kuznetskii artel’, they wrote not a word about listening to the 
Constitution, but rather wrote that they listened to the newspaper and 
made a point to add about the establishment of a 7 hour working day 
and also a number of such occurrences. All of this says that in the rai-
ispolkom, there are comrades who were sent for the discussion of the 
Constitution in the rural soviets, who don’t display serious attitudes 
towards this question.74
Regional officials blamed district officials’ failure to organize the discus-
sion properly around the master narrative for the rise of “off-topic” sug-
gestions. State and party officials never considered these suggestions, which 
as we shall see were among the most frequently proposed and actually 
reflected the desires of the populace. Likewise, in Lebiazhskii raion, where 
the District Executive Committee shifted the work on the discussion of the 
draft Constitution onto the shoulders of the chairmen of the rural soviets 
and collective farm chairmen, the regional officials blamed raion officials 
for “aberrant” suggestions, such as the proposal to organize legal peasant 
unions.75 A similar situation occurred at a meeting of the workers of the 
Slobodskoi forest production enterprise, where the draft Constitution was 
approved with changes to the following articles: to Article 11, include 100 
percent of all office workers at the forest production enterprise, to Article 
121, include technical education for 100 percent of all service workers and 
workers of the Slobodskoi forest production enterprise and the district for-
est products enterprise.76 Likewise, a regional Party committee report noted 
that in Slobodskoi raion, in a majority of cases the suggestions brought to 
the draft Constitution had an individual character, such as vacations for col-
lective farmers and the granting of forests to the collective farm, which was 
attributed to poor leadership of the discussion.77
Conclusion
The discussion of the draft Constitution was supposed to mobilize the 
entire population of the USSR to study the text of the draft Constitution, 
its theoretical underpinnings, and the rights and duties conveyed to citi-
zens, all within the context of continuing to build socialism. The central 
officials promulgated this narrative in the press and pushed local officials to 
create detailed lesson plans to meet these goals. In urban areas, where the 
Party and state had a strong presence and strong existing networks from 
which to draw organizers and agitational workers, the discussion of the 
draft Constitution proceeded more or less as the central officials envisioned 
it, although as discussed above, they were not problem-free. Study circles, 
meetings and radio listening sessions on the draft Constitution were organ-
ized and were relatively well-attended, although as noted above, there were 
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quite a few exceptions. However, the local cadres tasked with implementing 
the discussion were often poorly trained and poorly prepared. On the col-
lective farms, cadres’ social standing often alienated them from their pri-
marily rural audience. The discussion had a more pronounced campaign 
character in the countryside as well, which often led to a “working up” of 
the Constitution rather than a sustained discussion. 
As additions to the draft Constitution began to trickle into regional and 
central offices, officials noted a large number of “individual” and “inappro-
priate” suggestions coming from the countryside. Such suggestions tended 
to focus on local and personal matters, like collective farm vacation days, 
rather than the grand scheme of socialist construction that central officials 
had sought to emphasize in their lesson plans and articles published in the 
central press. Raion officials’ organizational failures were blamed for the 
prominence of such suggestions. Central expectations were not and prob-
ably could not have been fulfilled in the implementation of the discussion 
of the draft Constitution by the local authorities tasked with carrying out 
their directives. The state had overreached and, by opening up the draft 
Constitution for discussion, it received responses that deviated wildly from 
its expectations. Unable or unwilling to concede that these suggestions may 
have been honest representations of popular opinion, regional and central 
authorities blamed raion officials. And, as we shall see in Chapter 6, those 
authorities used the discussion of the draft Constitution to have many local 
officials removed from office by their constituents.
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The popular discussion of the draft Constitution was supposed to unite the 
country in the pursuit of a common goal: the construction of socialism. 
What it succeeded in doing, however, was highlighting fractures in Soviet 
society and the dissonance between the central leadership’s state-building 
goals and the citizens’ local and personal focus. In the Kirov region, the 
popular responses reflected the socioeconomic divisions of the region, with 
most of the suggestions coming from rural inhabitants and focusing on 
issues that concerned them. Their suggestions demonstrated both the con-
tinuity between rural concerns in the pre-revolutionary period and under 
Soviet rule and served to highlight the changes in the mentality that 20 
years of Soviet power had wrought. However, the goals of Kirov’s pri-
marily rural inhabitants stand in sharp contrast with the more publicized 
suggestions made by the better-educated and more-integrated urban dwell-
ers who were much more likely to embrace the central leadership’s state-
building narrative than their rural counterparts. The popular discussion of 
the draft Constitution revealed that the heavily promoted and publicized 
state-building goals of the central party and state leadership were internal-
ized by only a small stratum of citizens, most of whom were members of 
the urban and working elite, while the vast, rural majority of the popula-
tion co-opted and used official language to promote their own local and 
personal aims. 
The contrast between the rural and urban discussion can be best seen 
by comparing the discussion of the draft Constitution as it was presented 
in the local newspapers with the reports compiled by district and regional 
officials from the popular discussion at large. As mentioned in the previ-
ous chapter, the central state and Party officials tried to guide and shape 
the discussion by urging local leaders to emphasize state-building aspects 
of the draft and criticizing discussion organizers when participants made 
many personal or locally oriented suggestions, a function for which Soviet 
newspapers were perfectly suited. Newspapers relied heavily on letters and 
materials from privileged groups, such as Party members, Stakhanovites, 
order winners, collective farm chairpeople, and urban workers. Such peo-
ple, though perhaps not representative of urban dwellers and intellectuals 
4 Validators of socialist victory 
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as a whole, tended to have a broader worldview and to conform more to 
the messages presented in official publications and in lesson plans.1 The 
popular discussion highlighted the stark divide between this small, yet 
active, educated, and privileged population, which had been successfully 
integrated into Soviet society, and the vast majority of the population, 
who focused on local and personal matters and were more isolated from 
state power.2 
The Party and the Soviet state had always been very conscious of public 
opinion and experimented with various ways of eliciting public opinion and 
support. As Jeremy Hicks notes, by 1922, letter writing had become institu-
tionalized as a source of information and a means of encouraging participa-
tion.3 The state sought to harness this enthusiasm and to turn public opinion 
into a force for establishing institutional forms of control, particularly in the 
periphery, where the local Party and state apparatus seemed at times beyond 
the center’s governance. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the workers’ and 
peasants’ correspondents movement took on the roles of the eyes and ears 
of the Party in the countryside, reporting on local officials who were not 
fulfilling their duties, on the success and failure of various campaigns, and 
other issues. Matthew Lenoe notes that for the authors, letters were a chan-
nel of petitions to those with all types of powers: asking for a job, expressing 
opinions for or against the Party line, settling private disputes, or seeking 
redress for injustice.4 
The local press was an important forum for the popular discussion of the 
draft Constitution, as it provided articles on the basic rights and democratic 
principles ensconced in the draft as well as letters from the inhabitants of 
the Kirov region about these rights and principles. The press reflected the 
center’s focus on creating enduring forms of administration, military power, 
revenue extraction, and economic development, and tied letter writers’ per-
sonal achievements or concerns to the master state-building narrative in 
a way not seen in public discussion in the countryside. Of the approxi-
mately 180 letters and suggestions printed in the main regional newspaper, 
Kirovskaia Pravda, most came from the urban dwellers or privileged rural 
workers: engineers, workers, housewives, political figures, brigadiers, doc-
tors, Stakhanovites, collective farm leaders, and tractor drivers.5 These cor-
respondents represented the strata of society that benefited the most from 
Soviet power, and as a result they were better educated and more supportive 
of the Party and other state groups. 
Their position as beneficiaries of the Soviet regime and believers in 
Soviet ideology is reflected in the tone and focus of their letters. Many let-
ters focused on the benefits and opportunities that Soviet citizenship had 
provided for them and how they would try to repay the regime with even 
greater labor outputs. One such letter, entitled, “Women in the workplace,” 
was written by N. Sumaneeva, an award-winning collective farmer from the 
Rosa Luxemburg collective farm. Sumaneeva’s letter describes how happy 
she was to hear6 the text of the new draft Constitution, which had “Stalinist 
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concern for the people embedded in it from beginning to end.”7 She enumer-
ates the tangible and intangible benefits the Soviet regime brought her: 
“I was illiterate, lived poorly and was dressed badly. Now I have become 
literate, have a house, a radio, a portable gramophone, a bicycle and 
good clothing. The government greatly values my work. In 1935, I was 
awarded the order ‘Mark of Honor’ for Stakhanovite flax processing 
work. 
She made clear that she felt like a valued and honored member of society 
who lived comfortably and was rewarded for her hard work. But, accord-
ing to Sumaneeva, these benefits were not just for her, they extended to 
all women, thanks to the new draft Constitution, which guaranteed equal 
rights, equal pay for equal work, and the right to vote and hold office. 
In gratitude to the Soviet state, Sumaneeva and her fellow collective farm 
women pledged to give back: 
This wonderful Stalinist policy makes me and the collective farm women 
of my work team happy and makes us wish to incessantly struggle for 
the attainment of the greatest flax harvest in the world. Thank you com-
rade Stalin for a good happy life.8
Sumaneeva’s letter is representative of much of the correspondence reprinted 
in Kirovskaia Pravda. Most of the writers had experienced significant 
improvements in their lives. They had either risen to positions of promi-
nence in economic or political areas, had seen increases in standards of liv-
ing, or had new educational opportunities. All seemed to earnestly believe 
in the Soviet system. They became “validators” for the regime. For example, 
Matvei Tubylov, a member of the rural Soviet, discussed how his parents 
could not vote during the Tsarist period, but he had been elected at the age 
of 24 to the rural Soviet. He noted how his family now had livestock and 
he owned a bicycle.9 Soviet power had brought his family the possibility of 
political participation and an improved lifestyle. A similar letter came from 
section leader, A. P. Smertina, on the “New Construction” collective farm. 
She noted that, in the past, she had been an illiterate peasant; now she was 
a citizen with full rights and a Stakhanovite worker on the collective farm. 
The state offered her unique opportunities to participate in the civic life of 
the country as a Stakhanovite. She talked about how she would never forget 
her participation in the 2nd Congress of Stakhanovite-Shock Workers in 
1934, where “together with our beloved Leaders [she] participated in the 
making of regulations on collective farm life.” Smertina also focused on 
how the Soviet state and the new Constitution provided opportunities for 
her children. She was the mother of nine children, eight of whom were in 
school, and she praised the Constitution for the right to education, which 
she believed would open many doors for them.10
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Like Tubylov and Smertina, many of the validators’ letters focused on 
how the new rights embodied in the draft Constitution resonated in their 
lives. In a letter originally entitled, “The Voice of an Elderly Man,” I. F 
Men’shkov, the 65-year-old accountant at the Kotel’nich mental hospital, 
explained that he was very pleased to see Article 120 about material aid 
in the draft Constitution. However, he considered it necessary to make 
some changes, specifically to lower the age for receiving a pension to 60 
and have the size of the pension be determined by the number of years 
worked. Above all, he considered it important to establish personal pen-
sions for those workers, like himself, who had worked more than 40 years.11 
Kopanev, a controller for the mechanical section of KUTShO,12 was another 
person whose life had been transformed by the benefits that the Soviet state 
provided for its citizens. He suffered from tuberculosis and was sent to a 
health resort for medical treatment, which was a right guaranteed to him 
under Article 120 of the draft Constitution. Additionally, the state educated 
his children for free, and every year his children relaxed at a Pioneer camp. 
Kopanev stated that he was waiting with impatience for the approval of 
the new Constitution, which codified these rights and expressed the state’s 
concern for its people.13 These personal stories served to concretely illus-
trate how socialism had transformed the lives of those who embraced it and 
worked hard.
Even a formerly disenfranchised member of society used the constitu-
tional discussion to demonstrate how the Soviet state had improved his 
life, despite the disadvantages that he still faced. Seventy-year-old Filipp 
Borodin, a person formerly deprived of voting rights, and as a result, liable 
for individual taxes, embraced Soviet power. He supported the Soviet sys-
tem because it had re-educated him and provided opportunities for his chil-
dren to live off the fruits of their own labor. Borodin had become a shock 
worker on the Stakhanovite work team in his collective farm and had sub-
scribed to a 50 ruble loan to the state.14 This man’s experience demonstrated 
how difficult it was to compartmentalize Soviet citizens based on one aspect 
of their identity. As a formerly disenfranchised person, it would stand to 
reason that Borodin would be anti-Soviet; instead, he embraced the positive 
changes in his life and became a Soviet supporter. While this letter undoubt-
edly served propagandistic functions, such as demonstrating that many of 
the formerly disenfranchised had reformed, it also served to illustrate that 
individual decisions and situations often served to drive state-citizen rela-
tions in the USSR.
The majority of the letters published in Kirovskaia Pravda served to vali-
date the state’s assertions that it had provided spiritually and materially 
for its citizens, and that many of these gains were codified in the new draft 
constitution.15 A great number of the authors responded by asserting that 
they would work harder for the state in appreciation for their new rights 
and privileges. Letters to Kirovskaia Pravda frequently dealt with the theme 
of working harder as an expression of appreciation. In the article, “The 
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Constitution Restored my Youth,” 57-year-old Stepan Dorofaevich Iuferov, 
a brigadier and order winner on the “Science” collective farm in Shabalinskii 
raion, was particularly impressed with how the Constitution gave laborers 
the right to free speech and press, which he thought was only possible in the 
USSR. Iuferov also noted that the draft Constitution gave laborers voting 
rights, the right to be elected and to develop their talents. He had worked for 
five years as a brigadier and stated that the Constitution has given him new 
strength to work, despite his advancing age.16 Taisiia Nikolaevna Shvrina, a 
tractor driver from the 13th group at the Bel’koi MTS, echoed Iuferov’s sen-
timents. She wanted to respond to the draft Constitution with even greater 
productive labor. She saw the Constitution as a mirror of Soviet life, reflect-
ing all of the advancements of socialism, which gave the ability for laborers 
to work honestly and have a happy life. In recognition of this fact, she and 
her husband, who was also a tractor driver, vowed to work harder to more 
quickly develop the motherland.17 
This desire to work ever harder for the benevolent socialist state was 
reflected in many of the letters that were selected for publication. In “The 
Wonderful Document of the Stalinist Era,” A. Gusak, an order winner and 
chairman of the Voroshilov stud farm, wrote:
Imbued with Stalinist concern for people, the new Constitution moti-
vates the laborers to work better; part 10 of the draft Constitution enu-
merates the rights and duties of citizens. This Constitution ensures [that] 
everyone has honorable work and many opportunities for a prosperous 
and cultured life, cultural growth, and for the complete utilization of 
their capabilities. But the Constitution places a great and honorable 
duty on citizens. It is a duty we must piously fulfill. We must respond 
to this appeal with enthusiasm, be vigilant in the struggle for develop-
ing the material standards of the country through increased produc-
tive labor.18
Another letter, this time from the factory director of Izhstal’ zavod, the 
Izhevsk steel factory, proclaimed that:
The new Stalinist Constitution is a testimonial to the final victory of 
socialism. The Constitution is the new stimulus for the further develop-
ment of the country, the ascension of industrial labor, and the growth 
of laborers’ welfare. The Izhstal’zavod collective of workers and service 
workers will work harder. The Constitution inspires us to work better; 
struggling for greater industrial output, for the improvement of product 
quality and for strengthening the might of our country.19
Such testimonials printed in Kirovskaia Pravda underscored the achieve-
ments of socialism as codified in the draft Constitution, validated that life 
had gotten better under Soviet power, and asserted that these achievements 
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were only possible because of the communist principles and class-based 
focus of the regime. This reciprocal relationship served to highlight the 
notion that rights were neither natural nor inalienable. While protected by 
state law, these rights came from the state, not from an immutable outside 
source. Hence, they should therefore be used to further the state-building 
goals of the government. 
Those who had their letters published represented a privileged stratum 
of Soviet society that had seen dramatic material and social gains since the 
regime assumed power. There is no reason to assume that those who wrote 
the letters did not believe that the Soviet system had made their life bet-
ter. However, these people were not representative of Soviet society as a 
whole. These letters better served as a continuation of the central narrative 
of the discussion, emphasizing the gains of socialism that were codified in 
the Constitution and the obligations citizens had towards the state in return 
for their rights and improved quality of life, rather than a reflection of the 
questions and concerns of the majority of citizens.20 
The divergence in the interests of the state and the citizens of the Kirov 
region is exemplified by a report from the Regional Executive Committee 
to the Central Executive Committee in Moscow. The report notes that the 
three most popular suggestions in the Kirov region were:
1 Don’t give priests the right to vote.
2 Make collective farmers equal to workers in the allocation of material 
aid in old age and sickness and access to resorts and rest houses.
3 Allow the arrest of malicious hooligans, bandits, and destroyers of 
socialist property without the sanction of the procurator.21
These suggestions ran counter to the state’s new policies as elucidated in 
the draft Constitution. Central authorities had promoted the expansion 
of the franchise to include even “former people,” such as the abovemen-
tioned Borodin, the introduction of habeas corpus, and a codified regu-
lated legal system as key policies for extending Soviet democracy. Stalin 
himself added the distinct delineation between the workers and the peas-
ants in both name and rights to the Constitution and considered these dis-
tinct class divisions to be the foundation of the Soviet state. However, for 
many people in the Kirov region, the state’s new policies and focus were 
viewed as disadvantageous, even harmful, to them. The grateful, happy 
state-building narrative represented in the letters published in newspapers 
was never widely accepted by the citizens of the USSR. The persistence 
of suggestions focused on individual problems and daily life did not rep-
resent a failure of explanatory work on the part of the district execu-
tive and party committees, or newspaper editors. Instead, this dissonance 
in the discussion represented a true divergence of interests between the 
central leadership and its citizens that no amount of explanatory work 
could reconcile.
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parties. 
3 Jeremy Hicks, “From Conduits to Commanders: Shifting Views of Workers 
Correspondents, 1924–26,” Revolutionary Russia, Vol. 19, No.2 (December, 
2006), 131–149.
4 Matthew Lenoe, “Letter Writing and the State: Reader Correspondence with 
Newspapers as a Source for Early Soviet History,” Cashiers du Monde Russe: 
Russie, Empire Russe, Union Sovietique, Etats Independants, Vol. 40, No. 
1–2 (1999), 139–170.
5 The full list includes: five heads of sections in manufacturing enterprises, 11 
order winners, four engineers, three housewives, 14 Stakhanovites, 16 work-
ers, nine students, eight brigadiers, three heads of agricultural artely, a head 
chef, three immigrant workers, a financial planner, an artist of a republic, a 
member of the Krai court, 14 individual collective farmers, two groups of col-
lective farmers, a master barber, four doctors, six current or former Red Army 
soldiers, a political worker, a member of the city Soviet, three tractor drivers, 
a chief swine herder, two shock workers, two accountants, two agronomists, 
three pipe fitters, six pensioners, a Kirov city judge, three Regional Executive 
Committee members, three heads of collective farms, an editor of a collective 
farm newspaper, a factory director, a section leader, two rural Soviet members, 
a Kraikom member, a machinist, a club director, and a secretary.
6 Many people went to public readings of the draft constitution. Therefore, they 
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7 Kirovskaia Pravda, July 2, 1936, 2.
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10 Kirovskaia Pravda, July 17, 1936, 3.
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13 Kirovskaia Pravda, July 5, 1936, 2.
14 GAKO, f. R-2168, op. 1, d. 474, l. 26.
15 Kirovskaia Pravda may have censored what it published, but unfortunately, 
I was able to find very few unpublished letters about the draft Constitution 
in the archives in Kirov. I did find a handful in GARF, one of which had been 
published in Kirovskaia Pravda. 
16 Kirovskaia Pravda, July 4, 1936, 2.
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18 Kirovskaia Pravda, July 10, 1936, 2.
19 Kirovskaia Pravda, July 11, 1936, 3.
20 For more information on the disparity between public and private narratives, 
see: Jochen Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary under Stalin 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2006).
21 GASPI KO, f. 1293, оp. 2, d. 43, l. 155. This whole report is reproduced in 
GAKO, f. R-2168, оp. 1, d. 473, l. 29.
The Party and government appealed to the people on such an important 
question, allowing them to express their opinions through corrections to the 
draft Constitution, demonstrating to the capitalist world that the Party and 
government, in conjunction with the people of our country, aspire towards 
one general goal and they move on the same path towards that goal.”1
from a report on the discussion made by 
workers of the Regional Forest Administration
The state and the Party sought to use the public discussion to rally national 
support for various state-building projects. However, popular suggestions 
often deviated from this state-building narrative and the tailored report-
ing of popular responses to the draft Constitution in local and regional 
newspapers. Citizens of the USSR, particularly those from rural areas, 
focused on securing rights and privileges from the central government often 
related to improving their daily lives. J. Arch Getty views the popularity of 
“bread and butter” suggestions as pragmatic citizens addressing the aspects 
of the Constitution that affected their everyday lives while ignoring such 
topics as freedom of speech, which they regarded as irrelevant.2 Certainly 
pragmatism underpinned many of the popular suggestions, but this work 
refutes Getty’s conclusion that such down-to-earth suggestions implied the 
ongoing continued existence of a village mentality and an ambiguous atti-
tude towards the Soviet state as a whole.3 As the following chapter dem-
onstrates, Soviet citizens had strongly developed opinions about the role 
of the state. By and large, the inhabitants of the Kirov region bought into 
the notion of a social contract, that in exchange for their labor on various 
state-building projects, the state was obligated to provide for them, though 
what type of support they thought they should receive was often informed 
by the individual discussant’s lived experience and current needs. In con-
trast, Sarah Davies believes that the vast propaganda campaign promot-
ing the draft Constitution exposed citizens to democratic concepts they had 
never before considered, made an explicit contrast between the ideal (the 
Constitution) and reality (everyday Soviet experience), and paradoxically 
5 Popular voices
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stimulated popular criticism of the Soviet regime.4 What this study dem-
onstrates is that many of the democratic additions to the draft, such as 
expanded voter franchise and habeas corpus, were highly unpopular and 
were often rejected in favor of tighter control and stability, a trend that 
has echoes in Putin’s popularity, despite accusations of authoritarianism. 
Both Getty and Davies see the Constitution as a catalyst for unanticipated 
misinterpretation of the regime’s intentions and focus on how this caused 
the Party and state leadership to rethink its position leading up to the elec-
tion campaign of 1937, which while important, overlooks the value of the 
discussion itself.5 This work uses the additions, corrections, and suggestions 
to the draft Constitution as a window for viewing the issues that concerned 
citizens, how they conceived of the socialist social contract, and how they 
defined political accountability.
Popular suggestions from the Kirov region are ideal for studying the pub-
lic discussion on a regional scale. The submissions from the Kirov region 
were reflective of larger countrywide trends, making the Kirov region a 
good representative of the USSR as a whole. As of November 15, 1936, 
43,427 suggestions from across the USSR had been compiled and tabulated 
by the Organizational Section of the Central Executive Committee. Of the 
146 articles of the Constitution, only nine articles had received more than a 
thousand individual suggestions. Those were as follows: Article 8, pertain-
ing to land usage (1,026); Article 109, concerning the election of people’s 
courts (1,551); Article 119, relating to the right to rest (4,060); Article 120, 
pertaining to material security and pensions (4,960); Article 121, on educa-
tion (3,400); Article 127, concerning habeas corpus (3,218); Article 132, on 
military service (2,416); Article 135, about voting rights (4,716); and Article 
142, pertaining to deputies’ responsibility to their constituents (1,048). (For 
the full text of articles, see Appendix).6 In Kirov, the six articles that received 
the most suggestions were: Article 8 (263), Article 119 (381), Article 120 
(476), Article 121 (259), Article 127 (223), and Article 135 (244).7 Articles 
109, 132, and 142 had a more modest number of suggestions, but nonethe-
less remained important in the Kirov region. From this it can clearly be seen 
that Kirov serves as an excellent model for evaluating the USSR.
During the popular discussion in the Kirov region, certain segments of the 
population were more vocal than others about the issues that touched their 
lives. Individuals rather than groups and men rather than women contrib-
uted more suggestions to the draft. From a total of 3,182 suggestions, 2,071 
were suggested by individuals (65.1 percent of the total), while 1,111 were 
suggested by groups (34.9 percent of the total). This suggests that the group 
mentality characteristic of village petitions was gradually being replaced by 
a sense of individuality. Of the 2,071 individual suggestions, 2,056 of them 
listed the gender of the person making the suggestion: 1,775 were male, 
and 281 were female. Put another way, individual women only made 13.7 
percent of the suggestions while 86.3 percent were made by men. Women 
tended to be more likely to make suggestions about traditionally feminine 
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topics such as child-rearing and household concerns. This tendency, cou-
pled with the low number of individual women’s suggestions, indicates the 
persistence of a strong patriarchy. Traditional patriarchal values were rein-
forced by the state. Despite early Soviet efforts to change traditional gender 
roles, Stalin supported those roles as a way to increase stability during the 
upheaval of the First Five-Year Plan and as a way to increase the Soviet 
Union’s population. 
Language appeared to be another factor that may have limited certain 
groups’ participation in the Constitutional discussion. Some of the questions 
asked during the discussion reflected the fact that the language and concepts 
used by state and Party representatives to explain the draft Constitution 
were sometimes confusing and beyond the experience of the discussants. 
One of the most telling examples came from Omutninskii raion, where the 
collective farmers were interested in what the words “race,” “chamber,” 
and “constitution” meant.8 These questions tended to arise in rural areas, 
where the state and Party had the least influence and educational levels were 
lower. They not only reflected the low political and civic educational levels 
in the countryside, they also exemplified part of the gap between the city and 
the country. In the city, the dialogue tended to be more sophisticated and 
politically aware, more reflective of the discussion of the draft Constitution 
in Kirovskaia Pravda. The questions that the collective farmers posed dur-
ing the discussion provide a snapshot of the levels of political illiteracy in the 
countryside. However, political illiteracy is not to be confused with politi-
cal impotence or lack of agency. While the rural population at one level 
may have been politically illiterate about terms, structures, etc., they were 
still savvy enough to ask penetrating questions.9 As illustrated in the case 
of the collective famers’ challenge to the road committee in Zuevka raion, 
discussed in Chapter 2, rural people were often able to incorporate the lan-
guage and laws of the state into their arguments against proposed policies. 
Much of their knowledge emanated from lived experience, which helps to 
explain why the rural population was more politically engaged about things 
of immediate importance. 
As a result, the most pressing themes brought up during the discussion of 
the draft Constitution were citizens’ rights and responsibilities and how they 
would be realized in daily life. In Kirov, the participants in the discussion 
focused on including or excluding certain groups of people from citizenship 
rights and/or the corresponding benefits. The participants used the rhetori-
cal and political tools that the state had given them to agitate for their inter-
ests in order to change state policy and were politically active and engaged 
in a dialogue with the state. Education, military service, vacation time, pen-
sions, land usage, and property ownership were the primary spheres where 
people from various sectors of society struggled to define citizenship and 
who was entitled to the rights and benefits of citizenship.10
In Viatka, local educational initiatives had roots in the pre-revolution-
ary zemstvos. The peasants had long valued basic education as a way to 
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improve their lives. After the revolution, the Soviet state had assumed the 
task of developing and administering the educational system, and the draft 
Constitution established education as a fundamental right. While the inter-
ests of the state and the inhabitants of the Kirov region were at odds on 
some issues, on the matter of schooling, their interests coincided. Better-
educated people were better citizens and builders of socialism and had more 
opportunities for improving the quality of their lives. 
Access to education was of particular concern to Kirovites. In total, they 
made 259 suggestions to Article 121, which dealt with education. One-
fifth (51) of the suggestions focused on removing or raising the age limit 
for matriculation into higher educational institutions. While there were 
undoubtedly many reasons for such suggestions, the limited educational 
opportunities available to most people, particularly rural inhabitants during 
the Tsarist period, meant that many older people now wished to have access 
to educational opportunities that they had been previously denied.11 
Access to school supplies, books, and other educational materials was 
another concern. Officials focused on how the Soviet Constitution provided 
the material means for the realization of citizenship rights like the freedom 
of press, and participants in the discussion argued that the material means 
to effectively utilize their right to education should be guaranteed by the 
state as well. One-third (86) of the suggestions to Article 121 dealt with pro-
viding students, in various circumstances, with school supplies or textbooks 
at the state’s expense. Some people suggested providing only for needy stu-
dents. For example, Iosif Andreevich Obatin suggested providing aid for 
elementary and junior high school students, particularly children having 
poor material conditions, such as dependents of single mothers who had 
many children.12 Other participants, such as Ivan Sergeevich Ustiugov, sug-
gested giving free educational supplies and writing accessories to all school 
students.13 Fairness, in this case equal access to education, was of primary 
concern to the citizens of the Kirov region. 
Fairness also motivated most of the suggestions to Article 132 about mili-
tary service. Kirov residents’ main foci were the integration of women into 
the armed services and the changing of the word “povinost’” (obligation), 
which had Tsarist overtones. Article 132 lauded service in the Red Army 
as the honorable duty of every citizen of the USSR, but the Party and state 
remained ambiguous about the role of women in the armed services. Many 
inhabitants of the Kirov region wanted to have the role of women in the 
military clarified. Almost half (45.6 percent) of the total suggestions con-
centrated on the inclusion of women in military service. Two main reasons 
were given for the inclusion of women: distributing responsibilities fairly 
between men and women who were equal citizens under the law, and the 
need to defend the USSR in case of war. Stolbova, a female collective farmer, 
suggested that military service in the Red Army should be an honorable 
commitment for both male and female citizens of the USSR.14 Mesheriakov, 
a Party organizer, felt that for women to have completely equal rights with 
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men, “it is necessary for women to also be granted the honorable duty of 
service in the ranks of the Worker and Peasants’ Red Army.”15 Bogomolov, 
a Party member, felt that since men and women have equal rights, women 
should do military service on equal terms with men. He felt that women 
could be effective partisans as they also could own a rifle and defend their 
motherland.16 
But not all participants felt that women should be drafted into the 
army. A citizen from the Mininskii voting district, Darovskoi raion, sug-
gested because “women have equal rights here, they may be beneficial to 
the army in the medical corps.”17 Other participants in the discussion sug-
gested that women serve only as volunteers in the Red Army,18 but that 
they should have to undergo compulsory military training to defend their 
motherland.19 So while the exact terms of service were not agreed upon, 
many of the inhabitants of the Kirov region felt that women, as citizens of 
the USSR, were obligated to and capable of defending their country. Timing 
was undoubtedly an important factor behind such suggestions. 1936 saw 
the rapid expansion of the Spanish Civil War, as well as growing threats 
from Japan and Germany, all of which received much press coverage in the 
USSR. But these suggestions may also reflect an increasing acceptance of 
women’s equality and an appeal to the sense of fairness that seems ingrained 
in the psyche of many participants. It is doubtful that state and Party offi-
cials encouraged the inclusion of women in the armed forces. Even during 
World War II, the state accepted women’s participation on the front but 
maintained a legal ambivalence about the role of women in the military and 
demobilized female units following the war, returning the Soviet military to 
a man’s domain and women to the role of support staff.
Many Soviet citizens took particular pride in serving their country, and 
nowhere was this pride more evident than in suggestions to rephrase Article 
132. The word used in the draft Constitution, “povinost,’” had roots in 
Tsarist society and implied a forced obligation. Many Soviet citizens had 
come to believe service to the new state was an honor and that the wording 
of the draft Constitution should reflect this. Aleksei Trushchkov, a collective 
farmer, explained the significance that this word had to Soviet citizens. He 
noted that, 
in the imperialist war, I was at the front bearing military duty “povi-
nost’’. My son Kostia and I quickly joined the Red Army. Service for 
him was a point of honor not an obligation, not “povinost’’, correct 
the article where it says that for us military obligation is ‘povinost’’—
change the word to service “sluzhba’.”20 
Approximately one-quarter (24 percent) of the total suggestions to Article 
132 dealt with changing the article’s wording, expressing citizens’ pride in 
the state that they helped construct and for which many of them had already 
fought and bled.
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The sense of fairness that dominated suggestions about education and 
military service pervaded the whole of the discussion, making the different 
rights afforded to workers and peasants by far the most contentious issue 
raised during the discussion. These different rights had a profound impact 
on the quality of citizens’ daily life and also violated their sense of equality. 
If both workers and peasants were builders of socialism, many participants 
believed they should have the same rights and responsibilities. This was 
reflected in the constitutional discussion where, for example, peasants were 
strongly opposed to the wording of Article 1 because the use of the words 
“workers and peasants,” rather than the more encompassing term, “labor-
ers” (трудящихся), implied a separation between workers and peasants that 
limited certain rights for the peasantry. Of the 64 total suggestions made 
to Article 1 in the Kirov region, 46 (71.9 percent) asked to change the term 
“workers and peasants” to the term “laborers,” which had been used in the 
two earlier constitutions, so that the peasantry could be afforded the same 
benefits as workers. 
Given the many connections between town and country in Kirov, rural 
inhabitants of the region were aware of the differences in lifestyle and the 
small luxuries afforded to urban dwellers. As the collective farmers saw 
it, workers had a limited number of hours a day when they could be com-
pelled to work, they paid lower tax rates, and they had more access to 
manufactured goods. In comparison, collective farmers worked long hours, 
often more than 12 hours at a time, without weekends or holidays. They 
questioned why, if all citizens had equal rights, did they work longer and 
receive fewer benefits than the workers. For example, in Alferovskii agricul-
tural artel’, participants raised several questions about specific governmen-
tal policies that affected their day-to-day lives.21 They wanted to know why 
workers did not pay taxes on their gardens or deliveries, but the collective 
farmers did. They also wished to know why the peasants’ workday was not 
limited to seven hours,22 why fixed working hours were not established on 
the collective farm, and why there was a shortage of manufactured goods 
in the countryside.23 On the “Red October” collective farm, the farmers 
wished to know why they paid both individual and collective farm taxes, an 
issue that exemplified the inequality between them and the workers.24 The 
collective farmers of Falenskii raion further questioned state policy by ask-
ing, “why not abolish grain collection in districts with bad harvests, because 
collective farmers live poorly?”25 
One of the biggest discrepancies that the collective farmers noticed was 
the lifestyle that husbands could give to their wives. On the collective farms, 
women had to work the same long hours as the men, sometimes even dur-
ing their last trimester of pregnancy. Despite the Party and state’s rhetorical 
focus on the paramount importance of labor and the right to work, in the 
urban centers of the Kirov region, many women were housewives who did 
not have to balance the double burden of working and raising children.26 
The collective farmers were quick to note this inequity and demanded that 
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the wives of workers and service personnel be obligated to work. Ivan 
Dokuchaev, a collective farmer, asked that all wives of workers and service 
personnel be obligated to participate in work on the same level as wives of 
collective farmers.27 Sitnikov, a Party member and chairman of the “Sitniki” 
collective farm, noted that few wives of service workers worked and some 
kept servants. He wanted it written into the draft Constitution that they 
were obliged to work.28 Six other suggestions, either from men or collective 
groups, were made to the draft Constitution to the effect that the wives of 
workers and technical workers should work. That men rather than women 
complained about workers’ wives not having to work may well be related 
to the man’s role in society. Russian men who were unable to provide for 
their wives were seen as lesser men than those who could. As such, provid-
ing well enough for their families that their wives did not have to work was 
an important marker of personal worth, one to which collective farm men 
would have aspired. Such suggestions make clear that the collective farmers 
used the open forum of the discussion of the draft Constitution to promote 
what they deemed to be fairness and equity in their lives, particularly in 
comparison to the more privileged urban population. 
This discrepancy in citizenship rights was also obvious in Articles 119 
and 120, which provided citizens with the right to rest (119), and the right 
to material security in old age and disability (120), aspects in which inclu-
sion and exclusion had a very real impact on quality of life. Questions about 
rights specifically granted to workers and service workers, but not to collec-
tive farmers in Article 119 and 120, appeared frequently during the discus-
sion of the draft Constitution. For example, in Slobodskoi district, many 
participants wanted to know why collective farmers were not insured, why 
the right to rest was only guaranteed for workers and service workers,29 and 
why elderly collective farmers were not paid a pension.30 On the “Khimik” 
collective farm, the collective farmers were interested in why they were not 
given paid vacation like workers, in spite of both groups having equal elec-
toral rights.31 They also wished to know where it was possible to get vacation 
funds and medical-leave certificates for collective farmers.32 In Nolinskii dis-
trict, participants questioned why collective farmers did not have weekends 
and vacations like workers and service workers did33 and how aging col-
lective farmers would be helped.34 Participants in Falenskii raion expressed 
their disapproval of the unequal treatment of collective farmers, stating: 
“We think it is wrong when collective farmers receive medical treatment 
only after paying, as it will be in the new Constitution.”35 They wanted to 
know why a state that had promised equal rights, even to former enemies, 
was excluding such a large portion of its population.
The inhabitants of the Kirov region did not hesitate to make suggestions 
to address this perceived unfair treatment. Of the 382 suggestions made to 
Article 119, 293 (76.7 percent) were about giving collective farmers vaca-
tions, with Article 120 containing 15 additional suggestions about vaca-
tions. Of the 476 suggestions made to Article 120, 199 (41.8 percent) were 
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requests for collective farmers to be included in all aspects of the social 
welfare system. 
Particularly telling is the language participants used in their suggestions. 
Using the Party’s own rhetoric, collective farmers argued that such rights 
were guaranteed to all citizens of the USSR. As equal citizens who had to 
bear the same burdens as the working class, collective farmers believed that 
they were entitled to the same state benefits. At a meeting of the “Eastern 
Dawn” Artel’,36 the collective farmers advocated granting “collective farm-
ers regular vacations on equal terms with workers.”37 A similar suggestion 
was made by Comrade Daregorodneva, a worker at the Iaransk city soviet, 
who suggested implementing social insurance for collective farmers on equal 
terms with workers and service workers.38 The general meetings of Sitka 
and Dubrovo villages proposed granting collective farmers, as citizens of the 
USSR, the right to rest and to work.39 Collective farmer S. P. Trukhin sug-
gested that “all citizens of the USSR have the right to rest” should apply to 
collective farmers as well, and they should be granted wintertime vacations 
with 50 percent of the median pay or without pay subject to the approval 
of the collective farm general assembly.40 Cherepanov, a collective farmer, 
contended: “In the furtherance of the erasure of borders between city and 
countryside, [it is necessary to] establish the right to yearly vacations for 
collective farmers.”41 Comrade S. A Rusinov from Karakulinskii raion rea-
soned that it was necessary to “add [a clause] about yearly vacations for 
collective farmers with the retention of median pay, because under socialism 
there will be an equal relationship towards the means of production.”42 The 
invocation of both the rights of equality and citizenship to justify the exten-
sion of these social welfare benefits to collective farmers indicated that the 
collective farmers had paid close attention to the language being used in the 
discussion and used that language to press their interests. 
This correlation between citizenship and social benefits was also reflected 
in suggestions that people whose behavior made them unworthy of citizen-
ship should be stripped of their social welfare benefits. Sokolov, from the 
city of Sovetsk, requested that people who lost their ability to work due to 
drunkenness, fighting, and other disreputable behavior not be granted the 
right to social security.43 Likewise, at the plenum of Kokorovshinskii rural 
soviet, a suggestion was made that “it was necessary to count only laborers 
and to exclude the non-working elements of the citizens of the USSR from 
receiving social security.”44
It should be noted, however, that even among the collective farmers, not 
all were considered equally deserving. Some proposals regarding vacations 
for collective farmers illustrate nicely the social and political stratification 
that still existed in the countryside. Quite a few suggestions about giving 
vacations to collective farmers sought to limit that right to a certain strata, 
such as Stakhanovites, collective farm chairpersons, brigadiers, stable hands, 
watchmen, and storekeepers, that is, those who worked year-round.45 Some 
advocated granting vacations only to those who worked between 225 and 
100 Interpreting citizens’ rights and duties
325 workdays on the collective farm. Such distinctions by collective farmers 
reflect the fact that collective farms were reliant on the overall cooperation 
and hard work of all of their members to thrive. The problems posed by 
unmotivated collective farmers were demonstrated by comments made dur-
ing the discussion. For example, at a meeting of the collective farmers of the 
“Surf” artel’, a suggestion was made to separate out those collective farm-
ers who consistently behaved lazily towards collective work, giving them 
individual tasks and having a brigadier directly supervise them.46 One col-
lective farmer went so far as to suggest expelling those who did not do any 
work on the collective farm but made use of collective farm rights from the 
collective farm.47 Using vacation as leverage would not only reward those 
who worked hard with well-deserved rest, but could be used to spur the less 
active collective farmers to work. 
Who was entitled to social benefits was not the only divisive issue; who 
should pay for it was contentious as well. There was disagreement between 
local elites and collective farms as to what institution should bear this finan-
cial burden. Party members and members of the local state apparatus tended 
to favor the formation of collective farm mutual aid societies to defray the 
costs. Comrade V. A. Troshkov suggested sending sick collective farmers 
who needed medical treatment to resorts at the expense of the collective 
farms or of the mutual aid societies. He wanted to add to the Constitution 
that “every collective farm must purchase 1–2 travel vouchers to resorts for 
the best Stakhanovites and shockworkers of the field.”48 Comrade Teplykh 
likewise thought that collective farms should “implement social insurance 
on the collective farm’s tab and broaden the network of collective farm 
mutual aide societies” to pay for this expense.49 Comrade I. V. Sozonov, too, 
suggested equally providing “collective farmers life insurance through coop-
erative organizations with the deductions for insurance coming from the 
general earnings of the collective farm,”50 whereas Comrade E. M. Istomin 
proposed insuring collective farmers on the government’s tab, but deduct-
ing a percent corresponding to government expenditures on their members 
from the collective farm.51
However, many collective farmers felt strongly that the state had the 
responsibility to look after their well-being and should do so with its 
own funds, rather than collective farm money.52 The collective farmers of 
“Combine” artel’ addressed this issue, stating, “The state should provide 
aid to aging collective farmers, not the mutual aid societies, which are cre-
ated with the collective farmers’ personal earnings.”53 Collective farmer 
Fedor Stepanovich Kislitsin suggested that the state pay for the widespread 
development of social insurance for workers, service workers, and collective 
farmers. He concluded that this might take some time to implement, but like 
the achievements elucidated in the new Constitution, he believed that with 
time it was possible, noting, “We formed the Constitution not in one or two 
years but ten, it might even be more years. If there is not the ability to do 
this now, in the future it is necessary to implement it.”54 Such disagreements 
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over who should receive benefits and benefit funding showed that the collec-
tive farmers were actively engaged and politically astute, even if they did not 
reach a consensus. However, there was an overall consensus among the col-
lective farmers that, as citizens of the USSR, they deserved access to benefits. 
Social welfare benefits were not just the concern of the collective farm-
ers, though. Urban dwellers and service workers also relied on state ben-
efits; many saw it as a social safety net. The allocation of pensions for a 
number of groups, such as veterans, orphans, the elderly, and the disabled, 
made up almost one-fourth (19.5 percent) of all suggestions made to Article 
120. Fairness and the state’s obligation to provide for its citizens were at 
the center of many of these suggestions. For example, the teachers’ collec-
tive of Burkovskoi Elementary School sent a letter to the Central Executive 
Committee in Moscow detailing its concern about providing for children 
when a parent died. Given the detailed nature of the report, the collective 
clearly expected the state to seriously consider its proposal and act on it. 
They suggested that, 
if a husband or a wife died and left behind 1–6 minor children plus an 
able-bodied spouse, the remaining spouse must receive a pension for the 
children in the amount of 100% of the salary of the deceased until the 
end of the minority of the youngest child, but that the pension should 
be proportionately reduced upon the end of the minority of every child. 
They provided a specific formula that they proposed be used to calculate a 
family’s benefits: 
У4: four children
Х: the wage of the spouse
7: the received pension
С: the amount of the pension’s decrease per child





5 Y−4= (7-4C/Y*Y)=K55 
Fairness, providing equally for every child, was at the heart of the formula. 
Of the many people who co-opted the language of fairness, state building, 
and class struggle to advocate for their personal interests, one of the most 
compelling examples comes from Timofei Ovechkin, a former accountant 
from a forest products collective farm in Shurminskii raion. He used the 
Party’s language and appealed to a sense of fairness to endorse his sug-
gested change to the draft Constitution, raising the amount of money that 
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he received as a pension. He addressed his case directly to the state’s leaders 
on the Central Executive Committee, utilizing a traditional letter-writing 
model.56 Ovechkin contextualized his request within the democratization of 
the USSR, writing: 
In connection with the discussion of the Stalinist Constitution, I cannot 
describe my enthusiasm at the acceptance of the Constitution, which is 
clear and thanks to comrade Stalin and his coworkers. And I cannot be 
silent about the true democracy that Soviet power gives us.57 
Even as he proceeded to his main argument, raising his pension, Ovechkin 
was careful to maintain a broader context for his claim. He framed the case 
for his very specific request in terms of fairness—those who had served in 
low-paid positions on collective farms and were left unable to work by that 
service should have greater pensions because they fulfilled their patriotic 
duty by strengthening collectivization. Although his prose was inelegant, his 
argument was clear: 
pensions should be fixed based on the calculations for the final year of 
pay and in the absence of such reports, on the basis of qualifications or 
rating, in particular reflecting the years of class struggle on the collective 
farms of those freely serving qualified workers, in consideration of the 
still, at that time, weak collective farms, the organization of poor mem-
bers, the temporary disruptions of financial ability and progress, which 
was forced as collective farms pay a very small rate to civilians, and to 
the worker who saw this, but committed himself to the pursuit of class 
struggle and came to help, not paying attention to selfish topics of low 
wages, who is in retirement at this time.”58
Ovechkin noted that he and many other citizens had sacrificed financial and 
material security to work poorly paid jobs that furthered the development 
of socialism. He cited his own experience to highlight the level of sacrifice 
made and the conditions he endured. He lived in the village of R-Mureka 
in 1927, where:
there was organized a collective farm with an inclination towards for-
est products production. A sawmill was organized by kulaks, who left 
at the end of 1928 leaving the poor peasants in need of an account-
ant, but no one was satisfied with the pay and the collective farm was 
in danger of going out of business. The initiation of class struggle 
prompted me to throw aside service as an accountant in a trade soci-
ety (потребобществе) where the pay rate was around 7 rubles, with 
overtime and an apartment allowance. I went to work for 45 rubles a 
month. In 1929 I became sick and over the course of the year had to 
retire. I wanted to move to a forest organization with a salary of 100 to 
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150 rubles as a consequence. They didn’t release me, promising future 
material support from the insurance office, also from the collective farm 
and the rest of it. The class struggle on the collective farms increased 
and I committed myself to this activity, threw aside selfish interests but 
in March of 1932 I got married and retired, and found that my pay 
from overtime was only 54 rubles and for a third category of disability 
pension I today receive 18 rubles 59 kopeks.59
According to Ovechkin, his long service on the beleaguered collective farm 
destroyed his health, and he was reliant on his pension to survive, as he 
could no longer work. He asked the state to take note of his sacrifices and 
increase pensions for people like him, as small pensions punished such peo-
ple for their service in badly needed but poorly paid positions. The careful 
framing of personal concerns in the state’s language of equality demon-
strated the political acumen of the citizens of the Kirov region, who pushed 
their local and personal concerns by fitting them into a Soviet cosmology.
Even children responded to the state’s call to participate, and they too 
used the language of revolutionary struggle and state building to give 
their locally oriented requests union-wide importance. Yuri Alekseevich 
Krasnoperov, a ten-year-old from the city of Sarpul’, wrote (probably with 
help) a letter to the state and Party leadership.60 Yuri’s letter demonstrates 
the mix of intimacy and appeal that marked much Soviet correspondence.61 
At the end of his letter, Yuri informed the Party leaders that it was his birth-
day, as if they were friends or relatives. But, at the same time, he couched 
his appeal to improve the quality of nurseries in the small provincial city of 
Sarpul’ in the language of patriotism. He wrote:
In connection with the new draft Constitution, I ask that you pay atten-
tion to children’s nurseries and kindergartens in order to maintain their 
health so that our young generation doesn’t die from poor care and 
also make provisions for directors in such cities as Sarapul’, Kirovskii 
Krai. There are deadly sicknesses in the nurseries here on account of 
there being insufficient nannies for children. We need children for the 
replacement of our ranks of school children and also defenders of our 
Motherland the USSR. Therefore I ask you earnestly to pay attention 
to my letter.62 
He emphasized how important healthy children, the cadres and soldiers of 
the future, were to the state. But the most striking thing about the letter 
is its address. The address, “To the center of Moscow,” is reminiscent of 
Chekov’s short story “Vanka,” where a small boy addresses his pleas for 
help: “to Grandfather, in the village.” However, unlike Vanka’s cries for 
help, which were destined to never reach his grandfather and underscored 
the tragedy and hopelessness of the situation, Yuri’s letter was in fact deliv-
ered to the Central Executive Committee, which is where I found it gathered 
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with thousands of other suggestions in carefully categorized folders. The 
state obviously took great pains to gather and view the correspondence of 
all its citizens. The citizens of the USSR in turn used this interest, and their 
increasing level of education, to directly appeal to central state authorities. 
Neither Ovechkin nor Yuri Krasnoperov were unique in using different 
articles of the draft Constitution as a touchstone for personal desires or pet 
interests. Many participants in the predominately rural Kirov region chose 
to use the discussion to offer up their own visions of what socialism should 
be, which more often than not focused on improving rural inhabitants’ daily 
lives. One of the most pressing issues was access to land and other natural 
resources that were vital for survival. Peasants had long struggled to gain 
access to natural resources such as meadows, forests, and waterways. In 
his work, Crime, Culture, Conflict and Justice in Rural Russia 1856–1914, 
Stephen Frank notes that crimes, such as stealing wood from private or state 
forests, were commonplace and often created much friction between the 
peasantry and the local officials. In Russia’s Peasants, Aaron Retish notes 
the competition for land in the Viatka province from the revolution into the 
NEP period.63 Even following collectivization, land remained a key issue in 
Kirov.64 
While the question of the distribution of arable land had been decided in 
1935 with the State Act on the Eternal Usage of Land, Article 8 of the draft 
Constitution brought the issue of land rights to the forefront again. Many 
collective farmers took advantage of the popular discussion to request 
eternal access to or ownership of the resources that they had traditionally 
been denied but felt justified using. In the Kirov region, Article 8 received 
263 total suggestions, of which 218 requested giving the collective farmers 
eternal usage of the forests. Other suggestions proposed that meadows and 
hayfields be turned over to the collective farms (18 requests) and that col-
lective farms have water rights to local streams and ponds (seven requests). 
Three additional suggestions to give the forests to the collective farms were 
submitted for Article 6 (about the allocation of natural resources). These 
resources were highly prized and jealously guarded. Collective farmers 
suggested denying access to land and other natural resources to individual 
smallholders and giving underutilized land to “more deserving collective 
farms”65 so as to “guarantee proper land usage.”66 The collective farmers 
argued that access to natural resources should be given to those who best 
fulfilled the state’s mandate of building socialism through collectivized agri-
culture. Whether that was the motivation behind their claims is unclear, but 
it is clear that they used the state’s discourse to press their case.
Article 9 provided for the continued existence of individual farming 
in the USSR and was hotly contested in the Kirov region. While Article 9 
received far fewer suggestions than Article 8, it too raised important issues 
of land usage and highlighted social tensions in the countryside. Individual 
smallholders competed with the collective farmers for resources and the 
state, while protecting their existence in the Constitution, had enacted a 
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series of discriminatory economic measures against them. Individual small-
holdings had the potential to fragment collective farm land. In some cases, 
these smallholders were unpopular because they failed or refused to partici-
pate in the voluntary civic work on roads, bridges, etc.; collective farmers 
were mandated to expend their time and energy on such work.67 Therefore, 
some collective farmers tried to use the language of socialist construction 
to expand their land holdings and challenge individual smallholders who 
existed outside of the collective community. 
Of the 24 suggestions made to this article, nine were directed against indi-
vidual smallholders and called for either banning the practice of individual 
smallholding directly or denying them access to land. For example, a group 
of collective farmers from the Kalinin collective farm challenged the individ-
ual smallholders’ existence on the basis of socialist principles, stating “the 
socialist system of production in the USSR is governmental in form, and 
therefore the development of independent peasant production cannot be 
allowed.”68 Others challenged the smallholders’ existence based on the debt 
that they owed to the state. L. M. Zhuikov, a collective farmer, proposed 
“to remove the independent smallholders’ right to use their garden plot if 
they owed two years of back taxes and absolutely give it to the collective 
farms, as the independent smallholders accumulate arrears every year.”69 
Land usage was not just a concern of rural inhabitants. Many people 
who lived in urban areas were recent arrivals from the countryside and 
maintained strong connections to their rural roots. Some of these urban 
dwellers wanted to know why land was not put aside for workers under 
the same conditions as for collective farmers.70 Kudrin, a Party member 
and worker at the Votkinskii power plant, suggested that the Constitution 
“include a point about workers’ rights to use the hinterland and haymaking 
grounds.”71 Likewise, I. K. Markov from the “1st of May” collective farm 
suggested “securing part of the land for eternal usage for workers and ser-
vice workers.”72 While such suggestions were not numerous, they demon-
strate the continued importance of agricultural ties for workers and service 
workers, and the overall importance of access to land for food production, 
even in urban areas of the USSR.
The drafters of the Constitution were aware of the citizenry’s reliance 
on domestic food production for household survival. As such, they sought 
to codify Soviet citizens’ rights to personal property while still promot-
ing the construction of a collectivist and socialist society. Perhaps no issue 
reflected this specifically Soviet understanding of constitutionalism better 
than the issue of private cow ownership. According to Article 7 of the draft 
Constitution, buildings, livestock, and tools were property of the collec-
tive farms, but every collective farm household had the right to “a small 
garden plot and personal property for subsidiary economic activity on the 
garden plot, livestock, including a milk cow (продуктивный скот), fowl and 
other petty agricultural stock as specified in the charter of the artel’.” 73 
Such issues were not included in most Western constitutions, but in the 
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USSR, the right to own private livestock was present in Stetskii, Tal’, and 
Iakovlev’s first complete draft of the draft Constitution and became part of 
the ratified 1936 Constitution. As noted earlier in Chapter 1, this level of 
specificity was part of the overall Soviet conceptualization of a constitution 
as a list of very specific achievements, rights, and duties, rather than as a list 
of broad guiding principles. The prohibition of owning a lot of livestock 
signaled the victory of collectivization over personal smallholding and of 
state ownership over private ownership. Yet, such an article created a con-
stitutionally protected niche for personal property and agriculture alongside 
collective agriculture.
As mentioned, earlier in 1935, the Kirov regional authorities had lim-
ited the number of personal cows that a collective farmer could own as a 
way to strengthen collective farms and to promote the growth of collec-
tive livestock holdings. Up to that point, many collective farmers had been 
devoting most of their efforts into caring and raising their own livestock, 
thereby neglecting the collective herds that the state deemed vital. However, 
the state recognized the importance of cows to supplement the collective 
farm payments in kind and to help households attain a better standard of 
living. As a result, in 1934–1935, when the state and Party were trying to 
strengthen collective farms, the lack of a milk cow (безкоровность) was 
one of the main disparities among collective farm households they tried to 
address. Private cows provided important sources of food for large fami-
lies in the countryside, and the limitations imposed unfair disadvantages on 
large families who had many young children. Although young children ate, 
they were not accounted for in the division of collective farm goods, as they 
were not able to work. Thus, multiple household cows would have allowed 
them to make up the shortfall. 
Given the importance of private cows in everyday life, it should not 
be surprising that this issue was raised during the discussion of the draft 
Constitution. In the Kirov region, there were three recorded suggestions to 
amend the number of cows constitutionally allowed. At the general meeting 
of the “Stepan Razin” collective farm, it was suggested that collective farm-
ers with large families be authorized to have two cows for personal use.74 
Shabalin, a worker from Kirovskii raion, suggested that collective farm-
ers having eight to ten members in a family be allowed to have two milk 
cows.75 Another collective farmer, Shikalov, made an analogous sugges-
tion.76 Although the numbers were small, the constitutionality of multiple 
cow ownership resonated with people and illustrates the personal socioeco-
nomic issues addressed in the draft. Cows helped to define quality of life 
in the countryside, and multiple cows would help to raise the standard of 
living for large families. The suggestions about cows serve to illustrate that 
many of the very personal, seemingly irrelevant suggestions about the draft 
Constitution were responses to state policies and procedures outlined in the 
draft. What in any other country would have been a legislative initiative 
became a constitutional principle in the USSR.
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The popular suggestions provide insight into the issues that preoccupied 
Kirovites, as well as how they interpreted socialism based on their daily 
experiences and interactions with the Party and state. In particular, refram-
ing citizenship to include all inhabitants of the USSR and the selective expan-
sion of citizens’ rights and privileges became a source of debate for many 
of the participants. In Kirov, the participants in the discussion focused on 
including or excluding people from citizenship rights and/or corresponding 
benefits, while stressing issues that would create safe, stable, and materi-
ally secure lives for themselves. They used the rhetorical and political tools 
that the state had given them to agitate for their interests, often citing state 
policies or their contributions to state-building efforts to justify increased 
material benefits and political equality for themselves or their community. 
The evidence in the chapter makes clear that many discussants were politi-
cally active and engaged in a dialogue with the state so as to promote their 
interests, which were often drastically different from the needs and expecta-
tions that the state had been promoting through its managed discussion of 
the draft Constitution.
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Two major aspects of the new draft Constitution were the expansion of 
electoral and citizenship rights to all people in the USSR1 and the estab-
lishment of habeas corpus protections for the accused. At the local level, 
citizens accepted what they deemed useful features of these policies, while 
core aspects, which threatened local stability, were met with resistance and 
hostility. Kirovites embraced Stalin’s mandate that democracy be a tool 
for making local officials accountable for their behavior and failures. They 
had many suggestions to increase their ability to hold local officeholders 
accountable and demonstrated their willingness to remove incompetent or 
corrupt officials during the 1936 local elections, which this chapter dis-
cusses. But, Kirovites prized safety and stability, particularly in the coun-
tryside where the state was the weakest. As a result, they overwhelmingly 
rejected the re-enfranchisement of those stripped of their rights and habeas 
corpus protections. In their place, the inhabitants of the Kirov region pro-
posed counter-suggestions to keep voting restrictions and to make it easier 
for the police and citizens to apprehend criminals. 
In the second half of 1935, a series of decrees abolished social criteria for 
entrance to higher education and marked the reversal of harsh discrimina-
tion policies against people with “class alien” backgrounds. However, many 
Soviet citizens, who continued to mistrust these groups, met this change in 
state policies with much hostility. Sarah Davis notes that many workers felt 
such measures would reduce the opportunities for them to gain higher edu-
cation, and that without positive discrimination, the working class would 
once again be relegated to its former lowly social position.2 The distrust 
of former kulaks was often rooted in village politics and property issues. 
Priests and other disenfranchised religious figures present a more compli-
cated picture. Most of the Soviet-era studies focus mainly on the repression 
of the clergy by the state and were written after perestroika by clergymen. 
Some pre-revolutionary studies of the peasantry mention that peasants were 
often distrustful of the local priests, who were often viewed as greedy and 
corrupt. Despite the mass of popular suggestions that demonstrate a popu-
lar distrust of priests, no in-depth studies exist on popular attitudes towards 
the clergy in the 1930s, which lies beyond the scope of this project.
6 Integration, exclusion, and 
accountability
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However, in the Kirov region, the state’s new, benevolent attitude toward 
the former lishentsy (those legally deprived of voting rights), particularly 
towards priests and other members of the Orthodox Church, was met with 
both resistance and confusion during the public discussion of the draft 
Constitution. Discussants wanted to know, “Will priests be able to use vot-
ing rights?”,3 “Why are priests allowed the right to be elected and to elect 
people to the soviets?”,4 and why priests and members of “religious cults”5 
were given “broad democracy in the election.”6 Some of the participants 
appeared to be asking for clarification, while others stated or implied that the 
expansion of the electoral franchise would have negative consequences for 
both the state and its citizens. In Omutninskii raion, the collective farmers 
were concerned with whether members of religious cults would be elected in 
elections to the soviet.7 They also asked if members of religious cults would 
be allowed to participate in elections and whether they would elect class-
alien people who were currently deprived of voting rights.8 Participants else-
where in the Kirov region wanted to know if “priests and former kulaks can 
remove nominated candidates and propose their own.”9 Of the 244 sugges-
tions made to Article 135, 203 (83.2 percent) of them were related to limit-
ing the voting rights of former lishentsy and “cult members.” For reasons 
that are not clear, “cult members” attracted more ire than the former kulaks, 
with 130 suggestions proposing either stripping them of their right to vote, 
their right to be elected to office, or both. By comparison, only 73 sugges-
tions targeted the electoral rights of the former kulaks and landowners.
The participants in the discussion opposed the extension of the franchise 
to former lishentsy for several reasons. There were widespread fears that 
the formerly disenfranchised people would gain positions of power and in 
some cases try to reclaim land or property that had been redistributed.10 
Some expressed fears that the former lishentsy would use their new rights to 
infiltrate the state apparatus and perhaps establish their own small, nepo-
tistic governing circles. Such fears were not unfounded. NKVD Party cell 
reports for 1936 noted that on at least one occasion, a former kulak was 
elected to the rural soviet, and he put his friends and supporters in locally 
powerful positions.11 The participants in the discussion were well aware 
that many of the formerly disenfranchised were still locally influential and 
quite capable of using their new rights to promote their interests and settle 
old scores.12 One discussant, Maslennikov, argued that granting electoral 
rights to kulaks and having secret elections might allow foreign elements to 
be elected to the local administration. He therefore contended, if they give 
kulaks the right to vote, it needed to be through open and not secret elec-
tions.13 Similarly, D. A. Shabalin, a Party member, considered it inappropri-
ate to allow the former lishentsy, who were deprived of rights because of 
their social character, to be elected, as they might stand up for the interests 
of the bourgeoisie in the organs of administration.14 Such concerns reflect 
the instability in the countryside and anxiety about the lingering influence 
of the formerly disenfranchised.
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While concerns about local power shaped the trepidations of some of the 
discussion participants, others felt that the former lishentsy had not proven 
themselves worthy of full citizenship rights and the honors and responsibili-
ties that citizenship entailed. For example, collective farmer Kudrevatykh 
suggested that people who had been deprived of voting rights should be 
given the right to participate in elections to the soviet only after they proved 
themselves capable of building socialism.15 D. Il’in, a Stakhanovite worker, 
shared Kudrevatykh’s sentiment. He proposed not granting voting rights to 
members of religious cults because “they aren’t occupied with useful work 
for Soviet society and parasites on society must not be admitted to the elec-
tions to the soviets.”16 He also suggested that they must not be allowed to 
stand for election to the soviets, which was the highest responsibility and 
honor for the laborers of the USSR.17
Discussants who opposed the expansion of the franchise often utilized 
Party messages about the struggle between the forward-thinking workers 
and peasants, and the remnants of the old regime, to justify their opposi-
tion, protesting that “former people” were untrustworthy. N. F. Nikulin, 
a collective farmer, suggested segregating people who interfered with “our 
October conquests” and formulating a special article not allowing them 
to participate in elections.18 Similarly, Murav’ev, a collective farmer, asked 
the state to not give the right to vote to former merchants, landlords, and 
factory and mine owners as “all of them are enemies of laborers and must 
not have the right to vote or be elected.”19 Nor were religious people to be 
trusted. Ovchinnikov, a collective farmer, recommended that members of 
religious cults not be granted voting rights, because “at the present time 
they are still not familiar with work and continue to befog the heads of 
the laborers.”20 Comrade Gagarinkov also agreed that cult members “who 
today pull the wool over the heads of the laborers” should not be eligible to 
stand for election.21 I. P. Plotnikov, a worker and Party member, summed 
up this distrust, arguing that members of religious cults not be eligible to 
be elected “as religion is an irreconcilable enemy of socialism.”22 Whether 
these people had truly internalized the Party’s longstanding argument about 
the dangers of former exploiters and religious people, or whether they were 
using the Party’s rhetoric to further a personal cause, is unknown. But they 
used the language of the Party to make a compelling argument against the 
new electoral policies proposed by the same leaders who had given them 
these ideological tools.
The maintenance of law and order was another area of contention between 
the central state and the inhabitants of the Kirov region. As noted in the over-
view of life in Kirov, crime remained a problem, and violence against state 
and collective farm officials was often reported by word of mouth and in the 
news. The inability of the state to provide for the security of its citizens, even 
its officials, led some to think that personal safety and personal property 
were of secondary concern to the central Party and state leadership. This per-
spective bred resistance to the implementation of habeas corpus among the 
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inhabitants of the Kirov region, particularly in the countryside where state 
and policing organs had the weakest presence.23 Many participants expressed 
concern that the implementation of habeas corpus would undermine citizens’ 
security and any semblance of law and order in the villages. These concerns 
were reflected in the suggestions to Article 127, which received 223 sugges-
tions. Of these, 198 (88.8 percent) specifically asked for arrests to be carried 
out without the sanctions of the procurator (habeas corpus). 
As the table above indicates, one of the main reasons people were 
opposed to habeas corpus was because they believed it would delay the 
apprehension of the criminals and would allow criminals to either perpe-
trate more crime or, as Party member M. N. Vorob’ev feared, “hide from 
proletarian justice.”24
Many suggestions reflected a concern with order and security and a 
fear of violent crime. V. Ia. Kolosov proposed that the state bear increased 
responsibility for safeguarding social tranquility in the village by taking 
drastic measures against drunkenness, hooliganism, and rowdiness.25 The 
collective farmers of the “Truth” collective farm asked the state to grant the 
police the right to arrest “obvious criminals” who threatened social order.26 
Other collective farmers demanded that those perpetrating hooliganism and 
thievery, which “was a blight on the people, be quickly arrested on location 
without the sanctions of the procurator.”27 
The suggestions made to Article 131, about safeguarding property, like-
wise reflected popular concern with stability in the countryside. Safeguarding 
socialist property was one of the main priorities of the Soviet state and the 
area on which the procuracy focused much of its attention and resources. 
And while some of the citizens of the Kirov region also expressed concerns 
about the destruction and theft of socialist property,28 the majority of sug-
gestions made reflected a general concern with maintaining order. 
Almost half of the suggestions made to Article 131 involved expanding 
the definition of “enemies of the people” to address various local problems, 
such as disorder on the collective farms and hooliganism. Such suggestions 
demonstrated that disorder in the countryside, particularly on collective 
Table 6.1 Suggestions to Article 127
Breakdown of suggestions related to habeas corpus Number of suggestions
Allow local authorities to arrest criminals without the 
sanction of the procurator
102
Be allowed to arrest criminals who posed an immediate 
threat without sanctions
12
Allow criminals caught at the scene of the crime to be 
arrested without the sanction of the procurator
40
Allow the arrest of hooligans without procuratorial 
sanction
12
Allow citizens to arrest criminals themselves 10
Total 223
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farms, was an immediate threat to the well-being of the collective farmers. 
And indeed, as discussed in the overview of life in the Kirov region, poor 
organization and poor cooperation on a collective farm could spell disas-
ter for all of the members. Therefore, collective farmers were searching for 
ways, such as expulsion or arresting those disturbing the peace, to regulate 
the behavior of their members. For instance, at the general meeting of the 
October artel’,29 some in attendance suggested that people systematically 
destroying social order or engaged in hooliganism should be considered 
enemies of the people.30 At a rural soviet plenum,31 it was suggested that all 
people, who are “feloniously and habitually negligent or harming the collec-
tive farm, through the destruction of labor discipline, be considered enemies 
of the people.”32 Elsukov, a Party member and brigadier,33 took this idea a 
step further by demanding that “administrative measures be taken toward 
people encroaching on socialist property, by forcible resettlement from the 
limits of a given locale, where there has been an obvious crime.”34 Kirovites 
wished to exclude criminals, kulaks, and religious sect members from par-
ticipating in Soviet governance and from legal protections that would make 
them harder to control.
However, participants in the Kirov region actively took up democratic 
initiatives proposed in the draft when these measures gave them more con-
trol over local affairs. Stalin and other leaders felt that by making the Soviet 
system more participatory, it would enable the masses to police and remove 
unsuitable local representatives. This call for accountability dovetailed with 
Stalin’s policy to give voice to the “little people,” in which, as the local Party 
and state apparatus grew increasingly beyond the control of the central 
Party and state leadership, central officials turned to increasingly extreme 
means to control them, including encouraging local workers and officials 
to denounce their bosses publicly.35 Therefore, during the discussion of the 
draft Constitution, participants were encouraged to criticize local officials 
who had been lax in fulfilling their duty and to replace them with more 
competent and politically active representatives. 
The central state and the citizens of the Kirov region both had a vested 
interest in having competent and accountable local officials. Many partici-
pants in the popular discussion proposed suggestions to make both the judi-
ciary and local soviets more effective and responsive to their constituents. 
One of the proposed methods for making the judiciary more effective was 
to reinstate comrade courts and expand the number of social courts, which 
would fall under the preview of an individual enterprise or collective farm. 
In total, 40 such suggestions were made to several different articles of the 
draft Constitution. The workers and service workers at the Murashinskii 
raion supply union (Райпотребсоюз) suggested the organization of comrade 
courts on the state and collective farms because they got good results and 
freed up the people’s courts from petty cases.36 While expediting the judi-
cial process may have been a concern for some, educating people about the 
rule of law was another reason for suggestions to reinstate people’s courts 
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and people’s judges. I. E Mashkovtsev, a collective farmer, stated that the 
people’s judges needed to be elected from the local citizenry and that these 
judges should be obliged to conduct explanatory work in the locales—
that is, to explain the fundamental provisions of revolutionary legality.37 
Likewise, Zaleshin, a Party member and worker at the Krai Court in Kirov, 
requested the reinstatement of social courts because such courts were “one 
of the forms of re-education and development of laborers … it is necessary 
to organize them under the rural soviets, enterprises, and factories.”38 This 
didactic function was an important one for both the people and the state, 
which had in the past organized show trials to demonstrate the rule of law 
as well as the limits of acceptable behavior, and several additional sugges-
tions focused on the edifying functions of the court system. 
Legal education for judges and citizens was also proposed as a way to 
raise the level of competency of the judiciary and to help citizens connect 
with and trust the legal system. For example, Bazhutin, a Party member and 
trade union organizer, suggested that elected (lay) judges be compelled to 
attend judicial tutorial sessions and to study the judicial science of Soviet 
laws, because the judges might be elected directly from workers in produc-
tion.39 In his suggestion, Bazhutin addressed two of the major challenges 
facing the Soviet judicial system—how to maintain close ties to laborers 
while simultaneously maintaining a high level of legal competence. Early 
Soviet courts had elected laborers and instructed them to administer “revo-
lutionary justice” without clear formal legal guidelines. This practice, which 
resulted in a very uneven application of judicial principles and punishments, 
brought a lack of predictability to the judicial system. Vyshinsky addressed 
this shortcoming by advocating professionalizing the judiciary and institut-
ing strict legal codes, though lay judges, elected by the people but with little 
actual power, endured as a reminder of revolutionary legality. However, 
the professionalization of the judiciary destroyed the image and position of 
the citizen judge that the revolutionary Soviet state had been trying to create 
so as to make the judiciary closer to and more responsive to the will of the 
people, rather than just a branch of the state apparatus.40 
There were also calls for more direct methods of holding the judiciary 
responsible for their actions. Many people believed that local officials, 
including lay judges and procurators, should report to their constituents. For 
example, V. A. Erofeev suggested that, to improve the work of the people’s 
judges, they should be obligated to account for themselves in front of the 
voters twice a year. Specifically, he wanted them to report on the progress of 
their work and its characteristics, changes in the law, and citizens’ respon-
sibility for law violations.41 Thirty-three other suggestions about mandating 
judges and procurators reporting to voters were also put forth during the 
discussion. Requiring judicial officials to give reports allowed the voters to 
identify who was ineffective at their job and hold incompetent judicial offi-
cials accountable for their actions. For example, the inhabitants of Shakhnery 
and Malyshenki villages suggested “making people’s judges accountable for 
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illegal convictions.”42 Arziaev, a Party member, developed this idea even fur-
ther, suggesting recalling and re-electing people’s judges at the request of the 
voters in the case of inappropriate work by judges.43 Such suggestions illus-
trate that the inhabitants of the Kirov region were willing to use grassroots, 
direct democracy as a tool to keep elected judicial officials in line.
Concerns with competence and accountability extended to other state 
officeholders, and discussants offered similar suggestions for increasing the 
accountability of the local soviets, strengthening the connections between 
representatives and their constituents and raising the competency of repre-
sentatives in organs of power. One way to promote stronger ties between 
representatives and their constituents was to decrease the number of citi-
zens whom they represented. I.A. Mashkovtsev, a collective farmer, sug-
gested that delegates to the Supreme Soviet represent 100,000 people, as 
opposed to 300,000, as a smaller constituency would allow elected officials 
to better be connected with the voters and at the same time enable them to 
react to problems in the locales.44 A smaller constituency was also proposed 
to increase the responsiveness of rural soviet officials. Nina Tarasova sug-
gested that rural soviets must encompass no more than 1,000 people, and 
the radius of the rural soviet must be no more than 5 kilometers to make the 
local power closer to the population.45 By making both All-Union and local 
officials more accessible to their constituents, whether through decreasing 
the number of people they represented or limiting the distance constitu-
ents had to travel to meet with their representatives, such suggestions rep-
resented a desire to make officials responsible to their constituents and to 
enable citizens to evaluate the behavior of elected officials.
Raising local officials’ level of competence was of particular concern. Of 
the 50 total suggestions made to Article 95, three-quarters (37) focused on 
terms for representatives in the rural soviets. For example, S. P. Odegov, a 
collective farmer and order winner, asked that elected deputies to the sovi-
ets serve not for two years, but for four years, so that representatives could 
better adapt to the work and be more effective.46 Likewise, at the plenum 
of Koriakinskii rural soviet, a suggestion was made to elect deputies to the 
rural soviets for three years rather than two, so they could better master the 
work.47 To promote competent work at the local level, the inhabitants of 
the Kirov region suggested that “the soviet of the deputies of laborers report 
about their work to their laboring constituents.”48 In total, 52 such sugges-
tions were recorded during the discussion of the draft Constitution. 
In addition to suggesting ways to make representatives more accountable 
and responsive in general, some people took the public discussion as an 
opportunity to criticize local officials who they did not think were doing sat-
isfactory work. Moscow encouraged participants to use the discussion and 
the subsequent local soviet elections to criticize and remove ineffective local 
officials. Stalin himself called on the citizens of the USSR to use democracy 
as a whip to prompt local officials to be more effective and responsive to 
their needs. Comments made during the discussion of the draft Constitution 
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suggest that many people in the Kirov region were dissatisfied with the work 
of the local soviets and state officials. N. I. Piatin suggested that in future 
elections to the soviet, it was necessary to elect the best people, as those 
elected in the previous election were unable to work.49 Another participant 
asked that in future election campaigns, more seriousness be given to the 
nomination of candidates for deputy.50 Reports from District Executive 
Committees and the Regional Executive Committee also reflected discon-
tent with the work of local officials.51 
The use of the discussion as a forum to criticize, and even attack, deputies 
whom citizens believed were not sufficiently representing their interests once 
again demonstrated how the participants seized the open forum that the state 
provided and used it to agitate for their own interests. And while the lan-
guage used against local officials may have echoed official discourse, many 
of the reasons that deputies were dismissed from work were local and eco-
nomic. For example, collective farmer V. I. Sozinov was recorded as saying, 
Our Constitution is the most democratic in the world. Everyone has 
the right to vote and to be elected. Only those who are worthy of great 
honor are elected to the soviets through secret ballot, but we won’t elect 
idlers to the soviet. Ivan Sozinov works poorly for us on the collective 
farm and we won’t elect him to the soviet.52
By framing his criticism within the context of service as the greatest honor 
that a Soviet citizen could have, V. I. Sozinov made Ivan Sozinov’s poor 
work a matter of national and not just local importance. Likewise, during 
the discussion at a meeting of the “Thirteenth Anniversary of October” col-
lective farm, the collective farmers stated that:
a soviet deputy must be a model, through his own personal example 
he must lead the masses of laborers. But our deputy A. F. Gontsov acts 
completely otherwise. He neglects collective farm work, and didn’t do 
collective farm work, even on the order of the brigadier. Instead of 
strengthening work discipline on the collective farm [he] breaks it down, 
persuading the collective farmers to not go to work. There must not be a 
place for such a deputy in the rural soviet. During the re-elections to the 
soviets, we will not elect such good-for-nothings, but we will elect the 
best collective farmers who work in a Stakhanovite method, exemplify 
proper behavior, and accurately execute soviet laws.53 
By putting Gontsov’s behavior within the context of the larger discussion of 
constructing socialism, his shortcomings as a deputy took on much greater 
significance. 
A letter to Kaiskii Gornorabochii, the Kaiskii district newspaper,  entitled, 
“The Laborers were the Masters of the Country,” provides one of the more 
interesting examples of the use of official Soviet language to demand better 
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work at a local level. The letter writer seized upon the central themes of the 
discussion of the draft Constitution, such as the improved quality of life in 
the USSR and working to build socialism, to address local problems such as 
filth in the rural soviet building and the tardiness of local officials. The letter 
began by framing the problems with local authorities in the context of the 
struggle to build socialism:
We read the new draft Constitution. We, workers and collective farmers, 
attained such overall achievements under the leadership of the Communist 
Party. Earlier, under tsarist power, they governed us, the landlords and 
the capitalists didn’t ask us and no one dared talk to them. If you would 
have said something or looked, you would have found yourself with your 
teeth knocked out or with cuts from a birch rod. [Скажешь чего, того и 
смотри зубы выбьют или розгами напорют]. Now it is a different affair. 
Those who we wish are elected deputies in the soviets and we elect those 
who struggle for the masses, strengthening collective farms, safeguarding 
our socialist property and caring about us workers. 
Having been repressed under the tsars, the peasants emphasized the new 
opportunities that the Soviet socialist system afforded them. They also used 
this as a way to emphasize the great disservice that incompetent or corrupt 
local officials were doing, and not just to the local inhabitants but also to the 
USSR. When considering the re-election of these officials, the author stated:
Will we re-elect Polonin as the chairman of our Mineevskii rural soviet 
and Morozov as his deputy? If they will work better we will elect them 
and if they work as now we will not. They are very slovenly. In the rural 
soviet it is always dirty, go to the rural soviet and there is nowhere to 
sit, lessons are conducted whenever they think about it, citizens com-
ing on business wait, wait and [then] leave and have to come again on 
another day. Earlier it was impossible to appoint an accurate time for 
lessons on collective farms and in brigades, for example from 9 o’clock 
to 12 and after 12, so citizens could know and come at the established 
time. The sections of the rural soviet also work poorly. The chairman 
doesn’t think up lesson plans or call assemblies and another time they 
didn’t meet for three months; it is impossible to work now. The new 
draft Constitution compels [them] to work in a new manner (заставляет 
работать по новому), with great care for the citizens of our country, and 
to strengthen our collective farms.54 
As this letter suggests, despite the rhetorical focus on state building that 
seemed to dominate the discussion of local authorities’ responsibilities, many 
of the reasons that local soviet officials were criticized or removed from 
work were of purely local concern. Such was the case in Pizhanskii district, 
where the discussion of the draft coincided with the rural soviet deputies’ 
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reports to their constituents. Utilizing this forum, the collective farmers 
criticized the work of the Pizhanskii, Semenudrskii, and L. Komarovskii 
rural soviets for their insufficient development of red corners, reading huts, 
and mass work.55 And popular frustration with the deputies’ work had real 
consequences. During the discussion, two deputies were removed, one from 
Pizhanskii rural soviet and one from L. Komarovskii rural soviet.56 Four 
other deputies were recalled by the voters for not justifying their trust.57 
The complaints and reasons for removing deputies varied, but they were 
inevitably local.58 For example, in Murashinskii district, there was widespread 
criticism of the unsatisfactory work of the soviets and the raiispolkomy, 
particularly the rural tax commissions and raion tax commissions’ untimely 
investigation of complaints. Two members of the raiispolkom, Tashlykov 
and Lotapov, were removed from office, and three deputies were removed 
from rural soviet membership for the inability to do proper work and other 
“discrediting reasons.”59 The voters of the agricultural artel’, “Red Falcon,” 
in Slobodkinskii rural soviet, accused the deputies of unsatisfactorily engag-
ing in cultural construction, the liquidation of illiteracy and semi-literacy, 
the organization and strengthening of collective farms, and the improve-
ment of the rural economy. The voters of Nazarovskii rural soviet were 
even more specific in their complaints against the district executive commit-
tee. They complained that the district executive committee unsatisfactorily 
considered the expansion of local handicraft production, the expansion of 
an uninterrupted supply of goods at the co-op, necessary seasonal goods, 
and the timely sending of necessary agricultural machinery on the collective 
farms.60 The failure of local officials in Slobodkinskii rural soviet to address 
local educational and economic concern resulted in three soviet deputies 
(M. T. Selivanov, A. A. Leushin, and F. B. Leushin) being removed and 
replaced by “the best shockworker-collective farmers.”61 Similarly, voters 
who were dissatisfied with their service removed deputies from their posi-
tions in Votkinskii district62 and Arbazhskii district.63 Overall, the Regional 
Executive Committee reported that 779 deputies were removed from 284 
soviets for incompetence during the 1936 local elections.64
The state had invited its citizens to participate in political discussion and 
to criticize and remove ineffective local officials from power. The citizens 
of the Kirov region took up the challenge and, in doing so, pushed for their 
own personal and local interests. But the evidence also makes clear that 
they did not always agree with rights granted by the draft Constitution. 
Many harbored suspicions about granting equal rights to “former people” 
and about the appropriateness of habeas corpus. However, the differences 
between the desires and interests of the people and the desires and inter-
ests of the state caused conflicts and raised central authorities’ suspicions 
about the true government of the countryside. The fact that the discussion 
proceeded with both parties working towards different goals had negative 
consequences in 1937, when in preparation for the elections to the Supreme 
Soviet, some of the newly enfranchised citizens, the former “former people” 
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in particular, began taking up this mantle of political activism and promot-
ing their interests over the interests of the state.
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The open discussion of the draft Constitution, which allowed citizens to 
criticize the proposed foundations of the state, coupled with the central lead-
ership’s emphasis on free and open elections, created stress on the Stalinist 
system. While central state authorities initially encouraged the population’s 
open participation, as the discussion progressed and the results from Party 
and local elections held in late 1936 became clear, the central and local 
authorities became increasingly concerned about “anti-Soviet” activity 
among some of the discussants. This anxiety carried over into preparations 
for the 1937 elections to the Supreme Soviet when reports from the Kirov 
region indicated that some former kulaks and priests used the relaxing of 
restrictions to agitate for their own interests and to win representation in 
some local organs of power.1 These reports amplified the anxieties that 
the central leadership had about the perceived increase in enemy activity 
throughout the country. The local NKVD Party cell minutes, from which I 
draw my materials, demonstrated growing anxiety within the NKVD and 
the community at large. As 1937 progressed, participants at those meet-
ings and in other governmental organs stopped referring to the infiltration 
of Soviet organs of power by class enemies as a possibility but rather as 
a reality that needed to be aggressively confronted. This perceived chal-
lenge to the dominant role of the Communist Party, which coincided with 
myriad other factors, such as massive demographic upheaval, the challenges 
of rapid industrialization, the 1936 economic crisis,2 failed verification of 
Party documents,3 and a mounting foreign threat, helped to trigger repres-
sion in 1937. This chapter explores how such reports and pressure from the 
regions contributed to the onset of mass repression in 1937 and its evolu-
tion. As this study examines one region of the RSFSR, the purpose of this 
chapter is not to make overstated claims about the mass repression, but to 
show ways in which local issues and state concerns overlapped, while also 
raising questions about popular involvement. 
“Anti-Soviet” behavior during the discussion
Central-state and Party rhetoric during the first months of the discussion 
emphasized that the destruction of all class enemies had been successful, 
7 The Constitution, the 1937 
elections, and repression
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which provided an opportunity for the greater democratization of the USSR 
through open, multi-candidate elections with full popular participation. 
This argument dominated the media coverage of the discussion and official 
state and Party statements. But signs of concern about “anti-Soviet” rheto-
ric and behavior began to surface in August 1936, coinciding with the first 
of the major Moscow show trials.
The first specific mention of the need to monitor the public discussion 
for anti-Soviet activities came on the heels of the Chairman of the Central 
Executive Committee, Mikhail Kalinin’s, August rebuke of regional authori-
ties. Kalinin’s reaction stemmed from a lack of reports about the discussion’s 
progress and a plethora of “incorrect” suggestions (discussed in Chapter 3 
and the Notes on Sources). In response to Kalinin’s complaint, Ivan Akulov, 
the secretary of the Central Executive Committee (TsIK), required reports 
from regional officials to answer a very specific list of questions. Reports of 
anti-Soviet behavior, specifically the “worming in of class enemies during 
the discussion of the draft Constitution,” and what form these activities 
took, were among the types of information that Akulov requested on behalf 
of the Central Executive Committee.4 
Akulov’s request was nothing extraordinary. In the past, when con-
fronted with a campaign that did not develop as the central leadership had 
envisioned, it would castigate lower officials for insufficient effort and call 
on them to look for class enemies who may have integrated themselves 
into the process and threatened it from the inside. However, the Central 
Executive Committee’s requests for information about the behavior of class 
enemy activities during the discussion suggested that they were no longer 
convinced that class enemies had been as thoroughly destroyed as the official 
rhetoric indicated. While it could be argued that the Soviet leadership had 
never believed its own rhetoric about the destruction of class enemies, the 
expansion of the electoral franchise in the draft and the appearance of this 
specific line of inquiry about class enemies only two months into the discus-
sion indicate that the leadership had indeed believed that it was safe to make 
the USSR more participatory. But something occurred during the course of 
the discussion to change the leadership’s assessment of the situation. It is 
unclear from my research what exactly triggered this reassessment, which 
coincides with increasing pushes for vigilance in other spheres as well. In 
his studies of the repression, J. Arch Getty argues that the central Party and 
state administration was increasingly suspicious of disobedience and silence 
on the part of regional officials about the fulfillment of campaigns.5 Given 
that Kalinin felt it necessary to criticize regional officials for their failure to 
send regular and complete reports, it is likely their unresponsiveness trig-
gered the tightening of central control over the discussion and the requests 
for information about class enemies. 
In the Kirov region, Party and state officials set about providing the Central 
Executive Committee with the requested information. In these reports, the 
same handful of anecdotes about class enemies keep reappearing, leading to 
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the conclusion that such incidents were rare, and these few examples were all 
that the local officials could find to fulfill Moscow’s request. Additionally, 
regional reports note that most of these complaints were nipped in the bud 
when they were voiced during the discussion. Meeting organizers, who 
considered certain opinions anti-Soviet, would often set those dissenters 
up as straw men in order to reinforce the main state-building narrative.6 
Therefore, it is hard to gauge how widespread or deep-rooted discontent 
was in the Kirov region. However, this material is important because the 
information central authorities received from the provinces was what they 
used to evaluate the overall progress of the discussion regionally and in the 
USSR as a whole. 
Most of the perceived anti-Soviet incidents recorded in the Kirov region 
were statements or suggestions made during discussion meetings. Some 
participants used these gatherings to express dissatisfaction with the 
standards of living that Soviet power had provided. For example, I. M. 
Cherninov, a collective farmer, said, “we, from the very beginning of Soviet 
power waited for improvement, we work like slaves, on our backs they 
build the cities, factories, but we peasants, our lives become poorer and 
poorer.”7 Another collective farmer, S. V. Ogorodnikov, announced: “the 
new Constitution helps nothing, we pay a lot of taxes and these are the ben-
efits derived from Soviet power. Tsar Nikolai II didn’t take anything from 
us and under his rule we lived better.”8 Even some local officials expressed 
dissatisfaction with the living conditions in the USSR. Egor Avdeevich 
Gontsov, a Komsomol organizer and member of the Koppashinskii rural 
soviet, said, “we live now as we earlier lived. As we starved earlier [under 
the Tsar] in this way, we are hungry today. The new Constitution didn’t 
bring improvement to us.”9 
Even those who recognized the Constitution as a positive document 
were sometimes critical of the quality of life in the Kirov region, and such 
comments were labeled anti-Soviet. Koz’minykh, a medical assistant, was 
reported to say, “the Constitution as a document is good, but not everything 
is in accord with it. I was in one school where three students sat without a 
jacket.”10 Others who believed that the Constitution had little bearing on 
their lives simply refused to engage in the discussion at all, like the service 
worker in the Khromonii factory who stated, “we are not interested in the 
Constitution and will not discuss it.”11 Like most suggestions, these com-
plaints were often local in nature but took on national significance when 
sent to Moscow as the voice of dissent.
Statements made at group meetings could easily be cut off by watch-
ful meeting organizers, but “anti-Soviet” interpretations of the draft 
Constitution, particularly those that empowered religious groups or indi-
vidual smallholders to challenge foundational state policy, proved more 
worrisome to the state. For example, Taiarikov,12 who had been formerly 
sentenced to hard labor, formed a group of collective farmers around him 
and argued that “as the freedom of speech, press and individual small 
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holding are now permitted in the Constitution, it is better for the collec-
tive farmers to become individual smallholders.” His words found sympa-
thetic ears, as some of the collective farmers reportedly ran away from the 
“Sower” collective farm, destabilizing it.13 Likewise, P. I. Nekrasov and M. 
T. Kharin, kulaks who had been deprived of rights, told people in their vil-
lage that, under the new Constitution, all those who had been deprived of 
rights would have full citizenship rights restored. Hence it was not necessary 
to fulfill any obligations to the state and all arrears to the state were going 
to be withdrawn.14 Additionally, suggestions to form trade unions among 
the collective farmers were rejected as anti-Soviet, because trade unions had 
on occasion posed challenges to the state by agitating for greater rights for 
unionized workers.15 Such interpretations of the draft Constitution could 
have had real consequences because they challenged the collectivized agri-
cultural system that the state had worked so hard to create.
For similar reasons, local officials and the NKVD also labeled pro-reli-
gious interpretations of the draft Constitution as anti-Soviet. Discussion 
organizers and the NKVD carefully documented comments such as those 
made by S. A. Korobintsyn, the accountant at the Kumenskii raion com-
munications section who wanted to add the right to engage in religious 
propaganda following the phrase, “freedom of antireligious propaganda.”16 
Despite almost two decades of sustained state repression, the church appa-
ratus remained more or less intact. So when people like Semina, a female 
worker at the “Stasovoi” artel’,17 stated that, “in the draft Constitution it is 
stated about the freedom to leave religious cults, however, everywhere they 
close churches even though the majority of the population is against it,”18 
local, regional, and central state and Party officials took notice. 
In Sanchurskii raion, several religious people allegedly challenged com-
munists in local positions of power. The chairman of the Zaozerskii rural 
soviet, comrade Mykhin, faced opposition from locals, who in one report 
were described as simply individual smallholders.19 However, a different 
report portrayed the culprit as a religious fanatic and smallholder (религиоз
ный фанатик-единоличник) who interpreted the draft Constitution to mean 
that during the election campaign, it was permissible and even necessary to 
push priests into the membership of the rural soviet.20 Additionally, multi-
ple sources record that Abramovich, a member of the Sanchurskii church, 
addressed the raion executive committee about having religious processions 
without the approval of the organs of power “on the basis of the draft 
Constitution.”21 Such interpretations of the draft Constitution challenged, 
however indirectly, well-known state policies, including the collectivization 
of agriculture, the use of taxation to encourage collectivization, the clos-
ing of churches, and the active struggle against religion. While such inci-
dents were rare, their challenge to established state policies qualified them as 
“class enemy interpretations” rather than “mistaken” interpretations. 
Most of the “anti-Soviet” activity in the Kirov region was limited to 
words. Only in Votkinskii raion was violence directed against members of 
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the collective farm administration or Party members. A report to the TsIK 
lists several violent incidents, citing the sharp struggle between class enemy 
elements and the local aktiv as the precipitating factor for such acts. On the 
“Niva” collective farm, “class enemy elements” stabbed the deputy chair-
man of the collective farm and threw him in the river (зарезали и бросил 
в реку). During a meeting of the “17th Party Conference” collective farm, 
someone burned down the apartment of the collective farm chairman, com-
rade Shkurikhin.22 There was also a case of arson on the “Red Hill” col-
lective farm in Balanyrinskii rural soviet. The district executive committee 
there alleged that, in connection with the low grain harvest in the raion, 
kulaks disseminated rumors about the difficulties with grain and urged the 
dismantling of collective farms. On the “Excavator” collective farm, an 
individual smallholder, Sobin, angry about his agricultural taxes, beat up 
Comrade Romanov from Upolnomochennskii rural soviet23 and attacked a 
female tractor driver.24 Given the localized nature of such violent behavior, 
it seems likely that local conditions, perhaps connected with the poor har-
vest in 1936, triggered such violent acts. 
The fact that the same incidents, anti-Soviet rhetoric, and critical inter-
pretations of the Constitution were used in multiple reports to the Central 
Executive Committee suggests that “anti-Soviet” behavior was unlikely to 
have been a widespread problem in the Kirov region. Moscow’s soliciting of 
such information is more likely a reflection of central anxieties than mount-
ing local threats. Despite their relative rarity, reports on “anti-Soviet” activ-
ities reinforced central anxieties about the intentions or activities of class 
enemies. Anxiety about class enemies and their potential to exercise the new 
rights that the 1936 Constitution gave them intensified as the preparations 
for local elections at the end of 1936 and the 1937 elections to the Supreme 
Soviet unfolded. Some local officials feared that these new rights provided 
the formerly disenfranchised with a way to enter local organs of power and 
to promote their own agendas.
The ratified Constitution and the elections of 1937
Despite reports of anti-Soviet activity during the popular discussion of the 
draft and widespread popular disapproval of the expanded franchise, Stalin 
defended his decision to grant universal suffrage. In his speech on the draft 
Constitution made at the 8th Congress of Soviets in December 1936, Stalin 
reiterated his argument that the Soviet state had deprived “dangerous ele-
ments” of voting rights during a time when they were waging open war 
against the people and undermining Soviet laws. But now that the exploiting 
class had been destroyed and Soviet power had strengthened, the time to 
introduce universal suffrage had come. He countered the argument that uni-
versal suffrage would allow enemy elements to worm their way into soviet 
organs of power25 by replying that not all former kulaks and white-guard-
ists were harmful to Soviet power, and, if the people somewhere elected 
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dangerous people, it would mean that the agitational and propagandistic 
work was not effectively carried out.26
While some in the central leadership may have been convinced that full 
democracy was a viable option, the language in reports on election prepara-
tions from Kirov’s Regional Party Committee and district Party organiza-
tions suggests that, like its citizenry, Kirov’s regional and local officials were 
unsupportive of full citizenship rights for former class enemies. Although 
the number of incidents may have been few, it appears that local officials 
saw them as harbingers of disorder. They felt that the former lishentsy were 
undermining Soviet authority, particularly in the countryside.27 Getty has 
argued that such sentiment was part of a national trend as “the regional 
leaders felt that anti-Soviet feeling was strong enough in the country to 
threaten Party control, and open elections would give it voice. They resisted 
the new voting system from the beginning.”28 Reframing the formerly dis-
enfranchised as “class enemies” may have served as a way for local and 
regional officials to undermine the new voting system.
It is unclear from the documentary evidence from the Kirov region just 
how strongly the regional and local leadership opposed the new voting sys-
tem or what steps they may have taken against it. However, minutes of the 
meeting of the Murashinskii district NKVD Party cell suggest that local 
officials did not share Stalin’s belief that re-enfranchising such people would 
not result in increased enemy activity. This meeting followed on the heels of 
the 8th Congress of Soviets, in December 1936, at which the Constitution 
was ratified and Stalin dismissed concerns about class enemies using the 
Constitution to their own ends. However, the atmosphere at this local Party 
meeting was far less optimistic. Comrade Zabodkin spoke on the question 
of the elections and of those formerly deprived of voting rights. In the past, 
he noted, the class enemy wormed themselves into the Soviet organs and 
now could do so again, particularly where there would be poor prepara-
tory work for the elections.29 Therefore, Zabodkin opined, we must know 
the class enemy’s plan and stop it promptly. Comrade Zherekhov said that 
in connection with the new system of elections to the soviets, the harmful 
elements would of course attempt to use this opportunity to give their vote 
to their people. The task of monitoring harmful elements placed a great 
responsibility on Party members and the NKVD, particularly those sections 
in which one or another communist works.30
Despite some local officials’ doubts, the central leadership maintained its 
stance on expanded election rights well into August 1937. In the protocol 
of the general Party meeting of the Nolinskii district Party cell of the NKVD 
from August 12, 1937 on the topic of elections, the assembled NKVD mem-
bers noted that: 
All members and candidate members of the All Union Communist 
Party, [should] not allow the violation of the Stalinist Constitution, 
and quickly quash any violation of the Constitution regardless of who 
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they are, but particularly on the part of workers of the District Party 
Committee.31 
This sort of directive implied that the state was serious at least through August 
about maintaining the electoral standards set forth in the Constitution. But 
it is interesting to note that the meeting seemed especially concerned that 
“workers of the District Party Committee,” that is, local Party members, 
might be the ones who violated the Constitution. However, the increas-
ing pressure from local and regional officials in the face of what the latter 
regarded as serious efforts by anti-Soviet elements to gain a foothold in local 
organs of power influenced how the central leadership dealt with the ques-
tion of open and multi-candidate elections. 
Reports from the Kirov region in early 1937, undoubtedly issued in 
response to a central directive, consistently noted anti-Soviet and counter-
revolutionary incidents following the ratification of the Constitution and the 
extension of citizenship rights to the formerly disenfranchised. The intensity 
of reported anti-Soviet enemy activities varied dramatically, ranging from 
reported rumors to outright agitation. In Ziuzdinskii district, the District 
Party Committee reported that harmful elements prepared for the elections 
to the Supreme Soviet and the lower soviet organs. Their reportedly harm-
ful work was conducted in differing ways, including individual statements, 
underground meetings, and writing slogans against Soviet power on trees 
in the forest and on tablets.32 These incidents were used as straw men to 
inspire increased agitation and propagandistic work before the elections. A 
report about preparation for the elections to the Supreme Soviet noted that 
agitprop instructors had intensified their work because the counter-revolu-
tionary elements used districts where political work was weak or absent to 
conduct anti-Soviet campaigns.33 
While in some cases enemy activity may have simply been a foil for 
increasing Party work, there were incidents of “enemy activity” that were 
genuinely threatening to local order. In the village of Kora, the former head 
of the collective farm, Fir Ovsizhnikov, agitated for the elimination of pig 
farms, incited the collective farmers to divide up the pigs, ridiculed animal 
husbandry, and called rabbits Soviet sheep and goats Soviet cows. He agi-
tated against communists, saying, “on the collective farm it is possible to 
allow one communist for breeding and remove his eyes …”34 Although it 
is unclear what exactly he meant, his intent is clear. In the view of local 
officials, Ovsizhnikov’s hostility towards the state and its policies, and his 
veiled threats of violence towards its representatives in the countryside, 
posed a potential threat to state control and local stability that was made 
more dire by the pending elections.
It is undeniable that some former class enemies exploited the weakness 
of the state in the rural areas to return to positions of power. Noskov, 
a former kulak from the village of Kir’ia, who had become chairman of 
the rural soviet, allegedly told a local candidate, “if you [the candidate] 
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will work for us [Noskov and his supporters] then we will vote for you 
under the new Constitution, but if you will not be with us, then we will 
not vote for you.”35 Noskov was chairman of the rural soviet, despite his 
past as a kulak, and undoubtedly wielded some power in the district. His 
statement makes clear that he intended to use his influence and position 
to see that people who shared his interests rather the state’s would be 
elected. Further defiance of the state’s power and subversion of its inter-
ests came from others in Ziuzdinskii district. Under collectivization, col-
lective farmers had to pay taxes, but individual smallholders had to fulfill 
additional state obligations because of their individual status; these extra 
burdens on them were part of the way that the state encouraged people 
to collectivize. However, with the ratification of the Constitution and the 
proclamation of equal rights, these individual smallholders refused to pay 
what they viewed as discriminatory taxes. Some of the individual small-
holders of Kharinskii rural soviet (I. K. Ichetovkin, Sh. S. Kazakov, and 
others) categorically refused to fulfill any state obligation, arguing that the 
Constitution guaranteed the equal rights of all citizens.36 Such incidents 
posed threats to the already over-taxed local administrators trying to keep 
order in the countryside.
In addition to challenging or subverting state control in the countryside, 
others used the election meetings and their new constitutional rights to 
express dissatisfaction with state policies and the state itself. On one col-
lective farm in Iaranskii district, a collective farmer urged people to vote 
against Stalin because he “takes bread from us and it is necessary to vote 
for someone who will not take bread.”37 In the village of Kozlakh, rumors 
circulated that on the 12th of December in Moscow, there would be a differ-
ent administration, life would be better, and the collective farms would be 
dissolved. In the village of Polom, in the same district, Paraskovia Plastinina 
stated that “we will vote for the Antichrist.”38 Such incidents suggest that 
some people still felt that their lives would be better without Soviet power, 
to the point that some people felt the Antichrist was preferable. These dis-
satisfied citizens hoped the upcoming elections would reverse the more oner-
ous Soviet policies or result in a complete regime change. 
Others took a less extreme approach in demonstrating their dissatisfac-
tion with the Soviet regime by focusing on questions of democracy, the 
violation of the new Constitution, and regulations of elections. For exam-
ple, a telegram from the Kirov Regional Party Committee addressed to 
Stalin himself noted that in a number of districts, there were questions and 
speeches in meetings about how the registration of only one candidate per 
seat in the Soviet of the Union undermined the democratic nature of the 
electoral laws.39 Others took it a step further and declared the elections ille-
gitimate because they violated the rules that the state itself had set forth. For 
example, in Omutninskii district, after comrades Stalin, Andreev, Litvinov, 
Budennney, and Rodin did not give their approval to being placed on the 
ballot in Omutninskii voting district, there remained only one candidate on 
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the ballot for the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. The 
chairman of the district voting committee reported that “enemies of the peo-
ple” took advantage of this situation and spread rumors that it was useless 
to go to the elections because without two candidates it meant that the regu-
lations on elections had been violated and that democracy did not exist. The 
author noted that, in response, agitators were organized to explain that this 
assertion was false and reportedly an unknown party beat up the rumor-
spreading “enemies.”40 
Many reports from district Party committees ascribed incidents of 
counter-revolutionary activity to the ratification of the new Constitution. 
A report from the Ziuzdinskii District Party Committee noted that “the 
complete facts demonstrate that, in connection with the approval of the 
Stalinist Constitution, the counter-revolutionary activity of harmful ele-
ments, particularly of clergymen has revived in Ziuzdinskii district.”41 
Those in attendance at the March 20, 1937 general Party cell meeting of the 
Nolinskii district NKVD reached a similar conclusion. Party members noted 
that the new electoral system and the Constitution gave the opportunity for 
harmful elements to participate in elections and to be elected. Therefore, 
it concluded that the Party organization as a whole and every member of 
the Party individually must conduct mass political work among the popu-
lation in order to exclude alien people from the soviets.42 At the previous 
(February 19) meeting of the Nolinskii Party cell of the NKVD, comrade 
Kolomytsev stated that:
the approved new Stalinist Constitution gives the right to vote to all 
adult citizens, with the exception of those deprived of the right to vote 
by the court. Several counter-revolutionary groups, particularly mem-
bers of different types of cults, are using these laws to begin carrying out 
anti-Soviet agitation. They conduct this agitation not only among those 
of advanced age, but they also draw in the youth.43 
Whether rooted in long-established Soviet trends or the prejudices, fears, or 
personal experiences of local officials, members of already suspect groups, 
such as former kulaks and members of the religious establishment, were 
often named as the perpetrators of counter-revolutionary activities. For 
example, at a 1937 pre-election meeting on the “Country of the Soviets” col-
lective farm, a drunken administrative exile, N. P. Shestakov, allegedly cre-
ated an uproar by shouting counter-revolutionary statements before being 
arrested.44 In Shabalino, during the electoral discussion, a former kulak, 
Ustiuzhanov, stated: “you can write down any growth figure you want, 
maybe having grown not 16 tsenters (1600 kg) but more. It is all self-delu-
sion.” He was reportedly rebuffed by a 65-year-old collective farmer who 
said: “Blockhead, if you could be taken back 40 years, we grew only 2–3 
tsenters of potatoes on one hectare, but now hundreds grow from collective 
farm land and there is the wonder.”45 In both cases, the complainants’ pasts 
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were important. The comments both men made caught the attention of local 
officials because of their past, while similar comments made by upstand-
ing citizens were treated as complaints to be refuted rather than subversive 
actions. 
Likewise, local and regional officials often portrayed clergymen and reli-
gious believers as real threats to local power. For example, a report from 
Ziuzdinskii district notes that the harmful anti-Soviet work of the clergy 
was concentrated primarily in three or four rural soviets where all churches 
had been closed but the clergy still had influence which they used to pro-
mote religion in these areas. According to the chairman of the Ziuzdinskii 
District Party Committee, Batyrev, in March 1937, the Bishop Zhuravlev, 
living in exile near the city of Omsk, charged the priest, Samodurov (from 
Vereshaginskii district, Sverdlovsk oblast’), to work with the priests of the 
city of Omutninsk “to perform religious rites for the believers.” Upon the 
priests’ arrival, former kulaks, individual smallholders, and some of the 
collective famers of the Ivanovskii, Kir’ianskii, and other collective farms 
gathered around them. The clergymen focused their work on the opening 
of churches. An individual smallholder from the village of Kuvakushska, 
Sidorov, who was also a former psalm reader, headed up this work. 
Reportedly, there had already been repeated endeavors to collect materi-
als and money, and Noskov,46 a former kulak and chairman of the rural 
soviet, acted as the keeper of such funds. Additionally, these religious sup-
porters also reportedly conducted preparations for the elections to the 
Supreme Soviet. Batyrev and other local administrators felt very threatened 
by their actions.47
All of these incidents culminated in local officials adopting a siege men-
tality in the second half of 1937. For example, a report from Omutninskii 
district listed a number of anti-Soviet acts that had taken place during the 
elections to the Supreme Soviet:
1 In Kirs, the clergy worked very strongly to spread rumors that those who 
went to the elections would also be voting for the closure of churches.
2 In the 19th voting district in the city of Omutninsk, someone wrote on 
one voting bulletin, “we want Aleksander Kerensky, we want Trotsky.”
3 In the 26th voting district, someone wrote on one bulletin, “you will 
vote against your will for our candidates when there are no other 
candidates.” 
4 In Uninskii district, there was an incident when in several separate bul-
letins it was written: “I vote for Jesus Christ.”
5 In the city of Omutninsk, on the evening of the elections, there 
arrived from the Urals an unknown worker who stayed with Anton 
Nikolaevich Loginov in building 40 on Komsomol Street. When the 
agitator arrived, this unidentified worker answered, “that if you will go 
to the elections with us then I won’t go. The electoral system is incor-
rect and I don’t agree with it. Our elections in the Urals don’t proceed 
in this manner.”48
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In reaction to this list, the chairman of the district election commission, Riakin, 
concluded that there were many enemies and that “they must be fished out 
and destroyed.”49 Riakin’s comments suggest a shift towards viewing “coun-
ter-revolutionary events” perpetrated by former class enemies as part of an 
organized network, which needed to be rooted out and destroyed, rather 
than being the isolated acts of individual “class enemies.” Such a change in 
perception can also be found in the NKVD Party cell meeting protocols. 
Minutes from the local NKVD Party cell meetings in the early months of 
1937 demonstrated a belief that, while it was dangerous to allow the partici-
pation of the formerly disenfranchised, the situation could be managed with 
proper vigilance. At the March 10, 1937 closed meeting of the Falenskii 
District NKVD Party cell, comrade Bystrov stated: 
According to the Stalinist Constitution the up-coming elections will 
allow the participation by cult members, former White Guardists, 
Kulaks and others. They will not only vote but they can also be elected. 
In order to not exclude communists from the soviets, we [the NKVD 
and the Party] need to be exceptionally vigilant and to develop work 
among the masses. But I believe that among us in the Party organiza-
tion not everyone has studied the Constitution, for example, Smetanin, 
who is the leader of the militsia, even though he is laden with work, it 
is necessary for him to study.50 
Other calls for increased mass work and vigilance came from the Sovetskii 
district NKVD. At a closed meeting on March 9, Comrade Polushin noted 
that it was necessary to further explain the Stalinist Constitution so that 
there would be no violations of democracy during the elections to the 
Soviets. At the same meeting, when the question of former people partici-
pating was posed, Comrade Kasbianov cited Stalin’s answer, “It is neces-
sary to work, not to complain (хныкать),” to those who suggested limiting 
the rights of the former class enemies so they did not infiltrate state offices, 
reiterating the central leadership’s assertion that any remaining anti-Soviet 
sentiment could be managed with appropriate mass work.51
Concern about the elections being used to benefit class enemies and the 
need for increased vigilance dominated the March 25 meeting of the Kaiskii 
NKVD Party cell. Comrade Agafokov opened the meeting stating, “on the 
basis of the new Constitution class enemies will meddle in the conduct of 
our work, and based on that we must be vigilant.”52 Several of his col-
leagues echoed his concern. Comrade Vladimirov noted that, “the re-elec-
tions of Party organs on the basis of the new Constitution will proceed by 
secret ballot voting. Taking advantage of this, class enemies might worm in 
as deputies in the rural soviets. Therefore we must have revolutionary vigi-
lance…”53 Comrade Uiferev argued that:
on the basis of the new Constitution, the decision of the Central 
Committee specifically touched upon the question about revolutionary 
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vigilance and being ready for new re-elections. But we are poorly pre-
pared and the class enemies are preparing better than us, they will try to 
use this new Constitution to force in their deputies to the Soviets. Right 
now in this place of exile, settlers declare that if the new Constitution 
doesn’t give us passports,54 we will run away. Now there were some 
people who ran away, but in Biserovskii district the chairman of the 
rural soviet doesn’t chase after the run-aways.”55 
Uiferev provided specific examples of class enemies actively engaging the 
state and using the language of the new Constitution to agitate for greater 
rights. His fellow Party member, Khlust’ianov, offered further illustrations 
that the agitation of class enemies on the basis of the new Constitution 
was not just the imaginings of a paranoid state. He reported that “on the 
basis of the new Constitution, Kulaks come and say—we need passports, 
if we will elect deputies in the oblast’ then how can we go without pass-
ports.”56 The members of the Party cell concluded that “the presence of 
class enemy elements in our district, who received citizenship rights under 
the new Constitution, present our Party organization with the task of the 
further strengthening of vigilance, the unmasking of the schemes of class 
enemies, [and] remembering the words of Comrade Zhdanov at the ple-
num of the Central Committee, that the enemy is acting among us, thor-
oughly preparing for the election.”57 Presented with concrete examples, the 
language of the protocols of the district NKVD Party meetings changed. 
Class enemies exploiting their new rights against the state and worming 
their way into organs of power was now no longer just a possibility, some-
thing that might happen if the Party did not conduct adequate work among 
the masses; these were now facts that forced the local NKVD and Party to 
take action.58 
As the elections approached, the language became increasingly belliger-
ent, and one sees a tendency to dehumanize those labeled as class enemies. A 
participant at the July 25 Zuevskii district NKVD cell meeting stated: 
Comrades, I would like to remind you that our collective in the upcom-
ing election campaign must be more vigilant than ever or the class enemy 
will begin to put out his tentacles. As we know from the press, using 
the broad rights of the new Constitution, members of religious sects, 
priests and other henchmen (прихвостень) conduct a hidden struggle. 
They want to defame our best people so they won’t get into the organs 
of administration of Soviet power.59 
As the concerns about class enemies evolved, their alleged goals became 
more concrete: to occupy the local positions of power themselves and to 
destabilize the Soviet system. This alleged change spurred Soviet officials at 
all levels to accept the existence of such an organized and highly-motivated 
sleeping enemy in their midst. 
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Of all the activities in which former kulaks and clergymen engaged, the 
agitating for and electing their own candidates was the most disquieting 
for the central leadership and most directly threatening to local leaders. 
For example, in the village of Rodygino, the Regional Party Committee 
reported Rodygin, a Trotskyist who had been purged from the Party, 
agitated for the nomination of class-alien people to the Supreme Soviet.60 
In the village of Natiunicha, S. A. Chiudinovskikh stated, “here is the 
priest Filip’ev, who has a higher education, maybe he should be elected 
to the soviet.”61 And on occasion, the fears of the Party and state leader-
ship were realized when, in local elections, former class enemies were 
indeed elected to positions of power. At a NKVD cell meeting, comrade 
Kozel noted that many people did not understand the power of the secret 
ballot very well, as evinced by their election of delegates to professional 
organs, but class enemies seemed to understand that power as former 
kulaks were elected.62
Given popular opinion on the re-enfranchisement of the formerly dis-
enfranchised, the struggle for governance in the countryside, and NKVD 
reports, it is doubtful that local and regional officials in Kirov ever believed 
that restoring voting rights to former kulaks and clergymen was a viable 
option. However, central Party and state leaders pushed regional and local 
officials to support and attempt to implement the expanded electoral pro-
cess outlined in the Stalinist Constitution and the subsequent “Regulations 
on Elections.” This policy change meant reclassifying former class ene-
mies as full citizens. However, their new status quickly eroded as regional 
Party, state, and NKVD reports detailing anti-Soviet activity were sent 
to the Central Committee. These reports began to consistently associate 
these activities with the formerly disenfranchised and offered increasingly 
specific incidents even though the numbers (at least from Kirov) of the 
incidents were limited. At the same time, NKVD Chief Yezhov was push-
ing for increased vigilance,63 a sentiment that was quickly picked up by the 
lower NKVD organs. By mid-year, the complete certainty of the NKVD 
organs, even at the lowest level, that class enemies were worming into 
local organs of power during the election period, combined with reports 
of anti-Soviet activities from various provinces, contributed to the deci-
sion to unleash mass arrests of “anti-Soviet” elements beginning in July 
1937. The intensification of repression against such groups only escalated 
after that. 
The ratification of the 1936 Constitution contributed to repression in 
1937 as local anxieties deepened because of the increasingly strident rhet-
oric coming from Party leaders and, as Getty argues, anxieties and pres-
sures from the regions convinced the center that the threats were real. The 
increased reports of enemy activity both reflected and contributed to an 
overall state of anxiety about enemy activities in this period. These reports 
and the evidence that they offered no doubt influenced the central leader-
ship’s decisions to repress certain segments of the population. 
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Stalin’s Constitution utilizes the discussion of the draft Constitution to 
examine the discourse between the central state leadership and citizens as 
well as the limitations of central power. For the central leadership, mobiliz-
ing its citizenry in a variety of state-building campaigns was the main goal of 
the discussion of the draft Constitution. Central state actors tried to develop 
enduring institutional forms for territorial administration, military-coercive 
power, revenue extraction, and other socioeconomic functions through 
such campaigns. However, the goals of the central leadership at times stood 
in stark contrast with the people’s expressed interpretation of that social 
contract. Citizens of the USSR focused on securing rights and privileges, 
often related to improving their daily lives, from the central government, 
but also made known their support of and opposition to aspects of the draft 
Constitution. 
Employing a regional case study, in this case, of the Kirov region, has 
enabled a tight focus that establishes the local context in order to under-
stand why citizens made the suggestions and had the reactions that they did 
to the draft Constitution. This approach reveals quite clearly the mecha-
nisms put in place for a discussion of the draft Constitution and the prob-
lems of implementation of central decrees at local and regional levels. It also 
allows for the examination of the varied responses to the discussion and 
popular suggestions by distinct governing and Party organs at the local and 
regional level. Regional studies like this one demonstrate that Soviet citizens 
had agency. They often shrewdly sought to manipulate state goals, rhetoric, 
and campaigns to their own ends. But as this study argues, the population 
of the Kirov region did not always speak with one voice. Urban residents 
and rural residents often had divergent views, as did local elites and the local 
population, and at times so too did different generations.
However, the central leadership’s view of constitutional theory in the 
USSR and how it used this theory to formulate the draft constitution had a 
profound effect on the discussion. Stalin and the central state leadership ini-
tiated a popular campaign, and the popular response that followed revealed 
much about how the people of the USSR conceived of the role of state and 
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citizen, and the latter’s role in constructing socialism. Soviet leaders decided 
to rewrite the Constitution for several reasons, the most important of them 
and the ones about which they spoke publicly being: the class enemies had 
been vanquished; it was time to expand the franchise; and the state needed 
citizens’ active participation to enhance the construction of Soviet socialism. 
Additionally, rewriting the Constitution represented an important step in 
modernizing the Soviet state as a state, by creating a uniform central code 
of laws and establishing a social contract between the state and the citizens. 
The central leadership did not view single-party rule and popular par-
ticipation as antithetical. Indeed, leaders encouraged popular participa-
tion, within a strict framework, as a way to strengthen social and economic 
development in the USSR. The redefinition of citizens and citizenship, which 
included the re-enfranchisement of former priests and kulaks, as well as 
its focus on state building, illustrate how the central state sought to create 
a new social contract with its citizens and what it expected from them in 
return. The direction that the central leadership tried to give to the popular 
discussion reflected the changes that the central leadership hoped to bring 
about: a more participatory society within a one-party state, and a culture 
with the shared purpose of building a socialist society. These expectations 
were reflected in the narrative that the central authorities set forth in recom-
mended lesson plans and newspaper articles.
While the central leadership envisioned a people devoted to selflessly 
building socialism, the people of the Kirov region had a somewhat differ-
ent set of expectations. They believed that they should exercise more local 
control over an array of issues and that the state should provide them with 
increased material benefits because of the sacrifices that they had made and 
expected to make for a while longer. Many of the popular suggestions that 
came out of the Kirov region, especially its collective farms, were personal 
and local: they focused on citizens’ rights, access to social welfare pro-
grams, local power, and safety and security. The people of the Kirov region 
embraced some state programs because they were beneficial to their every-
day lives, and they rejected others. But they always used the language of the 
discussion and state-building, as articulated by Moscow, to frame and legiti-
mate their requests. Their comments and suggestions often made references 
to the principles, such as equality, enunciated in the draft Constitution. 
This study has argued that many of the citizens of the Kirov region, espe-
cially the collective farmers, participated in the public discussion and used 
the opportunity to express their concerns and their pride. The peasant par-
ticipants in this study defy easy stereotype. They were neither sullen nor 
docile. Although not highly literate, they valued the promises of education. 
They were politically astute in various ways. Many appreciated the changes 
that the revolution had brought, but they were still critical of certain poli-
cies. As this study suggests, local or regional studies are essential if we are 
to understand local concerns, especially those of the collective farm system 
and collective farmers.
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As the popular discussion indicated, Kirov’s citizens—and presumably 
many citizens across the USSR—reacted to the draft in complex ways. On 
the one hand, many applauded it for what it represented and promised. 
After all, a mere score of years earlier, there was no Constitution, nor were 
there citizens. But Kirov’s residents’ comments and suggestions convey what 
they wanted out of this social contract, and those needs were often very 
specific. Liberal conceptions of the rights of individuals are less evident than 
demands for more social control, especially at the local level. The class and 
social suspicions, often rooted in local experiences but fueled by central 
campaigns, that appeared in the popular discussion make clear that the 
USSR in the mid-1930s was still a society in formation. 
The focus on local and personal interests demonstrates that underlying 
the common language that unified the central state’s narrative and popular 
suggestions were often rather different interpretations of the rights and roles 
of the state and citizens. Many Kirov residents, for example, were critical 
of the proposed guarantees of habeas corpus, not on principle but because 
crime was a regular feature of rural life. Tensions such as these between 
the central state leadership’s interpretation of the rights and duties of citi-
zens, and citizens’ interpretations, became more apparent when some of the 
recently enfranchised former people seized upon their new constitutional 
rights and began to set forth their own candidates, who advocated for their 
own interests in the subsequent elections. Reports of anti-Soviet activities in 
the region and instances of former people nominating their own candidates 
for local offices were often sent to Moscow, where these reports most likely 
served to exacerbate the anxieties of the central leadership. 
The onset of mass repression in 1937, followed by the massive destruc-
tion of Soviet society during World War II, meant that some of the aspira-
tions enunciated in the Constitution remained unfulfilled. But one should 
not dismiss the 1936 Constitution out of hand. The opening up of the elec-
toral franchise, combined with a public forum for discussion, encouraged 
many Soviet citizens to engage the state in a dialogue, albeit a long-distance 
one, about their needs and responsibilities. At no point in this dialogue 
can we find any trace of Western liberalism. The draft Constitution, while 
granting many of the rights and freedoms found in Constitutions in Western 
Europe and North America, conveyed an entirely different vision of the 
role and function of a constitution. This was a social contract in a literal 
sense, one in which benefits and rights were specifically enunciated. The 
Soviet Constitution was a roadmap to a socialist society and a specific type 
of democracy—Soviet democracy. Given the influence of the 1936 Soviet 
Constitution, the lack of scholarly attention that it has received seems odd. 
The author hopes that this study will not be the only study of that foun-
dational document and popular reactions to it, nor of the influence that it 
had on later Soviet and post-Soviet constitutions. As this study shows, such 
studies can provide keen insight into the desires and dislikes of the Soviet 
citizenry in the 1930s.
Most of the information in this work on both the implementation of the 
discussion and the popular response to the draft Constitution comes from 
regional and local Party and state documents. Many of these documents 
were designed to address certain questions and concerns raised by offi-
cials in Moscow. Mikhail Kalinin, the Chairman of the Central Executive 
Committee, was particularly upset with the lack of information coming 
from the regions during the early phases of the public discussion of the draft 
Constitution, as without such reports it was impossible for central authori-
ties to monitor either the progress of the discussion or popular response.1 
In response to this dearth of information, Ivan Akulov, the secretary of 
the Central Executive Committee (TsIK), sent out a directive in August 
1936 with specific questions to be answered by the regional officials in their 
reports on the implementation of the popular discussion. 
The questions that Moscow presented to regional officials undoubtedly 
shaped the information supplied in the reports and how the documents, on 
which this work is based, portrayed discussion of the draft Constitution. 
The specified questions resulted in a great deal of information on topics 
such as criticism of local Soviet leaders, their actions, and enemies infiltrat-
ing both the discussion and various institutions. Because the regional and 
district officials were specifically asked to find this material, it is difficult 
to ascertain whether these issues were really of great local importance, or 
if the many examples were simply ways of fulfilling a central directive. In 
the case of both the criticism of local Soviets and of the enemy infiltration, I 
suspect they were less important to the people of the Kirov region than their 
presence in the documentation would imply, due to the repetition of the 
same six or seven incidents in many documents. This information may not 
have reflected the reality in the Kirov region, but it indicates the focus and 
concern of central officials. They wanted the discussion to be instrumental 
in purging incompetent people from the urban and rural soviets and feared 
a return of enemy elements, even as they enfranchised them in the draft 
Constitution. 
Additionally, most of the suggestions, additions, and corrections were 
collected and recorded by local and regional state and Party agencies, which 
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were under tremendous pressure to quickly collect additions and corrections 
and send them to the Central Executive Committee. Regional and local offi-
cials were often unable to complete such tasks efficiently or accurately, rais-
ing questions about the completeness and accuracy of the collected popular 
suggestions, which provide the bulk of the source material for Chapters 5 
and 6. 
The reported number of suggestions gathered and sent to Moscow from 
the Kirov region varied rather considerably. On November 22, 1936, the 
head of the Kirov Regional Executive Committee, Aleksandr Alekseevich 
Bobkov, reported a total of 4,288 suggestions gathered from the krai and sent 
to Moscow as of October 21.2 However, a report to the Central Executive 
Committee from the Organizational Section of the Kirov Regional Executive 
Committee dated November 10, 1936 noted that the Regional Executive 
Committee had received a total of 3,968 additions, corrections, and sug-
gestions to the draft Constitution.3 In the material from the district Party 
committees, district executive committees, city Party committees, Regional 
Party Committee, and Regional Executive Committee, I read 3,203 sugges-
tions, additions, and corrections to the draft Constitution. It is these 3,203 
suggestions from the Party and state archival sources in Kirov that form 
the basis for the book’s analysis. While this material represents the bulk of 
the additions and corrections gathered by Party and state representatives 
in the Kirov region, it is incomplete and is dependent on the accuracy with 
which those tasked with conducting the discussion of the draft Constitution 
gathered and recorded popular suggestions. Indubitably, many were never 
recorded or were lost. However, given the large number of suggestions that 
regional officials and the Central Committee deemed “incorrect,” I would 
suggest that the Kirov region’s popular suggestions accurately reflect the 
concerns of the people and were not consciously edited to fit the prevailing 
political narrative.
Inaccurate information about the discussion of the draft Constitution, 
however, poses a problem not just for historians delving into the past but 
also presented difficulty for the central state leadership who needed to mobi-
lize its people to face a myriad of problems at home and abroad. 
In the fall of 1936, the Central Committee expressed alarm about the com-
pleteness and accuracy of materials from the Kirov region. On November 
13, 1936, the Deputy Secretary of the Central Executive Committee, 
N. Novikov, sent a letter to the head of the Kirov Regional Executive 
Committee, Bobkov, accusing the Regional Executive Committee of mis-
handling suggestions and falsifying their reports to the Central Executive 
Committee. He stated: 
it is obvious that the compiling of additions and corrections to the draft 
Constitution in the Organizational Section of the Regional Executive 
Committee did not proceed without some problems as the statistical 
reports are very confusing and they had been made very tentatively as 
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the Regional Executive Committee doesn’t know the exact number of 
additions.4 
He believed that the Regional Executive Committee had tried to cover 
up their disorganization by lying. Novikov bluntly accused the Regional 
Executive Committee of using fictitious statistics (1,543 and 2,142 addi-
tions respectively) in place of the 219 suggestions on October 2 and 660 on 
October 10 that had been actually accounted for.5 He warned Bobkov that, 
“all of that whitewashing and cheating made your own situation awkward 
because of the deliberately false data given for your article in Pravda.”6 
Novikov demanded that Bobkov pay attention to the organization of the 
statistical report on suggestions and additions to the draft Constitution and 
also report what action he had taken to correct the problem.7
On November 22, Bobkov responded to Novikov’s accusations. Bobkov 
blamed local officials for the late compilation of some of the additions and 
suggestions, noting that, “there are around 900 suggestions that we have 
not yet sent because they were received late and because a portion of them 
aren’t relevant to the draft Constitution, but relate to the work of local 
organs of power.”8 He also detailed the process by which the additions and 
corrections from the Kirov region had been gathered into books and when 
they had been specifically sent to Moscow, “refut[ing] the fiction, which 
[Central Executive Committee] instructor Maslov reported to you, falsify-
ing the true state of affairs.”9 
This heated exchange between two bureaucrats highlights several impor-
tant aspects of the discussion of the draft Constitution. The incredibly nega-
tive reaction from the Central Executive Committee to what it viewed as 
incompetence and fraud demonstrated that the highest authorities in the 
Soviet Union cared about the popular suggestions and the feedback that 
its citizens offered. Novikov’s sharp rebuke to Bobkov, as well as Mikhail 
Kalinin and Ivan Akulov’s concern about poor responses from the regions 
and subsequent mandated reporting, highlight the seriousness with which 
the central authorities viewed this campaign in particular and the respon-
siveness of regional and local officials in general.10 Bobkov defended his 
people against the attack from the central authorities while simultaneously 
passing blame for late or incomplete reports onto local officials. This sort 
of blame-mongering was common in 1930s Soviet bureaucratic relations 
and was, at least in part, a function of the extreme pressures of the Stalinist 
period.11 The obvious friction between the Central Executive Committee’s 
representative, Inspector Maslov, and the Regional Executive Committee’s 
representative, Bobkov, also emphasized the conflicting goals and duties that 
splintered Soviet bureaucracy. The material covered in this book reveals the 
limits of Party and state power in that the state offices, be it at the national, 
regional, or local level, and corresponding Party organizations, could not 
always control or direct the discussion as they wished.
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1 GARF, f. 3316, оp. 8, d. 222, l. 36.
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8 GAKO, f. R-2168, op. 1, d. 473, l. 123.
9 GAKO, f. R-2168, op. 1, d. 473, l. 123.
10 J. Arch Getty and Oleg Naumov deal with the issue of regional and local com-
pliance and non-compliance with central state and Party demands in detail in 
The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932–
1939 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).
11 Larry Holmes deals with this culture of negativity in depth in Grand Theater: 




Article 1. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state of workers 
and peasants.
Article 2. The Soviets of Laboring People’s Deputies, which grew and 
attained strength as a result of the overthrow of the landlords and capital-
ists and the achievement of the dictatorship of the proletariat, constitute the 
political foundation of the USSR.
Article 3. In the USSR, all power belongs to the laboring people of the town 
and country as represented by the Soviets of Laboring People’s Deputies.
Article 4. The socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of 
the means and instruments of production, firmly established as a result of 
the abolition of the capitalist system of economy, the abolition of private 
ownership of the means and instruments of production, and the abolition 
of the exploitation of man by man, constitutes the economic foundation of 
the USSR.
Article 5. Socialist property in the USSR exists either in the form of state 
property (the possession of the whole people) or in the form of cooperative 
and collective-farm property (property of a collective farm or property of a 
cooperative association).
Article 6. The land, its natural deposits, waters, forests, mills, factories, 
mines, rail, water and air transport, banks, means of communication, large 
state-organized agricultural enterprises (state farms, machine and tractor 
stations, etc.), as well as municipal enterprises and primary housing stock 
in the cities and industrial centers, are state property; that is, they belong to 
the whole people.
Article 7. Social enterprises in collective farm and cooperative organiza-
tions with their living and inanimate stock, used in collective farm and 
The draft Constitution of the USSR
(As published in Pravda, June 12, 1936.  
This is the author’s translation.)
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cooperative organization production equally with their communal build-
ings, are property of the collective farms and cooperative organizations. 
Every collective farm household can have a small garden plot and personal 
property for subsidiary economic activity on the garden plot, productive 
livestock, fowl, and petty agricultural stock as specified in agreement with 
the charter of the artel’.
Article 8. The land occupied by collective farms is secured to them for an 
unlimited time, that is, in perpetuity.
Article 9. Alongside the socialist system of economy, which is the predomi-
nant form of economy in the USSR, the law permits the small private econ-
omy of individual smallholders and artisans based on their personal labor 
and precluding the exploitation of the labor of others.
Article 10. The right of citizens to personal ownership of their incomes from 
work and of their savings, of their dwelling houses and subsidiary household 
economy, their household furniture and utensils and articles of personal use 
and convenience, as well as the right of inheritance of personal property of 
citizens, is protected by law.
Article 11. The economic life of the USSR is determined and directed by 
the state national economic plan in the interest of increasing the public 
wealth, of steadily improving the material and cultural level of the labor-
ers, of consolidating the independence of the USSR, and strengthening its 
defensive capacity.
Article 12. Labor is considered the duty of every able citizen on the prin-
ciple: “he who does not work does not eat.” In the USSR, the principle of 




Article 13. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a unified state, formed 
on the basis of the voluntary association of Soviet Socialist Republics having 
equal rights, namely:
The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic;
The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic;
The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic;
The Azeri Soviet Socialist Republic;
The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic;
The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic; 
The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic;
The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic;
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The Tadjik Soviet Socialist Republic;
The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic;
The Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic.
Article 14. The jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as 
represented by its highest organs of state authority and organs of govern-
ment, covers:
a Representation of the Union in international relations, conclusion and 
ratification of treaties with other states;
b Questions of war and peace;
c Admission of new republics into the USSR;
d Control over the observance of the Constitution of the USSR and ensur-
ing conformity of the Constitutions of the Union Republics with the 
Constitution of the USSR;
e Approving the alterations of boundaries between Union Republics;
f Organization of the defense of the USSR and the leadership of all armed 
forces of the USSR;
g Foreign trade on the basis of state monopoly;
h Safeguarding the State security;
i Establishment of the national economic plans of the USSR;
j Approval of the single-state budget of the USSR, as well as of the taxes 
and revenues dealing with the educational all-Union, Republican, and 
local budgets;
k Administration of banks, industrial and agricultural establishments and 
enterprises, and trading enterprises of all-Union importance;
l Administration of transport and communications;
m Leadership of monetary and credit systems;
n Organization of state insurance;
o Raising and granting of loans;
p Establishment of the basic principles for the use of land as well as for 
the use of natural deposits, forests, and waters;
q Establishment of the basic principles in the areas of education and pub-
lic health;
r Organization of a uniform system of national economic statistics;
s Establishment of the principles of labor legislation;
t Legislation on the judicial system and judicial procedure; criminal and 
civil codes;
u Laws on union citizenship; laws on the rights of foreigners;
v Issuing of all-Union acts of amnesty.
Article 15. The sovereignty of the Union Republics is limited only within the 
provisions set forth in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR. Outside 
of these provisions, each Union Republic exercises state authority indepen-
dently. The USSR protects the sovereign rights of the Union Republics.
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Article 16. Each Union Republic has its own Constitution, which takes 
account of the specific features of the Republic and is formulated in com-
plete conformity with the Constitution of the USSR.
Article 17. The right freely to secede from the USSR is reserved for every 
Union Republic.
Article 18. The territory of a Union Republic may not be altered without 
its consent.
Article 19. The laws of the USSR have equal strength within the territory of 
every Union Republic.
Article 20. In the event of divergence between a law of a Union Republic 
and an all-Union law, the all-Union law prevails.
Article 21. For citizens of the USSR, a single Union citizenship is established. 
Every citizen of a Union Republic is considered a citizen of the USSR.
Article 22. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic consists of these 
regions (krai): Azovo-Black Sea region, the Far Eastern region, Western 
Siberian region, Kransoiarsk, Northern Caucasian region; (oblast’): 
Voronezh region, Eastern Siberian region, Gorky region, Western region, 
Ivanov region, Kalinin region, Kirov region, Kuibashev region, Kursk region, 
Leningrad region, Moscow region, Omsk region, Orenburg region, Saratov 
region, Sverdlovsk region, Northern region, Stalingrad region, Chliabinsk 
region, Yaroslavl region; Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics: Tartar 
republic, Bashkir republic, Dagestan, Buriat-Mongol republic, Kabardino-
Balkar republic, Kalmytsk republic, Karelia republic, Komi republic, 
Crimean republic, Marii republic, Mordovsk republic, Volga German 
republic, Northern Ossetia, Udmurt republic, Chechno-Ingushetia, Chuvash 
republic, Iakutia; Autonomous regions: Adygeisk region, Jewish region, 
Karachevsk region, Oirotsk region, Khakassk region, Cherkessk region.
Article 23. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic consists of the Vinnitsa, 
Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kiev, Odessa Kharkov, Chenigov regions, and 
Moldovsk Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic.
Article 24. The Azeri Soviet Socialist Republic includes the Nakhichevan 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the Nagorno-Karabakh 
Autonomous Region.
Article 25. The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic includes the Abkhazian 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the Adjar Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic, and the South Ossetian Autonomous Region.
Article 26. The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic includes the Kara-Kalpak 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.
Article 27. The Tadjik Soviet Socialist Republic includes the Gorno-
Badakhshan Autonomous Region.
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Article 28. The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic consists of the Aktyubinsk, 
Alma-Ata, East Kazakhstan, West Kazakhstan, Karaganda, and South 
Kazakhstan Regions.
Article 29. The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, Belorussian SSR, 
Turkmen SSR, and Kirgiz SSR don’t have any autonomous regions within 
their borders.
Chapter III
The highest organs of state power of the USSR
Article 30. The highest organ of state authority of the USSR is the Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR.
Article 31. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR exercises all rights conferred 
on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with Article 14 of 
the Constitution, insofar as they do not, by virtue of the Constitution, come 
within the jurisdiction of organs of the USSR that are accountable to the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR, that is, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
of the USSR, the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR, and the 
People’s Commissariats of the USSR.
Article 32. The legislative power of the USSR is exercised exclusively by the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
Article 33. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR consists of two Chambers: the 
Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities.
Article 34. The Soviet of the Union is elected by the citizens of the USSR on 
the basis of one deputy for every 300,000 people.
Article 35. The Soviet of Nationalities is elected by the citizens of the USSR, 
allocated by Union and Autonomous Republics and Soviets of Laborers 
Deputies of Autonomous Regions on the basis of ten deputies from each 
Union Republic, five deputies from each Autonomous Republic, and two 
deputies from each Autonomous Region.
Article 36. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR is elected for a term of four years.
Article 37. Both Chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Soviet of 
the Union, and the Soviet of Nationalities have equal rights.
Article 38. The Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities can in 
equal measure initiate legislation.
Article 39. A law is considered adopted if passed by both Chambers of the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR by a simple majority vote in each.
Article 40. Laws, passed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, are published 
with the signatures of the Chairman and Secretary of the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
Appendix 151
Article 41. Sessions of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities 
begin and end at the same time.
Article 42. The Soviet of the Union elects a Chairman of the Soviet of the 
Union and two Vice-Chairmen.
Article 43. The Soviet of Nationalities elects a Chairman of the Soviet of 
Nationalities and two Vice-Chairmen.
Article 44. The Chairmen of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of 
Nationalities preside over the sittings of the respective Chambers and direct 
the internal proceedings of these bodies.
Article 45. Joint meetings of both Chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the 
USSR are presided over alternately by the Chairman of the Soviet of the 
Union and the Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities.
Article 46. Sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR are convened by the 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR twice a year. Special sessions 
are convened by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR at its dis-
cretion or at the request of one of the Union Republics.
Article 47. In case of disagreement between the Soviet of the Union and the 
Soviet of Nationalities, the question is referred for settlement to a concilia-
tory commission formed on an equal basis. If the conciliation commission 
fails to arrive at an agreement, or if its decision fails to satisfy one of the 
Chambers, the question is considered for a second time by the Chambers. 
Failing agreement between the two Chambers, the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR dissolves the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and orders 
new elections.
Article 48. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR elects the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR at a joint sitting of both Chambers consisting 
of a Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 4 Vice-
Chairmen, a Secretary of the Presidium, and 31 members of the Presidium. 
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is accountable to the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR for all its activities.
Article 49. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR:
a Convenes the sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR;
b Interprets laws of the USSR currently in force, issues decrees;
c Dissolves the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in conformity with Article 47 
of the Constitution of the USSR and orders new elections;
d Conducts nationwide referendums on its own initiative or on the request 
of one of the Union Republics;
e Rescinds the decisions and orders of the Council of People’s Commissars 
of the USSR and of the Councils of People’s Commissars of the Union 
Republics in case they do not conform to law;
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f Between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, relieves of their 
posts and appoints individual People’s Commissars of the USSR 
on the recommendation of the Chairman of the Council of People’s 
Commissars of the USSR, subject to subsequent confirmation by the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR;
g Awards decorations and confers titles of honor of the USSR;
h Exercises the right of pardon;
i Appoints and removes the higher commands of the armed forces of 
the USSR;
j In the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 
proclaims a state of war in the event of armed attack on the USSR;
k Orders general or partial mobilization;
l Ratifies international treaties;
m Appoints and recalls plenipotentiary representatives of the USSR to for-
eign states;
n Accepts accredited diplomatic representatives from foreign states.
Article 50. The Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities elect 
Credentials Commissions that verify the credentials of the members of each 
Chamber. On the recommendation of the Credentials Commissions, the 
Chambers decide either to endorse the credentials or to annul the election of 
the individual deputies.
Article 51. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR, when it deems it necessary, 
appoints auditing commissions on any matter. It is the duty of all institu-
tions and public servants to comply with the demands of these commissions 
and to submit to them the necessary materials and documents.
Article 52. A deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR may not be pros-
ecuted or arrested without the consent of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 
and during the period when the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is not in session, 
without the consent of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
Article 53. At the end of the term of office or after the dissolution of the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR prior to the expiration of its term of office, the 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR retains its powers until the 
formation of a new Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR by the 
newly-elected Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
Article 54. At the end of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of the 
USSR, or in case of its dissolution prior to the expiration of its term of 
office, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR orders new elections 
to be held within a period not exceeding two months from the date of expi-
ration of the term of office or dissolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
Article 55. The newly-elected Supreme Soviet of the USSR is convened by 
the outgoing Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR not later than 
one month after the elections.
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Article 56. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR, at a joint sitting of both 
Chambers, appoints the Government of the USSR—the Council of People’s 
Commissars of the USSR.
Chapter IV
The highest organs of state authority of the Union Republics
Article 57. The highest organ of state power of a Union Republic is the 
Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic.
Article 58. The Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic is elected by the citizens 
of the Republic for a term of four years. The basis of representation is estab-
lished by the Constitution of the Union Republic.
Article 59. The Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic is the only legislative 
organ of the Republic.
Article 60. The Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic:
a Adopts the Constitution of the Republic and amends it in accordance 
with Article 16 of the Constitution of the USSR;
b Confirms the Constitutions of the Autonomous Republics forming part 
of it and defines the boundaries of their territories;
c Approves the national economic plan and also the Republic’s budget;
d Exercises the right of amnesty and pardon of citizens sentenced by the 
judicial organs of the Union Republic.
Article 61. The Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic elects the Presidium 
of the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic, consisting of a Chairman of 
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic, his deputy, and 
members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic. 
The powers of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic are 
defined by the Constitution of the Union Republic.
Article 62. The Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic elects a Chairman and 
Vice-Chairmen to conduct its meetings.
Article 63. The Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic appoints the Government 
of the Union Republic, namely, the Council of People’s Commissars of the 
Union Republic.
Chapter V
The organs of state administration of the USSR
Article 64. The highest executive and administrative organ of state power of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is the Council of People’s Commissars 
of the USSR.
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Article 65. The Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR is responsible 
to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and accountable to it.
Article 66. The Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR issues deci-
sions and orders on the basis and in pursuance of the laws in operation and 
supervises their execution.
Article 67. The decisions and orders of the Council of People’s Commissars 
of the USSR are binding throughout the territory of the USSR.
Article 68. The Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR:
a Coordinates and directs the work of the All-Union and Union-
Republican People’s Commissariats of the USSR and of other institu-
tions, economic and cultural, under its administration;
b Adopts measures to carry out the national economic plan and the state 
budget, and to strengthen the credit and monetary system;
c Adopts measures for the maintenance of public order, for the protec-
tion of the interests of the state, and for the safeguarding of the rights 
of citizens;
d Exercises general guidance in respect to relations with foreign states;
e Fixes the annual contingent of citizens to be called up for military ser-
vice and directs the general organization and development of the armed 
forces of the country.
Article 69. The Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR has the right, 
in respect of those branches of administration and economy which come 
within the jurisdiction of the USSR, to suspend decisions and orders of 
the Councils of People’s Commissars of the Union Republics and to annul 
orders and instructions of People’s Commissars of the USSR.
Article 70. The Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR is appointed by 
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and consists of:
The Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR;
The Vice-Chairmen of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR;
The Chairman of the State Planning Commission of the USSR;
The Chairman of the State Control Commission;
The People’s Commissars of the USSR;
The Chairman of the Procurement Commission;
The Chairman of the Committee on Arts;
The Chairman of the Committee on Higher Education.
Article 71. The Government of the USSR, or a People’s Commissar of the 
USSR to whom a question of a member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR 
Appendix 155
is addressed, must give a verbal or written reply to the respective Chamber 
within a period of not more than three days.
Article 72. The People’s Commissars of the USSR direct the branches of 
state administration which come within the jurisdiction of the USSR.
Article 73. The People’s Commissars of the USSR issue, within the lim-
its of the jurisdiction of the respective People’s Commissariats, orders and 
instructs on the basis and in accordance with the laws in operation, and also 
of decisions and orders of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR, 
and supervise their execution.
Article 74. The People’s Commissariats of the USSR are either All-Union or 
Union-Republican Commissariats.
Article 75. The All-Union People’s Commissariats direct the branches of 
state administration entrusted to them throughout the territory of the USSR 
either directly or through bodies appointed by them.
Article 76. The Union-Republican People’s Commissariats direct the 
branches of state administration entrusted to them through the correspond-
ing People’s Commissariats of the Union Republics.























The organs of administration of the Union Republics
Article 79. The highest executive and administrative organ of state author-
ity of a Union Republic is the Council of People’s Commissars of the 
Union Republic.
Article 80. The Council of People’s Commissars of a Union Republic is 
responsible to the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic and accountable 
to it.
Article 81. The Council of People’s Commissars of a Union Republic issues 
decisions and orders on the basis and in accordance with the laws in oper-
ation of the USSR and of the Union Republic, and of the decisions and 
orders of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR, and supervises 
their execution.
Article 82. The Council of People’s Commissars of a Union Republic 
has the right to suspend decisions and orders of Councils of People’s 
Commissars of Autonomous Republics, and to annul decisions and orders 
of Executive Committees of Soviets of Laborers’ Deputies of Regions and 
Autonomous Regions.
Article 83. The Council of People’s Commissars of a Union Republic is 
appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic and consists of:
The Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Union Republic;
The Deputy Chairmen;
The Chairman of the State Planning Commission;















The Representative of the Provision Committee;
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The Head of the Art Administration;
Representatives of All-Union People’s Commissariat.
Article 84. The People’s Commissars of a Union Republic direct the 
branches of state administration which come under the jurisdiction of the 
Union Republic.
Article 85. The People’s Commissars of a Union Republic issue, within the 
limits of the jurisdiction of their respective People’s Commissariats, orders 
and instructions on the basis and in accordance with the laws of the USSR and 
of the Union Republic, of the decisions and orders of the Council of People’s 
Commissars of the USSR and that of the Union Republic, and of the orders 
and instructions of the Union Republican People’s Commissariats of the USSR.
Article 86. The People’s Commissariats of a Union Republic are either 
Union-Republican or Republican Commissariats.
Article 87. The Union-Republican People’s Commissariats direct the 
branches of state administration entrusted to them and are subordinate both 
to the Council of People’s Commissars of the Union Republic and to the 
corresponding Union-Republican People’s Commissariats of the USSR.
Article 88. The Republican People’s Commissariats direct the branches of 
state administration entrusted to them and are directly subordinate to the 
Council of People’s Commissars of the Union Republic.
Chapter VII
The highest organs of state power of Autonomous  
Soviet Socialist Republics
Article 89. The highest organ of state authority of an Autonomous Republic 
is the Supreme Soviet of the ASSR.
Article 90. The Supreme Soviet of an Autonomous Republic is elected by the 
citizens of the Republic for a term of four years on the basis of representa-
tion established by the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic.
Article 91. The Supreme Soviet of an Autonomous Republic is the sole leg-
islative organ of the ASSR.
Article 92. Each Autonomous Republic has its own Constitution, which takes 
account of the specific features of the Autonomous Republic and is drawn 
up in complete accordance with the Constitution of the Union Republic.
Article 93. The Supreme Soviet of an Autonomous Republic elects the 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Republic and appoints 
the Council of People’s Commissars of the Autonomous Republic, in accord-
ance with its Constitution.
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Chapter VIII
The local organs of state power
Article 94. The organs of state authority in territories, regions, autonomous 
regions, areas, districts, cities, and rural localities (stations, villages, ham-
lets, kishlaks, auls) are the Soviets of Laborers’ Deputies.
Article 95. The Soviets of Laborers’ Deputies of territories, regions, autono-
mous regions, areas, districts, cities, and rural localities (stations, villages, 
hamlets, kishlaks, auls) are elected by the laborers of the respective territo-
ries, regions, autonomous regions, areas, districts, cities, or villages for a 
term of two years.
Article 96. The basis of representation for Soviets of Laborers’ Deputies is 
defined by the Constitutions of the Union Republics.
Article 97. The Soviets of Laborers’ Deputies direct the work of the organs of 
administration subordinate to them; maintain public order, the observance 
of the laws, and the protection of the rights of citizens; direct local economic 
and cultural organization and development; and draw up the local budgets.
Article 98. The Soviets of Laborers’ Deputies adopt decisions and issue 
orders within the limits of the powers vested in them by the laws of the 
USSR and of the Union Republic.
Article 99. The executive and administrative organs of the Soviets of 
Laborers’ Deputies of territories, regions, autonomous regions, areas, dis-
tricts, cities, and rural localities are the Executive Committees elected by 
them, consisting of a Chairman, his deputy, and members.
Article 100. The executive and administrative organ of rural Soviets of 
Laborers’ Deputies in small settlements, in accordance with the Constitutions 
of the Union Republics, is the Chairman and his deputy elected by them.
Article 101. The executive organs of the Soviets of Laborers’ Deputies 
are directly accountable both to the Soviets of Laborers’ Deputies 
that elected them and to the executive organ of the superior Soviet of 
Laborers’ Deputies.
Chapter IX
The courts and the procuracy
Article 102. In the USSR, justice is administered by the Supreme Court 
of the USSR, the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, the Territorial 
and the Regional courts, the courts of the Autonomous Republics and the 
Autonomous Regions, the special courts of the USSR established by decision 
of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the People’s Courts.
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Article 103. All court cases are tried with the participation of people’s asses-
sors, except in cases specially provided for by law.
Article 104. The Supreme Court of the USSR is the highest judicial organ. The 
Supreme Court of the USSR is charged with the supervision of the judicial 
activities of all the judicial organs of the USSR and of the Union Republics.
Article 105. The Supreme Court of the USSR and the special courts of the 
USSR are elected by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for a term of five years.
Article 106. The Supreme Courts of the Union Republics are elected by the 
Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics for a term of five years.
Article 107. The Supreme Courts of the Autonomous Republics are elected 
by the Supreme Soviets of the Autonomous Republics for a term of five years.
Article 108. The Territorial and the Regional courts and the courts of the 
Autonomous Regions are elected by the Territorial and Regional Soviets 
of Laborers’ Deputies or by the Soviets of Laborers’ Deputies of the 
Autonomous Regions for a term of five years.
Article 109. People’s Courts are elected by the citizens of the district on the 
basis of universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot for a term of 
three years.
Article 110. Judicial proceedings are conducted in the language of the 
Union Republic, Autonomous Republic, or Autonomous Region, with per-
sons not knowing this language being guaranteed every opportunity of fully 
acquainting themselves with the material of the case through an interpreter 
and likewise the right to use their own language in court.
Article 111. In all courts of the USSR, cases are heard in public, unless other-
wise provided for by law, and the accused is guaranteed the right to defense.
Article 112. Judges are independent and subject only to the law.
Article 113. Supreme supervision over the strict execution of the laws by 
all People’s Commissariats and institutions subordinated to them, as well 
as by public servants and citizens of the USSR, is vested in the Procurator 
of the USSR.
Article 114. The Procurator of the USSR is appointed by the Supreme Soviet 
of the USSR for a term of seven years.
Article 115. Procurators of Republics, Territories, and Regions, as well 
as Procurators of Autonomous Republics and Autonomous Regions, are 
appointed by the Procurator of the USSR for a term of five years.
Article 116. District procurators are appointed for a term of five years 
by the Procurators of the Union Republics, subject to the approval of the 
Procurator of the USSR.
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Article 117. The organs of the Procurator’s Office perform their functions 
independently of any local organs whatsoever, being subordinate solely to 
the Procurator of the USSR.
Chapter X
The fundamental rights and duties of citizens
Article 118. Citizens of the USSR have the right to work, that is, are guar-
anteed the right to employment and payment for their work in accordance 
with its quantity and quality. The right to work is ensured by the socialist 
organization of the national economy, the steady growth of the productive 
forces of Soviet society, the elimination of the possibility of economic crises, 
and the abolition of unemployment.
Article 119. Citizens of the USSR have the right to rest. The right to rest is 
ensured by the reduction of the working day to seven hours for the over-
whelming majority of the workers, the institution of annual vacations with 
full pay for workers and service workers, and the provision of a wide network 
of sanatoria, rest homes, and clubs for the accommodation of the laborers.
Article 120. Citizens of the USSR have the right to material security in old 
age and also in case of sickness or loss of capacity to work. This right is 
ensured by the extensive development of social insurance of workers and 
service workers at state expense, free medical service, and the provision of a 
wide network of health resorts for the use of the laborers.
Article 121. Citizens of the USSR have the equal right to education. This 
right is guaranteed by the existence of universal compulsory elementary 
education, free education up to higher school, a system of state stipends for 
the overwhelming majority of students in higher education, and state aid 
for instruction in schools in native languages, the organization in factories, 
state farms, machine tractor stations, and on collective farms of industrial-
technical and agricultural instruction for laborers.
Article 122. Women in the USSR are granted equal rights with men in all 
areas of economic, state, cultural, social, and political life. The ability to use 
these rights is guaranteed to women by granting them an equal right with 
men to work, payment for work, rest, social insurance, and education, and 
by state protection of the interests of mother and child, maternity leave with 
full pay, and the provision of a wide network of maternity homes, nurseries, 
and kindergartens.
Article 123. Equal rights of citizens of the USSR, irrespective of their 
nationality or race, in all areas of economic, state, cultural, social, and 
political life, is an inviolable law. Any direct or indirect restriction of the 
rights of, or, conversely, any establishment of direct or indirect privileges 
for, citizens on account of their race or nationality, as well as any advocacy 
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of racial or national exclusiveness or hatred and contempt, is punishable 
by law.
Article 124. In order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church 
in the USSR is separated from the state, and the school from the church. 
Freedom from religious cults and freedom from antireligious propaganda is 
recognized for all citizens.
Article 125. In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in 
order to strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the USSR are guar-
anteed by law:
a freedom of speech;
b freedom of the press;
c freedom of assembly and meetings;
d freedom of street processions and demonstrations.
These civil rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the laborers and 
their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the 
streets, communications facilities, and other material requisites for the exer-
cise of these rights.
Article 126. In accordance with the interests of the laborers, and in order 
to develop the organizational initiative and political activity of the masses 
of the people, citizens of the USSR are ensured the right to unite in public 
organizations—trade unions, cooperative associations, youth organizations, 
sport and defense organizations, cultural, technical, and scientific societies; 
and the most active and politically most-conscious citizens in the ranks of 
the working class and other sections of the laborers unite in the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union, which is the vanguard of laborers in their struggle 
to strengthen and develop the socialist system and is the leading core of all 
organizations of the laborers, both public and state.
Article 127. Citizens of the USSR are guaranteed the inviolability of their 
person. No one may be placed under arrest with the exception of a court 
order or with the sanction of the procurator.
Article 128. The inviolability of the homes of citizens and privacy of cor-
respondence are protected by law.
Article 129. The USSR grants the right of asylum to foreign citizens perse-
cuted for defending the interests of the laborers, or for their scientific activi-
ties, or for their struggle for national liberation.
Article 130. It is the duty of every citizen of the USSR to observe the 
Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to observe the 
laws, to maintain labor discipline, honestly to perform public duties, and to 
respect the rules of socialist conduct.
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Article 131. Every citizen of the USSR is obligated to take care of and 
strengthen social socialist property, as the sacred and inviolable foundation 
of soviet construction, as the source of wealth and power of the mother-
land, and as the source of a prosperous and cultural life for all laborers. 
People, encroaching on social socialist property, are considered enemies of 
the people.
Article 132. Universal military service is law. Military service in the Workers’ 
and Peasants’ Red Army is an honorable duty of the citizens of the USSR.
Article 133. The defense of the fatherland is the sacred duty of every citi-
zen of the USSR. Treason to the motherland—violation of the oath of alle-
giance, desertion to the enemy, impairing the military power of the state, 
and espionage for a foreign state are punishable with all the severity of the 
law as the most heinous of crimes.
Chapter XI
The electoral system
Article 134. The election of deputies to all Soviets of Laborers’ Deputies—
of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Supreme Soviets of the Union 
Republics, the Soviets of Laborers’ Deputies of the Territories and 
Regions, the Supreme Soviets of the Autonomous Republics, Soviets of 
Laborers’ Deputies of Autonomous Regions, and area, district, city, and 
rural (station, village, hamlet, kishlak, aul) Soviets of Laborers’ Deputies—
are conducted on the basis of universal, direct, and equal suffrage by 
secret ballot.
Article 135. Elections of deputies are universal: all citizens of the USSR who 
have reached the age of 18 have the right to participate in the election of 
deputies and to be elected, with the exclusion of insane people and those 
deprived of voting rights by the court.
Article 136. Elections of deputies are equal: each citizen has the right to vote 
and be elected irrespective of race or nationality, religion, educational and 
residential qualifications, social origin, property status, or past activities.
Article 137. Women have the right to vote and be elected on equal terms 
with men.
Article 138. Citizens serving in the Red Army have the right to vote and be 
elected on equal terms with all other citizens.
Article 139. Elections of deputies are direct: all Soviets of Laborers’ Deputies, 
from rural and city Soviets of Laborers’ Deputies to the Supreme Soviet of 
the USSR, are elected by the citizens by direct vote.
Article 140. Voting at elections of deputies is secret.
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Article 141. Candidates for election are nominated according to electoral 
areas. The right to nominate candidates is secured to public organizations 
and societies of the working people: Communist Party organizations, trade 
unions, cooperatives, youth organizations, and cultural societies.
Article 142. It is the duty of every deputy to report to the voters on his 
work and on the work of the Soviet of Laborers’ Deputies, and they may be 
recalled at any time in the manner established by law upon the decision of 
a majority of the electors.
Chapter XII
The coat of arms, flag, and capitol
Article 143. The coat of arms of the USSR consists of a sickle and hammer 
against a globe, surrounded by ears of grain, depicted in the rays of the sun, 
and with the inscription: “Workers of All Countries, Unite!” in the lan-
guages of the Union Republics. At the top of the arms is a five-pointed star.
Article 144. The state flag of the USSR is of red cloth, with the sickle and 
hammer depicted in gold in the upper corner near the staff, and above them 
a five-pointed red star bordered in gold. The ratio of the width to the length 
is 1:2.
Article 145. The capitol of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is the City 
of Moscow.
Chapter XIII
Procedure for changing the Constitution
Article 146. Changes to the Constitution can only occur upon the decision 
of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, adopted by a two-thirds majority in 
each house.
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